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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Economics of Statelessness and State Formation
Rau´l Sa´nchez de la Sierra
This dissertation empirically examines economic exchange in the absence of the state.
Analyzing stateless economies is important because traditional economic analysis focuses on
an environment in which states are able to enforce property rights, but functioning states
are anomalous in the development process and in many developing countries today (Bates,
2011). Standard notions and results of economics may thus not be useful for a large part of
the development process (Grossman, 1999). However, in the absence of the state, there is
also no systematic data collection capacity. There is therefore no econometric evidence of
stateless economies.
In order to observe economic exchange in the absence of a state, I focus on a present-
day collapsed state: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a foundation for this
dissertation, I managed a team of 12 surveyors, as well as a team of 20 traders to collect data
on economic exchange in areas of the Eastern provinces of the DRC that are removed from
the central state. Eastern DRC is a well suited location to observe economic behavior in the
absence of a functioning state, because the state is unable to operate in large areas. This is
a major reason why the DRC is considered the second weakest state in the world, as well as
a “failed state”.1 Lacking a state to protect property rights and provide a judicial system,
the economy in the East has organized informally. Non-state actors regularly use coercion
to define property rights. Contracts are enforced under the threat of social sanctions, or the
threat of violence by village armed men who administer disputes.
1Available rankings include Fund For Peace (2013).
I draw on this data to analyze economic exchange in the absence of a state. I use
standard economic analysis as well as econometrics but introduce different notions than the
ones on which traditional economic analysis usually relies (Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2011,
Grossman, 1999, Hirshleifer, 1995). Instead of assuming that property rights are stable, I
allow some agents to use coercion in order to define property rights over goods and labor
services. In anarchy, coercion can lead to large efficiency losses, since uncoordinated coercive
actors do not internalize the distortions they generate on the incentives of those who produce
(Grossman, 1999). This leads me to the question of Chapter 1: when will individuals with
a comparative advantage in coercion, organize violence in a particular location, and hold
a “monopoly of violence”? A dominant approach across disciplines views a “monopoly of
violence” as a sufficient characterization of the state. Furthermore, it traces state origins back
to coercion and organized crime in medieval Europe (Tilly, 1985). Therefore, the exercise
in Chapter 1 uncovers the economic forces that lead to the formation of states - whether
these monopolies of violence are recognized as states by the international community or not.
However, in doing so, I take the notion of the state as a “monopoly of violence” as given.
But is this a useful view of the state? Why should any monopoly of violence, even those
with purely criminal motives, act as states? Olson (1993) endows this view of the state
with theoretical foundations: since criminals who hold a monopoly of violence are partial
residual claimants through the taxes they collect, it is in their interest to protect economic
activity and promote growth. Indeed, by increasing economic activity they can increase the
tax revenues that they collect. In Chapter 2, I use empirical evidence to test the theoretical
foundations that underlie this dominant view of the state. I examine in detail the behavior of
village monopolies of violence held by armed men in DRC, and introduce economic analysis
to predict state-like behavior: optimal taxation, public goods provision, and popular support.
I go a step further to refine this view of the state as a “monopoly of violence”, and show
that it is only useful if the monopoly of violence’s time horizon is sufficiently long and the
monopoly of violence is uncontested. Once I have established empirically the economic causes
of state formation and the link between organized crime and states, I turn to the impact
of the state on economic organization. In Chapter 3, I implement a field experiment that
allows me to observe the impact of the penetration of the state legal system. I find that the
state legal system allows for an increase in trade, and does not crowd-out pre-existing social
mechanisms generating trust and trade. However, there are limits to the effectiveness of the
formal system of contract enforcement. I find that only the groups which have captured the
state benefit from the leverage provided by the legal system. This confirms the view of the
state as an organization that holds a monopoly of violence, but one which can be captured
by a subset of the population. In what follows, I describe each chapter in more detail.
In Chapter 1, I focus on the following question: when do states arise? A dominant view
across disciplines is that states arise when violent actors impose a “monopoly of violence” in
order to extract taxes (Tilly, 1985). One key fact underlies all existing studies: states precede
the existence of statistics. In this chapter, I provide the first econometric evidence on the
determinants of nascent states’ formation. I conducted fieldwork in areas of DRC removed
from the central state, managing a team that collected village-level panel data on armed
groups. I develop a model that introduces optimal taxation theory to the decision of armed
groups to form local “monopolies of violence”, and argue that the returns to such decision
hinge on their ability to tax the local population. A sharp, exogenous rise in the price of
a bulky commodity used in the electronics industry, coltan, leads armed groups to impose
a “monopoly of violence” in coltan villages. A later increase in the price of gold, easier
to conceal and hence more difficult to tax, does not. Results from auxiliary tests provide
additional support to the theory. The findings support the hypothesis that the expected
revenue from taxation, in particular tax base elasticity, is a determinant of state formation.
In Chapter 2, I go a step further, and test the theory associating monopolies of violence
to state-like behavior. A dominant view across disciplines defines states as a “monopoly of
violence” and argues that states are a developed form of successful organized crime. Is this a
useful view of the state? If current states are monopolies of violence and also engage in state-
like behavior, this may be the result of a long historical process unrelated to their “monopoly
of violence”. In this chapter, I examine this view of the state empirically. I provide one of the
first studies with econometric evidence linking criminal “monopolies of violence” to state-like
behavior. To observe the behavior of criminal “monopolies of violence”, I draw on the same
data collection exercise as in Chapter 1. I apply optimal taxation theory to armed groups, and
show that armed groups will tax and promote growth like states whenever their “monopoly
of violence” is uncontested. Based on this data, I find that criminal “monopolies of violence”
consistently provide public goods, develop popular support, and elaborate taxation schemes
consistent with optimal taxation and European medieval states. In addition, using the
timing of a peace agreement as an instrument for the presence of armed men in the village,
I establish that the village “monopolies of violence” have a positive impact on economic
activity. In 2003, a peace agreement (Sun-city agreement) led a large number of village
“monopolies of violence” to relocate, in order to integrate the national government. This led
to a security vacuum. I find that the vacuum caused by this peace agreement led to reductions
in economic activity. I then use the timing of a large scale military operation in order to
instrument for changes in the time horizon of existing village “monopolies of violence”, which
came under threat as a result of the military operation. I find that when their “monopoly of
violence” comes under threat, armed groups turn from partial expropriation through stable
taxation with full commitment, to full-scale violent expropriations. These findings support
the view that the origins and workings of states can be obtained from criminal “monopolies
of violence”, but only if they have a stable time horizon.
Having studied the causes that lead to the emergence of states, taxation and coercion,
in Chapter 3 I investigate how to take advantage of the state in order to increase trade in
contexts where distrust prevents trade to occur. Absent states to enforce contracts, societies
may develop group-based mechanisms to generate trade when commitment problems prevail
(Greif, 1993). However, groups are often fragmented. Can expanding access to the state
legal system complement social mechanisms of contract enforcement sustained by groups?
Or does legal intermediation by the state crowd them out? In this chapter, I provide evidence
on the impact of state contracts on trade. As a foundation for this chapter, I created a home
delivery business in DRC. Traders sell a domestic good in households of different ethnic
groups, and commit to deliver the good in the future. Shared ethnicity and formal contracts
are equally effective at increasing trade by sustaining trust. Furthermore, contracts do not
crowd-out ethnic group based mechanisms of trust production. Why do contracts increase
trust? Results from a last experiment suggest that contracts are enforceable. However,
they only protect claimants of ethnic groups that have captured the state administration.
These findings suggest that even the state apparatus is embedded in the social structure,
and expanding the reach of the state may have positive welfare effects, only for the groups
that have vested control in the state institutions.
Each of the three chapters is self-contained, so a reader interested in only one of these
parts can focus on only one chapter. Each chapter contains an overview of the context
relevant for that chapter. There are overlaps in the descriptions of the context. Chapters
one and two are based on the same data collection exercise, but focus on different variables.
Chapter 3 draws on a different field experiment.
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Chapter 1
On the Origins of States:
Stationary Bandits and Taxation in
Eastern Congo
Rau´l Sa´nchez de la Sierra
21.1 Introduction
Without states, coercion can be used in order to expropriate goods and services. Uncoor-
dinated expropriations by actors with access to means of violence can cause large efficiency
losses (Grossman, 1999, Hirshleifer, 1995).1 Indeed, anthropologists have documented that
prior to states, levels of arbitrary violence were unusually high. Coordinating coercion, thus,
can lead to large welfare gains. When will individuals with a comparative advantage in co-
ercion organize violence in a particular location, and hold a ”monopoly of violence”? Since
a dominant view across social sciences defines the state as a “monopoly of violence” and
empasizes its criminal origins, this question uncovers the process of state formation. This
is important: social scientists across disciplines refer to this process as the “Great Transfor-
mation” (Bates, 2011) because of its impact on development and violence. It is precisely in
a “failed state”, the Democratic Republic of Congo, where millions of persons have died in
recent years as a consequence of the arbitrary use of violence by armed groups.2
Why do states arise? Historical accounts of state formation trace its origins to territorial
conquests by medieval lords.3 A dominant view is that states arise when armed organiza-
tions, lords and bandits, impose a “monopoly of violence” in their locality in order to collect
tribute and finance wars (Tilly, 1985). Olson (1993) endowed this view of the state with
theoretical foundations. He develops a criminal metaphor of states, comparing states to
1“Throughout history the responses of human societies to the problems of distributing property and of
allocating resources between productive and appropriative activities probably have had greater consequences
for welfare than have their responses to the problem of allocating resources among different productive activ-
ities taking property as given, which is the problem on which economic analysis traditionally has focused.”
(Grossman, 1994)
2See I.R.C. (2007). According to Fund For Peace (2013), the DRC is the second weakest state after
Somalia.
3“The trimmed-down argument stresses the interdependence of war making and state making and the
analogy between both of those processes and what, when less successful and smaller in scale, we call organized
crime. War makes states, I shall claim.” (Tilly, 1985)
3“stationary bandits”. Stationary bandits own the monopoly of violence, and thus promote
growth in order to tax it, in contrast to “roving bandits”, who engage in uncoordinated
expropriations and discourage economic activity.
A fundamental fact is that prior to the state, there are generally no statistics. There is
therefore no formal statistical evidence on the process, let alone the causes of state origins.
In this paper, I provide econometric evidence on the determinants of the formation of
“monopolies of violence”. I develop a theory that draws on the theory of optimal taxation to
explain armed groups’ decision to form “monopolies of violence”. If medieval lords formed
states in order to collect taxes, the choice to form a state must depend on their expected
ability to tax. The key insight of the model is that an increase in the value of output in-
creases the returns to form a state, but less so if output cannot be taxed. I test this theory
using a novel dataset on armed groups in 140 villages of Eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo removed from state control. My results suggest that a positive demand shock on a
bulky mineral, coltan, leads armed groups to acquire villages endowed with coltan, and hold
a monopoly of violence, where they develop taxation systems. A later demand shock on
gold, easier to conceal and hence more difficult to tax, does not have this effect in villages
endowed with gold.
As a foundation for this study, I managed a team of data collectors in remote and war-
torn areas of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in order to collect a village-level panel
dataset of yearly activity of armed groups. The data allows me to identify types of violence
(territorial conquests and pillage of assets), the formation and collapse of monopolies of vi-
olence at the village level, as well as taxation by armed groups on economic activities in the
village since 1995.
Eastern Congo is an ideal environment to examine the process that precedes the forma-
tion of the state by criminal actors. The Democratic Republic of Congo state is considered
4one of the world’s two weakest states, as well as a “failed state”; its authority is challenged
by armed groups who have proliferated in the East.4 Armed groups fight to control territory,
in which they administer “monopolies of violence”, collect taxes, provide public goods, and
even enjoy popular support, exactly as in historical accounts of European state formation.5
In the main result of the paper, I find that armed groups respond to an increase in the
price of coltan by conquering coltan villages, where they establish a monopoly of violence
and start collecting regular taxes, especially on mining activity. To establish a causal rela-
tionship I exploit a drastic demand shock for coltan. In the year 2000, innovations in the
video-games industry led the demand for columbite-tantalum (coltan) to skyrocket.6 The
US price of coltan rose abruptly from 90 US$ per kilogram to 590 US$ per kilogram at the
start of the year, and collapsed at the end of the year. The effect of this global demand
shock is concentrated in villages where coltan can easily be traded: those in the proximity
of local airports.
In the second result of the paper, I find that armed groups do not fight over the control
of gold villages, and do not create “monopolies of violence” in response to an increase in the
price of gold. To establish a causal relationship, I exploit a large rise on the price of gold.
Following September 11th and the resulting 2001-2002 global recession, a rush for gold as a
safe haven induced the price of gold to rise sharply.
This paper’s findings have important implications for theory and policy. The findings
provide an economic explanation for the origin of states. They expand a large body of work
in economics that emphasizes the role of states and institutions on economic growth and
4See United Nations Security Council (2002), Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani (2011), Stearns (2011) and
Verweijen (2013). See also the RRMP program evaluation reports http://www.rrmp.org.
5See Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014a).
6See United Nations Security Council (2002), Nest (2011), Stearns (2011).
5explains state choices as economic calculations (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Acemoglu,
Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2006, Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002, Besley and Persson, 2009, Gross-
man, 1997, North and Weingast, 1989). However, the process of state formation precedes the
existence of statistics. The causes that lead to the formation of the state, hence, rest on weak
empirical bases. By establishing empirically a causal link from potential tax revenues to the
formation of nascent states at the village level, this paper is the first to provide econometric
evidence on the process and causes of state formation.
My findings also contribute to existing scholarship outside of economics.7 Voluntaris-
tic theories argue that states emerged as a result of a mutually beneficial social contract
(Hobbes, 1651, Rousseau, 1762). On the other hand, conflict theories of state formation,
which are the dominant view, compare the origin of states to organized crime. They suggest
that states imposed monopolies of violence by coercion during episodes of war and conquest
(Carneiro, 1970, Olson, 1993, Tilly, 1985). My data allows me to go a step ahead of this
literature. I first use optimal taxation theory to explain why organizations of violence would
form “monopolies of violence” in certain locations and not others, and then test the predic-
tions using formal statistical methods.
Historical accounts of European state formation suggest that the growth of trade allowed
states to develop (Ardant, 1975). Since much of trade is observable, it can readily be taxed.
I find that price shocks give rise to local states particularly around trade routes. My re-
sults, therefore, enrich this strand of literature with disaggregated econometric evidence. In
a related literature, population mobility is argued to weaken the ability of states to collect
taxes and hence to arise (Carneiro, 1970, Herbst, 2011, Scott, 2009). This paper generalizes
the problem of factors’ mobility into a taxation problem, where the local tax authority, the
7The literature on state formation is separated between early and modern state formation. The literature
on early state formation is reviewed in Claessen and Van de Velde (1991) and Claessen and Skalnik (2011).
6stationary bandit, faces tax bases that can avoid taxes with varying degrees. My findings
suggest that the ability of gold producers to hide output is a key barrier to taxation by
armed groups. They thus join existing scholarship which emphasizes that population mobil-
ity reduces the likelihood that states form. Therefore, in this paper, I test and refine existing
theories of state formation in anthropology, sociology, political science, and economics.
This paper also joins a growing civil-war literature. Blattman and Miguel (2010) conclude
that the study of civil war is limited by the absence of high quality disaggregated data. I
collected a large, detailed dataset on armed groups’ behavior, thus, expanding the empirical
basis of the civil war literature. Drawing on this novel dataset, I find that demand for labor
intensive commodities increases violence, aimed at establishing taxation monopolies (unlike
pillages). However, Dube and Vargas (2013) find that a rise in the price of a labor intensive
commodity increases the returns to productive activities, hence decreases participation in
violence. By introducing taxation to the set of armed groups’ choices previously considered
and refining the types of violence, I can provide a new explanation for violence. This paper
also complements Weinstein (2007), who proposes a theory where the ability to recruit sol-
diers determines violence. Last, this paper also joins a growing body of empirical work in
the study of civil war (Besley and Persson, 2008, Dube and Naidu, 2010, Dube and Vargas,
2013, Nunn and Qian, 2012). To establish causality, I exploit the timing of large price shocks
and political events.
While the state-formation literature takes organized violence as given, the civil war liter-
ature explains the motives that lead individuals to engage in violence (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004, Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006, Weinstein, 2007). In this paper, I link these two
strands of literature by providing an explanation for why actors that engage in violence may
organize violence in a particular location, leading to “monopolies of violence”.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the setting and
7Section 1.3 presents the theory. Section 1.4 describes the data and data collection strategy
and Section 1.5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 1.6 examines the effect of price
shocks on armed groups’ acquisition and formation of monopolies of violence. Section 1.7
provides a brief discussion and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Background
As a result of the collapse of the central state, armed groups in the Democratic Republic of
Congo have proliferated since the 1990’s.8 To finance their operations, they collect taxes on
the mineral sector and other activities. Currently, there are 39 identified armed groups.
1.2.1 The conflicts
This study spans two historical phases: the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and the “post-
conflict” period (2003-2013).
The Second Congo War (1998-2003) involved a large number of armed groups, and is
referred to as the “Great African War”. In 1998, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la
De´mocratie (RCD) launched an offensive to overthrow the former DRC president in office,
Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila.9 The coup did not succeed, but a myriad of RCD units sustained the
control of the Eastern provinces, while the Congolese state defended the West. The RCD
struggled to dominate the rural areas, where it faced resistance by the self-defense groups
known as the Mayi-Mayi and by the Forces De Libe´ration du Rwanda (FDLR). These groups
formed temporary alliances, but they were internally divided. The war also involved the par-
ticipation of nine foreign armies and thirty local militia, who fought mostly in the east of
8The Democratic Republic of Congo was named Zaire until 1997.
9The First Congo War lasted from 1996 to 1997. It ended with the overthrow of President Mobutu.
8the country.
Despite the support from the UN Peacekeeping force (MONUSCO), in the “post-conflict”
period (2003-2013), the Congolese state struggled to regain control over the Eastern Provinces.
Following a peace agreement signed in Sun-City (South-Africa) in 2003, the Rassemblement
Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD) agreed to vacate the East of the Congo and integrate
the national government. The subsequent withdrawal of the RCD in 2003 and 2004 left large
areas in the East without protection. Following the departure of the RCD, the Forces De
Libe´ration du Rwanda (FDLR) and local self defense groups progressively increased their
territorial control. Only in 2009, the Congolese army, together with the United Nations
peacekeeping force and Rwanda, led a major operation against the FDLR. This operation,
named Kimia II, successfully weakened the link between the FLDR and its former tax base,
although it failed to eradicate it. Armed groups continue to operate in the East, where they
control up to 95% of the territory in some administrative divisions.10 Between May 2012
and November 2013, a new armed group, the M23, established its own administration in a
large territory, creating its own Ministries. Ideology, self-defense, and especially economic
interests motivate these groups.11
1.2.2 The mining sector
Armed groups developed economic interests during the Second Congo War, which persisted
during the post-conflict period. One of their major source of revenues is the taxation of
10In Shabunda, an administrative divsion in Sud-Kivu that this survey visited, the Raia-Mutombokis con-
trol 95% of the territory. See for instance http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/02/28/shabunda-la-milice-
raia-mutomboki-occupe-95-du-territoire-selon-son-administrateur/
11See the following historical accounts: Clark (2002), Nest (2011), Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani (2011),
Ngonzola-Ntalaja (2002), Stearns (2011), Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005), Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers
(2004), Van Reybrouck (2008), Autesserre (2006), Autesserre (2007), Autesserre (2008), Verweijen (2013).
9mineral trade.
Extraction of minerals in Eastern Congo is labor intensive, and is a major livelihood of
the local population. World Bank (2008) estimates that there are between 500,000 and 2
millions artisanal miners in DRC, responsible for 90 % of DRC mineral production. Heavy
minerals, with high volume productivity of labor (coltan, cassiterite), coexist with light
minerals (gold), which are harder to find and, thus, to produce. So-called artisanal mining
requires minimal capital and skills. After miners have extracted the heavy minerals, they
hand them over to carriers, usually in bags of 50 kilograms. Carriers walk up to one day
to the closest village (support village), where local traders purchase the output. Owing to
the large volumes produced and a poor road infrastructure, traders ship heavy minerals to
Bukavu and Goma by plane. Since trade is vulnerable to pillage, armed groups provide
security and collect taxes along the carrier’s route. They play a central role in the protection
of business (Verweijen, 2013). Gold output, however, is easy to conceal. Because of its large
value to weight ratio, gold miners conceal the gold output they are able to find. Miners and
traders smuggle gold directly through Burundi, Bukavu or Uvira, circumventing taxes, and
Congolese border customs. According to World Bank (2008) estimates, the value of gold
exports is US$125 million, most of which is smuggled. A central feature across minerals is
that armed groups provide security and collect taxes at the mine as well as on other economic
activity at the village.12
De jure, property rights are poorly defined. Land belongs to village chiefs according to
customary law, who then lease it out to individuals.13 Formal law, however, often contradicts
12The average world price per kilogram of gold in the period was US$17,404, against US$136 for coltan.
Daily production per worker is approximately 20 kg in coltan, and between 1 and 10 grams in gold. See De
Failly (2001), De Koening (2009), Nest (2011), Geenen (2013) and Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004) for
descriptions of the mineral sector.
13The Congolese legal system comprises “customary” law, which is the law inherited from local customs.
According to customary law, the village chief is the ultimate authority in the village and owner of the land.
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traditional law. A large number of state or quasi-state agencies, including criminal groups,
tax miners’ activity in seemingly arbitrary ways. De facto, however, the production pro-
cess is highly organized, with a well-defined hierarchy. Mining workers are usually residual
claimants. Taxes are anticipated, and armed groups often cooperate with the population by
offering protection in exchange for taxes. Since production is labor intensive, armed groups
rarely mine themselves, but tax miners instead.
In the period for which I have data, the mining sector was affected by two price shocks.
First, at the start of 2000, Playstation, a subsidiary of Sony, announced the release for
Christmas of a new promising product, which processed columbite-tantalum (coltan). Since
coltan extraction, mostly done in Australia by the year 2000, required large investments,
supply was inelastic. In response to the announcement, coltan processing firms rushed for
coltan from other areas, leading the daily price of coltan to skyrocket from $90 per kilogram
to $590 per kilogram, where it persisted until year end. The DRC emerged as a major sub-
stitute of Australia’s coltan. Second, following 9/11 and the economic downturn, investors
rushed for safe assets, including for gold. This led the price on gold to rise in the aftermath
of the crisis of 2002, which continued to rise during the post-conflict period (2004-2013).
Figure 1.6 shows the world prices of gold and coltan.14
1.3 A theory of stationary bandits
In this section, I develop a model where an armed group (henceforth, the bandit) can acquire
resources by taxing households’ activities. The objective of the model is to elicit how the
bandit’s ability to tax determines the returns to acquiring monopolies of violence in order to
14See Nest (2011), Stearns (2011), and United Nations Security Council (2002) for evidence on the coltan
shock.
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tax. Empirically, the main causal effect of interest is the effect of mineral demand on armed
groups choice to establish or quit taxation monopolies. The model generates three insights.
First, an increase in global demand for minerals that are easy to tax (coltan) increases
the returns to acquire a monopoly of violence (P1). Second, an increase in global demand
increases the returns of taxation monopolies especially in areas where output can be traded
(P1
′
). Third, an increase in global demand for minerals that can easily be concealed, and
hence harder to tax, results in a weaker effect on the returns to acquire taxation monopolies
(P2). The model thus applies established results of optimal taxation to the decision to
form proto-states. The model is similar to Besley and Persson (2013), although it ignores
dynamics. The tax base elasticity can refer to the population mobility across villages, which
has played a central role in historical accounts of state development in Africa (Herbst, 2011),
and East Asia (Scott, 2009). Tax base elasticity also captures general mobility of factors of
production, emphasized in Bates, Ndulu, O’Connell, Collier, and Soludo (2008) and Bates
and Lien (1985).
Anecdotal observation dictates the following modeling choices. First, the model considers
taxes on inputs and outputs. Armed groups indeed levy taxes on mineral output, taxes on
mining labor inputs, taxes on food sales, taxes on transit of persons, taxes on village mills and
poll taxes. I focus on labor taxes and output taxes for parsimony, and because they capture in
essence the behavioral responses in all other activities. Second, the model considers a static
framework where bandits can choose between acquiring civilian assets through uncoordinated
pillage or instead attempt to impose a “monopoly of violence”, in which case they may extract
revenue through taxation, which is announced and anticipated. These extreme forms of
expropriation also reflect the anecdotal observation of armed groups’ behavior in Eastern
Congo. Of 600 recorded detailed violent events in the sample villages, 56% are pillage
operations, aimed at capturing village assets. Another 40% are conquest attempts, aimed
12
at gaining the monopoly of violence in a village, by defeating a competing armed group.
Once established, armed groups collect taxes. Figure 1.1 supports the empirical distinction
between the two types of expropriation. The figure shows that conquests take place early
in the morning, possibly to surprise the defense force, and pillage operations take place
at sunset, consistent with a crime deterrence hypothesis (Becker, 1968). Finally, I ignore
strategic interactions, because in the period of the coltan shock, one armed group dominates
the rest militarily. I discuss limitations of doing so in Section 1.7.3.
1.3.1 Model setup
Consider one village economy and a mass of roving bandits. roving bandits engage in uncoor-
dinated expropriation of households’ assets and output. They are roving because they have
a short time horizon, and do not internalize future production in the village. One bandit,
however, has superior force, and can choose to impose his “monopoly of violence” in the
village, turning into a stationary bandit. If he acts as stationary bandit, he announces his
theft plan to households (a tax plan) so as to maximize his taxation revenue. The village is
composed of k of identical households, j = 1, 2, ..., k. In what follows, I drop the household
identifiers. Households are endowed with assets and choose the level of the following vari-
ables in N sectors i = 1, 2, . . . , n: labor supply, the amount of labor to hide from the tax on
labor, and the volumes of output to hide from the tax on output. The stationary bandit is
a Stackelberg leader and households are uncoordinated followers.
At step 0, the strong bandit chooses whether to compete over village assets by means
of pillaging (as a roving bandit) or to acquire the monopoly of expropriation at the village
(become a stationary bandit), at a fixed cost F. The fixed cost captures the costs incurred
in the attempt to conquer the village (waging troops, logistics, and expected losses for the
group), the investments made to maintain the control of the village, and potentially, the
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costs of administering the village. At step 1, the stationary bandit expropriates. If, in step
0, the strong bandit chooses to acquire resources by pillaging, he competes with other roving
bandits for expropriation. For simplicity, I assume that roving bandits, since they do not
have a long term relationship with households, can’t commit not to fully expropriate village
assets and output. When there are only roving bandits, therefore, households anticipate
that they will be expropriated with probability 1 and do not produce. Therefore, roving
bandits can only acquire household assets. If, in step 0, the strong bandit chooses instead
to acquire the monopoly of violence (and becomes a stationary bandit), I assume he is able
to develop a relationship with the households that allows him to commit to his promise of
theft.15 The stationary bandit expropriates using taxes on output τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn), taxes
on labor inputs t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn). He announces how much he plans to steal (tax) such as
to maximize his revenues taking into account behavioral responses by the households. I first
present the households’ and stationary bandit’s problems in step 1, when the strong bandit
has acquired the monopoly of violence. I then derive comparative statics of the effect of
price shocks on the bandit’s choice to acquire a monopoly of violence.
1.3.2 The stationary bandit’s economy
This section lays out the optimization problems of households and the stationary bandit,
and discusses under which conditions it will not be possible to tax gold output.
15The assumption of binding commitment by the stationary bandit reflects features of a repeated relation-
ship between the bandit and households. Without this assumption, the bandit will never be able to commit
and will always expropriate 100% after production. Anticipating this, the households would not produce.
However, this scenario leads back to anarchy. Analogous behavior can be obtained by simply introducing a
cost in the bandit’s payoff from deviating from the taxation plan. For similar treatment of the future, see
Dixit (2004)
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Optimization problems of the households and the stationary bandit
Labor volume productivity, α˜ ∈ Rn, is stochastic, and has the cumulative distribution func-
tion F (α˜). The sector volume productivities, α˜i ∈ R are independent across sectors, and
have a known cumulative distribution function Fi(α˜i). Output in sector i, y˜i is a linear func-
tion of labor inputs and volume productivity: y˜i = α˜iei. Households are residual claimants.
They sell the output they produce in the world markets, where the prices of outputs, pi, are
exogenous. Households’ Bernoulli utility is concave in the unique consumption good, and
the dis-utility from labor, c(e), is separable across sectors as well as convex in each sector
labor supply.
Prior to the realization of uncertainty, but knowing the distribution of volume labor
productivities and the vectors of taxes and prices, the households choose how much labor
to supply to each sector ei, i = 1, 2, ...n and how much labor to hide from labor taxes
eHi , i = 1, 2, ...n. Then, upon observing realized production, households choose the volume
of output they conceal from taxes Hi, i = 1, 2, ...n, given the sector tax on output τi and the
output price pi. The stationary bandit expropriates after households have allocated labor
supply, hidden labor, and concealed output.
Households’ revenues from production in sector i take the following form:
pii = (1− τi)piα˜iei + τipiHi − ti
(
ei − eHi
)−Gi(Hi, pi)− Ei (eHi , pi)
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where L is the household’s total time endowment, and α˜ ∈ Rn is the vector of labor
productivity realizations. The problem is akin to a portfolio allocation problem, albeit
here the household allocates its labor to sectors with uncertain volume productivities α˜i;
investment is costly (the dis-utility of labor supply); investment is taxed (the taxes on labor
inputs); the returns to investment are taxed (the taxes on output); and the household can
conceal part of the returns to investment (by concealing output). The household’s first order
condition implies conditions under which the household will conceal the totality of output
produced. For a given combination of taxes, prices, labor supply, and volume productivity
realization, the household will conceal all output produced if and only if the marginal revenue
from concealing an additional unit exceeds its marginal cost, i.e. when τipi > G
i
1(α˜iei, pi). In
that case, the optimal volume concealed is a function of τi, pi, ei, but also of the productivity
realization α˜i, i.e. H
∗
i = Hi(pi, α˜iei, τi). However, when the household conceals only part of
the output he produced (at interior solutions), the volume concealed is independent on the
realization, i.e. H∗i = Hi(pi, τi). The volume concealed, as a function of realized output has
the shape represented in Figure 1.2. The household’s optimal choice is characterized by the
following functions: e∗i (p, Fα, τ, t), e
H∗
i (pi, ti), H
∗
i (pi, α˜iei, τi). The sector i labor supply, e
∗
i ,
is decreasing in pj, ∀j 6= i. In the absence of income effects, it is increasing in pi and in Eαi.
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Finally, with sufficient prudence (large u′′′), e∗j is decreasing in V ar(αj).
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The stationary bandit chooses taxes to maximize his tax revenue.17 Since taxes are
communicated to households before they make their choices, the stationary bandit internal-









i (p, Fα, τ, t)−H∗i (pi, α˜iei, τi))− t
(
e∗i (p, Fα, τ, t)− eH∗i (pi, ti)
)]
When input taxes are not available, the revenue maximizing tax rates on output (optimal


















is the elasticity of observable output in the sector, and Y˜i = (αiei −Hi) pi. Define
sei =
αiei













i . This formula
16This reflects the standard precautionary savings motive.
17If the bandit would instead maximize a social welfare function, such as a Bergson-Samuelson functional,
the optimal taxes would lie between the revenue maximizing taxes and zero. Revenue maximizing optimal
taxes can be derived from the maximization of a social welfare function when the weighted average of the
social marginal utilities is zero. For a review of the optimal taxation literature, see Salanie (2011) and
Piketty and Saez (2012).
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captures that the optimal tax is proportional to the inverse of factor elasticities, a well-
established result of optimal taxation (Ramsey, 1927). In the absence of distributional
concerns, the indexes of relative discouragement do not enter the optimal tax formula. The
higher the elasticity of the sector’s taxable output, the smaller the optimal tax rate. The last
term in the denominator captures the fiscal externalities arising in the presence of multiple
taxable activities. Increasing the tax rate in sector l might induce reallocation of labor to
other sectors raising the optimal tax.
The impossibility to tax gold output
“Gold is immaterial. We cannot see it.” Interview with armed group member
While a worker in coltan mines might produce up to 50 kilograms of coltan per day, a
typical day of work in gold yields between 0.1 and 10 grams of gold output. In the absence
of sophisticated monitoring technology, concealing gold output must be costless (Geenen,
2013). This feature of gold production is reflected on this project’s qualitative fieldwork.
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence on gold mines elsewhere, shows that employers frequently
use X-rays to monitor gold miners and prevent theft.18 The majority of villages in Eastern
Congo is not electrified, and importing X-rays is unlikely to be affordable. Armed groups’
inability to monitor gold output is therefore an important characteristic affecting the choice
whether to become the stationary bandit at gold mines in response to price shocks. In what
follows i = g denotes the gold sector.
Assumption G1: Let Hi ∈ R such that ∀Hi < Hi, Gi1(Hi, pi) = 0. Let αg = sup{Ag},
18“A[...]workers at the end of their shift are ushered into a corridor surrounded by glass and monitored by
video cameras. Security guards carefully pick through the workers clothes and give them random full body
X-ray.” See: http://factsanddetails.com/world.php?itemid=1235 & subcatid=324.
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where Ag is the set of gold volume labor productivity realizations. I assume that: αgL ≤ Hi.
Assumption G2: Let Fi be the fixed cost of levying an output tax on sector i. I assume
that the expected volume productivity of labor in gold, Eα˜g, is sufficiently low, so that
the expected returns from taxing output are lower than the fixed cost of taxing output:
τ ∗g pgE (α˜geg −Hg) < Fg.19
Proposition 1: Under assumption G1, ∀τi > 0, H∗i = α˜iei. Under assumption G2, τ ∗i = 0.
Assumption G1 fits the anecdotal evidence, and guarantees that it is optimal to conceal
any output realization in gold. Under assumption G1, a tax on gold output is irrelevant.
Assumption G2 guarantees that it is not profitable to tax gold output. Assumptions G1 and
G2 are therefore both plausible and separately sufficient conditions for τ ∗g = 0. This result is
non-trivial: while lower average volume labor productivity Eα˜i leads to lower output taxes,
it does not necessarily lead to absence of output taxes, as can be seen from Equation 2.1.20
1.3.3 Main predictions: Prices and monopolies of violence
The strong bandit will choose to impose a monopoly of violence if:
p˜iV (p, Fα, a0)− F > Vr
19This assumes that the left hand side is increasing in Eα˜g. From the first order conditions, it can be
seen that eg is increasing in Eα˜g in the absence of income effects, and Hg is independent on α˜g at an interior
solution. Finally, under the same assumptions, from equation 2.1, τ∗g is increasing in Eα˜g.
20In particular, the optimal volume concealed H∗i is a function of τi. Concealing all realized output for
any τi is only possible if ∀τi > 0: τipi > Gi1(α˜iei, pi) . However, under the assumption that Gi1 > 0, ∀Hi,
there exists always some τi (α˜iei) > 0, such that ∀τi < τi (α˜iei), H∗i < α˜iei. It must therefore be that there
is either a fixed cost of imposing a tax, or that the marginal cost of hiding is approximately zero at low levels
of volume produced.
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Where p˜i = piβ is the effective discount factor. The term pi is the probability that the
stationary bandit maintains the monopoly of violence until production realizes, and β is the
time preference. As above, let i = c denote the coltan sector, i = g denote the gold sector,
and e˜ = ei − eHi the observable labor input in sector i. Assume a village is endowed only




















This expression shows that a rise in the output price increases the revenues from becom-
ing a stationary bandit in the village through three distinct channels. First, it raises the
value of output taxed, for a given level of output volume and tax level. Second, by leading
to an increase in labor supply, it increases the volume of output produced, and hence the
value of output taxed. Finally, since labor supply increases, the price shock also increases
the revenues from taxing labor inputs. In gold villages, only the third channel changes the
revenues to the bandit. The relative effects in gold and coltan depend on the labor supply
responses and the level of input taxes. Proposition 2 establishes sufficient conditions for this
result formally.
Proposition 2: Let G(H) = ph
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These results lead to the main predictions. In what follows, I refer to village“monopoly
of violence” and state interchangeably.
Prediction P1: Price shocks and the returns to form states. A rise in the price
of coltan increases the value of establishing a monopoly of violence in coltan villages. As a
result, in coltan villages, armed groups will impose a village monopoly of violence in order
to tax. In villages in which there was no state, armed groups will establish a monopoly of
violence; in villages in which there was already a monopoly of violence, they will attempt to
conquer it, leading to the emergence of new stationary bandits when conquests are success-
ful. In addition, in both cases, a rise in the price of coltan should lead to investments aimed
at deterring entry by competing invaders in coltan villages. In the empirical section, I use
acquisition of firearms to proxy for investments in deterrence.
Prediction P1
′
: Price shocks, trade infrastructure, and the returns to form
states. A rise in the price of coltan increases the value of establishing a monopoly of vio-
lence, especially in coltan villages near trade infrastructure. Since coltan can only be shipped
by air, Prediction P1′ implies that Prediction P1 will hold especially in villages sufficiently
close to airports.
Prediction P2: Price shocks, gold, and the returns to form states. A rise in the
price of gold increases the value of establishing a monopoly of violence in gold villages less
so than an identical value per unit increase in the price of coltan in coltan villages. As a
result, armed groups will respond to a price rise in gold less than in response to an increase
in the price of coltan of identical value per unit.
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1.3.4 Auxiliary predictions
I have now established that stationary bandits will be more likely when the price of a taxable
commodity is high. There are additional testable implications from the theory. If setting up
a monopoly of violence capable of collecting taxes entails a fixed cost F and the marginal
cost of taxing an additional household in the village is negligible, then villages with a larger
number of households, k, should be more profitable for stationary bandits, ∂V∂k > 0, and
stationary bandits should be thus more likely in villages with large k. Furthermore, since
∂V
∂p > 0, then villages endowed with minerals in addition to agriculture will generate higher
tax revenues to stationary bandits. stationary bandits should thus be more likely in villages
endowed with valuable minerals than in villages relying only on agricultural activities.
1.4 The data
This section describes the data collection, defines the main variables used in this paper,
and presents strategies used to minimize measurement error. I then present the summary
statistics.
1.4.1 Data collection
In order to obtain data on armed groups’ violence and taxation, I designed a data collection
project in Eastern Congo. I trained and monitored 11 local surveyors who collected the data
between May 2012 and September 2013. In each village, the surveyors trained a group of
village history specialists (village chiefs, elders, and mining sector experts) for the collec-
tion of non-sensitive historical data under adequate compensation (henceforth, the village
specialists). The data collection activities followed a strict protocol, designed to last 7 days
per village. During the day, the surveyors implemented retrospective household surveys, in
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private. In the evenings they provided guidance and corrected the progress of the village spe-
cialists. In the last day of data collection activities in each village, after having implemented
8 household surveys, the surveyors held a day-long meeting with the village specialists. In
this meeting, the researchers and village specialists confronted the data gathered from the
different sources, and surveyors collected additional sensitive data based on the information
they gathered in the household surveys. The data from this meeting compiles information
from all activities and is the main source of data used in this paper.
Within each administrative division, I drew a random sample of gold villages, and the
population of coltan villages.21 Figure 1.3 maps the villages in the sample based on their en-
dowment of minerals. The villages endowed with coltan and gold are well distributed across
the various administrative divisions, with no clustering of villages by mineral endowment.
1.4.2 Measurement
This section describes the main variables I use in this paper.
The village mineral endowment was already identified during prospection work. I did not
record any discrepancy between the mineral endowment from prospection and survey data
indicating whether the village had exploited a given mineral. Therefore, I define the mineral
21To identify the villages endowed with gold, coltan, or other minerals, I used the data from a mapping
implemented in 2009 by IPIS, a Belgian research institute, and SAESSCAM, a local mining institute. To
verify these lists, I interviewed in Bukavu a large number of mineral dealers working through Sud-Kivu,
during 3 months of preparatory work. Based on the compiled dataset, I endowed the surveyors with a list
containing all mining villages of each administrative division. In order to strengthen the representativeness
of the sample to be selected, I designed a strict prospection protocol. Following this protocol, in the first week
of work in each administrative division, the surveyors verified the existence and endowments of the villages
in the list, and added mining villages they discovered to exist. Upon finishing prospection work, and in areas
where they had access to electricity, the surveyors communicated the cross-checked lists by satellite phone.
I then implemented random sampling of gold villages using a statistical package and communicated the
selection using satellite phone. In areas without access to electricity, the surveyors followed a strict protocol
for selecting gold villages, based on a list of random numbers I previously generated using a statistical
package.This was only applied in one administrative unit (Shabunda).
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endowment for this paper as whether the mineral has been exploited at any point for which
I have data.
I take the yearly prices of minerals from United States Geological Survey (2010). Fig-
ure 1.6 shows the world prices of gold and coltan.
I define the presence of a stationary bandit in a given village as whether an armed person
or group had a monopoly of violence in the village for at least 6 months in a given year.
stationary bandits are common in Eastern Congo, and villagers faced no difficulties identify-
ing stationary bandits from roving bandits; the former have no intention to leave the village
in the short-term, and usually provide protection to the whole village. The language used
to identify stationary bandits is “organization of security”. Therefore, implicitly, stationary
bandits always provide security.
To measure violent events, focus on two major types of attacks, which reflect the anec-
dotal evidence. I measure conquest attempts by whether an armed group engages in violence
with another armed group, with the aim of acquiring the monopoly of violence of the village.
I define pillages as violent events on the village aimed exclusively at capturing assets. This
definition reflects the observation that local populations are able to distinguish the purpose
of the attacks unambiguously. Pillages also differ from conquest attempts on observable
characteristics, which facilitates their distinction for local populations. In a pillage, armed
groups usually arrive at sunset and flee with the village assets within a narrow period of
time. Conquest attempts take place early in the morning and violence is targeted at the
group controlling the village, with the aim to defeat them.
To measure taxes, I collected both whether a tax was levied on a given activity, and the
level of the tax. There was always consensus on whether an expropriation was a tax. Local
populations are familiar with distinct types of expropriation by various actors. While a tax
is always anticipated and reflects an implicit long-term contract between those who collect
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taxes and the population, other types of expropriation (pillages, or arbitrary expropriations,
known as “tracasseries”) are not.
Having collected the geographic coordinates during the survey, I can link my dataset
to geographical shapefiles I obtained from the Re´ferentiel Geographique Commun.22 This
source contains the map of the road network of the DRC, all airports (including small landing
lanes), the location of forests, rivers, lakes, and the regional capitals. I compute the shortest
distance of each village to the road, the lake, the forest, the regional capitals, Rwanda, and
the closest airport. In the analysis, I use a dummy variable indicating whether the distance
to the closest airport is above the 50% percentile in the sample. The results are unchanged
when I use the continuous measure. The next section describes the strategies implemented
to address measurement error and potential reporting biases at the data collection phase.
1.4.3 Design based strategies to minimize measurement error
To address measurement error at the design phase, I used three strategies. First, I designed
the village protocols so that surveyors received multiple signals on the village history from
private conversations during the 7 days of implementation. Surveyors compiled the infor-
mation collected in household surveys with the data assembled by the village specialists.
This strategy was highly effective as an averaging method. It also helped surveyors correct
information provided by the village specialists during the final meeting. Indeed, households
were overwhelmingly willing to reveal armed groups’ data in private, and there was consensus
that this was not problematic.23 To provide additional confidence on the survey measures,
22See Re´fe´rentiel Ge´ographique Commun (2010).
23Armed groups were absent in most villages. The Congolese army already protected a large number of
the sampled villages. In the Territoire of Shabunda, certain villages were under the control of the Raia-
Mutombokis at time of the interview. The Raia-Mutombokis did not consider sensitive the information
collected by this survey. This armed group had existed for less than one year. Surveyors collected historical
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Section 1.7.1 compares the data to other data sources, as well as well-known political events.
Second, the teams implemented an exhaustive set of time cues, based on information gath-
ered in the survey pilot, and on well known regional and national political events. Time cues
allow respondents and surveyors to assign with certainty events to years, based on common
knowledge of regional events (de Nicola and Gine, 2012). Third, based on the pilot villages,
survey questions focused on transitions and events easy to memorize. For instance, there are
two types of bags that carry the heavy minerals (50kg and 75kg). To measure output taxes,
surveyors obtained the fee paid on one bag and bag size used. I then compute the tax per
kilogram based on these variables. To measure taxes on labor, surveyors obtained the daily
fee paid at the entry of the mine to obtain the right to work. These fees are stable. Crucially,
because mining taxes are the heavier daily expense of miners, they were straightforward to
collect. The responses of households and village specialists were highly correlated at time of
the interviews.
1.4.4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1.4 shows armed groups’ presence in the sample villages over this period. There are
18 armed organizations in the sample, although most of the variation is concentrated in four
groups: the Congolese Army (40% of control year*villages and 5% of attacks), Mayi-Mayi’s
(20% of control year*villages and 21 % of attacks), RCD-Goma (15% of control year*villages
and 11% of attacks), and FDLR (12% of control year*villages and 45% of attacks). While the
RCD and the Mayi-Mayi’s were the main actors during the Second Congo war, the Congolese
Army and the FDLR are 85 % of the occupation year*villages after 2006. Figure 1.5 shows
the distribution of the length stationary bandits’ episodes. The median length of episodes
data on events preceding the Raias and about the Raias without problems. Surveyors were confident that
they achieved the same degree of quality as in other villages, including for data on the present years.
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with each stationary bandit is 4 years, exactly as the median unprotected episode. Table
1.1 shows summary statistics. In Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014a), I show that these stationary
bandits provide security, administer justice, administer village bureaucracies, and even enjoy
legitimacy in a large fraction of the villages in this sample.
1.5 Empirical strategy
This section examines the effect of the coltan and gold price shocks on armed groups activity.
I first present the econometric specification and discuss how I address potential threats to
identification. I then turn to the results of the baseline specification as well as their robustness
to alternative specifications.
1.5.1 Main predictions: econometric specification
The main causal effect of interest is the effect of mineral demand on armed groups’ con-
quest and emergence of new village stationary bandits. To measure the rise in the value of
acquiring a violence monopoly, I use the following variables: conquest operations aimed at
capturing the village; emergence of new stationary bandits; investment in deterrence (ac-
quisition of weapons). However, identifying demand shifters poses a challenge. First, local
prices are endogenous and might reflect changes in supply. For instance, by exercising local
monopoly power or depressing supply, armed groups might inflate local prices. Second, local
prices are retrospective, and despite efforts to increase the quality of data collection, they
might contain large measurement error; this may be systematically different across miner-
als or periods. I use the world prices and the timing of world price shocks instead. The
main specification is an OLS regression on the world prices interacted with dummies indi-
cating the (constant) mineral endowments at the village-level, with village and year fixed
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effects.24 While constant unobserved heterogeneity and common year effects are absorbed
in the fixed effects, imbalance between coltan villages and gold villages could be associated
with differential time trends. To reassure that coltan and gold villages are comparable on
observable characteristics, Table 1.2 shows the balance on observables between coltan and
gold villages. Of 11 outcomes considered, there is only imbalance in one (distance to closest
bridge in 2010), although this variable is post-treatment. In Section 1.6, I describe alter-
native methods I have used to analyze rare events data. Equation 1.2 presents the baseline
specification:




itβ + εit (1.2)
where Yit, depending on the specification, is a dummy indicating the presence of a village
monopoly of violence (stationary bandit) in village i in year t, whether the village was subject
to a conquest attempt, whether the village was subject to pillages, as well as whether the
a village stationary bandit acquired weapons. αi are village fixed effects, βt are the year
fixed effects, and Xit is a vector of village level time varying controls. Ci is a dummy for
whether village is endowed with coltan, and is constant over time. Pworldct is the world price of
coltan at year t. Regressors Pworldct and Ci are absorbed respectively by the year and village
fixed effects. I do not use time-varying controls, since these are potentially endogenous to
treatment and could lead to bias.25 However, I address a number of omitted variable problems
by estimating the time-varying effects of time invariant covariates, which I describe in this
section. To account for over-rejection stemming from autocorrelation of errors and prices, I
cluster the standard errors in all regressions at the level of the village.26
24The results obtained from instrumenting local prices with world prices are identical.
25This is the “bad control” problem in Angrist and Pischke (2009).
26Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrate that autocorrelations in the treatment and
outcome lead to underestimation of the standard errors in studies based on differences in differences.
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A test of prediction P1 is γc ≤ 0 against the alternative γc > 0. In what follows,
I refer to γc as the main coefficient. To test prediction P1
′
, I include a dummy indicating
whether the distance to the closest airport is above the sample median. I choose this strategy
for ease of interpretation and to avoid making linearity assumptions if I instead used the
continuous distance variable. The results are identical when I use the distance in kilometers.
Equation 1.3 presents the specification I use to test prediction P1
′
:












itβ˜ + ε˜it (1.3)
where α˜i are village fixed effects, β˜t are the year fixed effects. The term d
a
i is a dummy
variable indicating whether the time invariant distance to the closest airport is above the
median closest distance to an airport in the sample. Prediction P1
′
therefore implies that
γ˜c > 0 and γ˜ca < 0. Finally, when I include the main interaction for gold, γgGiP
world
gt , a test
of prediction P2 is γc ≤ γg against the alternative γc > γg.
1.5.2 Main predictions: threats to validity
In what follows, I discuss the threats to identification of the main effect (γc > 0).
One may worry that the coltan shock could be endogenous. The source of the coltan shock,
however is well documented. A demand shock in the coltan processing industry in response
to innovations in video-games generated a rush for coltan in DRC. It is therefore very un-
likely that the world price armed groups actions had any causal effect on the level of the
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worl price.2728
A plausible worry is that, given it only takes place in one year, the timing of the coltan
shock may coincide with events that occur systematically in coltan villages for reasons un-
related to the price. Since the coltan shock occurred during an episode of war, it is possible
that the difference in conquests between coltan and gold villages is larger during the war
than on average. This will be the case if geographic characteristics interact with coltan
endowments and are related to the war but unrelated to the price shock. For instance, the
presence of the Congolese Army in the second period might act as a deterrent on armed
groups conquests in coltan villages. To address this, in regressions on the whole period, I
include controls in the specifications for presence of the Congolese army. To measure the
presence of the Congolese army, I use a dummy indicating whether the army controls a given
village in a given year. In addition, I also include the proportion of neighboring villages that
are under the control of the Congolese army in a given year. I operationalize “neighboring
villages” by estimating the average number of sample villages in the same administrative
division that are under the control of the Congolese army, replicating this procedure for all
27Local supply response could have had a dampening effect on the world equilibrium price. In this case
the observed price is lesser than the price that would have obtained in the absence of supply response. Since
I focus on the coefficient sign, this does not affect my interpretation. The results are qualitatively identical
when I use the timing of the coltan demand shock instead of the price level.
28As a validity check on the relevance of the coltan shock, I collected economic data in the households
surveys. The retrospective households’ economic data reveals large economic effects of the mineral price
shock. Figure A.2 shows the number of marriages per village, yearly as collected in the village survey. Since
marriage in the survey area requires the payment of a Bride Price, marriage is a normal good. The coltan
shock drastically increased the number of celebrated marriages and led to large reallocation of labor to the
mining sector. Second, nighttime satellite lights data confirm the evidence of the coltan shock. Figure A.1
shows that a new bright town emerges in the year 2000 near Goma, the capital of the coltan province. This
lighting is absent prior to 2000, and vanishes progressively in the following years. Henderson, Storeygard,
and Weil (2011) introduced the nighttime data as a proxy for GDP. While not reported, this lighting is
reflected in the provinces average stable lights. In addition, I computed zonal statistics of stable lights in
each Province of the DRC and compared the change over time between coltan provinces and non-coltan
provinces. The results show an increase in stable lights in 2000 in coltan Provinces, but remain constant in
the remaining provinces.
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levels of the administration. Since the results are identical with all strategies, I include only
the village-level variable. However, the presence of the Congolese army is potentially a bad
control (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For robustness of the main estimate, I therefore run
the baseline regression restricting the years to the Second Congo War (1998-2004), when the
Congolese army is absent and the identity of the main armed groups is stable. Furthermore,
since the coltan shock occurred during an episode of war, the sequence of conquest could
reflect omitted variables that are correlated with mineral endowments. In particular, even
when the analysis is restricted to the war years, it could be that coltan villages are more
remote, and that armed groups first occupied villages near the road, followed by coltan vil-
lages. In that case, the timing of conquest of coltan villages could coincide with the timing
of the coltan shock. This is unlikely. As Table 1.2 shows, coltan and gold villages are not dis-
tinguishable on any observable geographic characteristics, except for the distance to bridges
in the year 2010. To also account for geographic omitted variables related to the sequence
of conquest, I replicate the results including as controls year dummies interacted with dis-
tance to the road, distance to airports, bridges, parks, lakes, and main trading towns. These
controls capture the time-varying impacts of time-invariant geographical variables that may
predict the timing of conquest. I only report the results based on the interaction with dis-
tance to the road, since results are unchanged when I use the other variables instead. In
what follows, I discuss threats to the interpretation that γc − γg is caused by heterogeneous
tax base elasticities.
The coltan shock and the gold shocks are of different magnitudes, and take place at
different times. This might invalidate interpretations of γc > γg in terms of tax elasticities.
Shocks of different magnitudes might generate very different armed groups’ responses if the
armed groups’ cost functions are concave. For instance, if there is a fixed cost of engaging in
conquest, a larger price shock might result in stronger outcomes for reasons unrelated to the
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physical properties of production of the mineral, but only related to the magnitude of the
shock. Furthermore, the timing of the shocks may be correlated with omitted variables. For
instance, following the Second Congo war in 2003, the Congolese Army progressively regains
control. If the Congolese Army acts as a deterrent, even when the difference in differences
identifying assumptions for each the separate effects are valid, the estimated value of γc− γg
would be biased. To address this, I follow the same two strategies that I introduced to
estimate the main coltan effect: I control flexibly for presence of the Congolese army, and I
restrict the analysis for the Second Congo War years.
Another possible threat to the interpretation that γc − γg is caused by heterogeneous
tax base elasticities is that, even if coltan and gold villages are distributed “randomly” in
the space, populations might not. If populations self select into gold or coltan villages, the
patterns of sorting by individual characteristics might be associated with different individual
treatment effects of price shocks. In particular, it could be that because of the features of
gold production, miners and armed groups specializing in gold have different endowments
and might react differently to price shocks. This a weaker concern for the effects on conquest
operations, since the decision to engage in conquest is made by bandits outside the village.
In what follows, I discuss bias arising in the estimation of the standard errors.
Finally, since the econometric strategy exploits price changes across multiple years, stan-
dard errors may be underestimated. This may lead to over-rejection. If neighboring villages
are subject to common shocks, an error structure with positive intra-cluster correlation
within village clusters could drive differences in outcomes for reasons unrelated to the tim-
ing of the shocks (Moulton, 1986). It is unlikely that spatial clustering leads to bias in
OLS standard errors, because the distribution mineral endowments is balanced within most
administrative divisions, as shown in Figure 1.3. For robustness, I replicated all regressions
clustering the standard errors at the level of the year interacted with the lowest level of the
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administration above the village (Groupement).29 To account for autocorrelation of village
errors over time, all regressions are presented with clustering of standard errors at the village
level. To go a step further, I use randomization inference (Gerber and Green, 2012). This
allows me to account for arbitrary error structures underlying the main coltan shock. To im-
plement randomization inference, I simulate a large number of fake allocations of the world
prices to years and recompute for each price allocation the corresponding coefficient from the
OLS estimation. This generates a distribution of coefficients estimated through OLS. Under
the null hypothesis that the coltan price has no effect, and ignoring violations of the strict
exogeneity assumption, this is the true distribution of the estimated coefficient in the sample.
This also allows me to avoid making assumptions on the distribution of errors. If there is a
problem of over-rejection because of the error structure, the real coefficient should lie within
the 95% of simulated coefficients around the mean. I also use randomization inference to
estimate the effects of the distance to airports, given the inherently spatial structure of the
distance problem. I next turn to the results.
1.5.3 Auxiliary predictions: econometric specification
To capture village size, I use the number of households listed in the village census at the
time of the survey, Pi. In addition, I use the migration data: number of immigrants Iit and
emigrants by year eit. To capture the tax potential of a village stemming from the value of
economic activities, I use a dummy indicating whether the village is endowed with minerals,
29Groupement is the lowest administrative division above the village. It generally comprises no more
than twenty villages. There are 31 Groupements in the sample, which generate more than 300 clusters for
regressions including all years, and 180 clusters for regressions including only the Second Congo War. In
addition, I replicated the regressions including coltan*year clustering of standard errors to account for any
correlation structure among villages with the same coltan endowment that might not be captured in spatial
shocks. This could be the case, for instance, if coltan villages have a common shock structure through
economic networks that are not tied to geography.
33
Mit. While agricultural activities are a potential source of tax revenue, minerals are generally
more profitable. I implement a pooled of the OLS stationary bandits dummy, Yit, on village
size, lagged immigration, lagged emigration and a dummy indicating whether the village is
endowed with minerals. Since I do not use fixed effects, and since the dependent variable
is likely to have strong autocorrelation, I include in all specifications a lagged dependent
variable. Furthermore, since I use repeated observations, and to account for autocorrelation
in the regressors and the dependent variables over time, I cluster the standard errors at the
village level. Equation 1.4 presents the baseline specification:
Yit = βMMit + βPPi + βIIit + βEEit + εit (1.4)
The auxiliary testable implications are βM > 0, βP > 0, βI > 0, βE < 0.
1.6 Results
This section implements this econometric strategy and takes the predictions of the effect of
price shocks to the data. I first describe the results, and in a second part, I show that the
results are robust to alternative econometric strategies.
1.6.1 Main predictions: baseline results
The theoretical model considers how changes in the prices of outputs in individual villages
affect the choices of armed groups in these villages. In particular, when the value of the
village taxable production increases, armed groups will attempt to acquire the village. If the
village is unprotected, they might simply march in the village, but if an armed group already
controls the village, armed groups may attempt to conquer the village. If the conquest is
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successful, they will emerge as a new stationary bandit in the village, and collect taxes. I use
these outcomes to test the main theoretical predictions: (P1) the coltan shock leads armed
groups to attempt to acquire the coltan villages. (P1
′
) this effect must exclusively take place
near airports.30 (P2) the effect of the gold price shock is lower than the effect of the coltan
shock.31 I start with the analysis of territorial conquests.
Figure 1.7 shows the proportion of mines in the sample in which armed groups attacked,
by mineral endowment: gold (left) and coltan (right). I focus on mines in which there was
already a stationary bandit collecting taxes in 1999, since acquisition of the village monopoly
of violence is peaceful when the mines have no stationary bandits. While the proportion of
gold mines attacked stays around 15% between 1999 and 2000, the proportion of coltan
mines attacked increases from 13% to 40%. I next show that these attacks are motivated
by the conquest of territory, not pillage. Figure 1.8 is identical to Figure 1.7, but uses con-
quest operations instead, which I observe for the village hosting the mine. Again, I focus on
villages in which there was a stationary bandit in 1999 collecting taxes in the vilalge mine.
The spike in conquest attempts in the year 2000 in coltan villages suggests that the coltan
shock led to an increase in territorial conquests.
Table 1.3 presents the results on conquests from the OLS regression. I use all villages in
the sample. While this reduces the coefficient size (conquests do not occur in villages without
stationary bandits), it allows me to increase precision of the coefficient estimators. Starting
30A possible concern is the airports may be constructed at a low cost. The qualitative fieldwork suggests
that mining areas were often located in remote forests under the control of numerous adverse armed groups.
This made building new landing lanes impossible. It is not implausible, however, that had the coltan shock
lasted longer, the armed groups might have engaged in creating new airports.
31In what follows, I present the results pooling all villages. However, the results on conquests are con-
centrated in the villages that had already a security force present in the previous year, and the results on
stationary bandits are concentrated in the villages that did not have one previously as expected. Pooling
all villages weakens my result because it captures the average effects, but I always include all villages for
consistency.
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with prediction P1 and P1
′
, the results confirm that the coltan shock led to an increase
in conquest attempts in coltan villages near airports. Columns (1)-(4) present the results
based on the whole period, while columns (4)-(9) restrict the years to the Second Congo
War (1998-2003), and columns (10) and (11) focus on the years 1999 and 2000. Column
(1) presents the results from the baseline specification. As expected from prediction P1, an
increase in the coltan price leads to an increase in conquest attempts on coltan villages. Col-
umn (2) adds an interaction of the main explanatory variable (Coltan X Coltan Price) with
a dummy indicating whether the village is above the median distance to the closest airport
in the sample. As expected from prediction P
′
, the effect of the coltan price on conquests
is concentrated near airports. Column (3) controls for the presence of the Congolese army.
One might indeed worry that since columns (1) and (2) use the full period, unobservables
related to the timing of the coltan shock may be associated with armed groups’ activity for
reasons unrelated to the price shock. If, in the period following the Second Congo War, the
Congolese army acts as a deterrent on armed groups especially in coltan villages, estimating
the effect of the coltan shock considering all years may be biased. While the coefficient
on the Congolese army dummy is significant, including it leaves the main result unaffected.
The results are identical when instead of the presence of the Congolese army I use three
alternative proxies for presence of the Congolese army, described in Section 1.5.1. Column
(4) replicates the baseline specification, but includes controls for linear time trends common
to coltan villages. To implement this, I allow time trends to differ the period prior to the
shock and the perior after the shock. I therefore control for the coltan endowment dummy
interacted with years, before and after the shock separately.
Columns (5)-(9) present the results of the baseline specification when the sample is re-
stricted to the years of the Second Congo War (1998-2003). The Congolese army is indeed
potentially a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Restricting the sample to the years
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of the Second Congo War allows me to eliminate omitted variables correlated with the change
in environment associated with the post-war period. Comparing column (5) to the baseline
specification in column (1), the main coefficient is larger in column (5). Column (6) includes
the interaction with the distance to airports dummy. The coefficient on the main interaction
(Coltan X Coltan Price) is larger, while its interaction with the distance to airports dummy
is negative. This confirms that the effect of the coltan price is concentrated near airports.
Column (7) controls for distance to the road, interacted with year dummies, to account
for flexible time-varying effects of distance to the road. I do this because the sequence of
conquests may be associated with geographical characteristics of coltan and gold villages un-
related to the coltan price (remotedness). The inclusion of this control leaves the coefficient
on the coltan and coltan price interaction unaffected. To account for year region-specific
shocks, column (8) includes region-year fixed effects. One could indeed worry that the best
coltan villages are concentrated in one region, where most conquests take place in the year
2000 for reasons unrelated to the shock. Including region*year fixed effects leaves the main
coefficient unaffected. Column (9) includes village linear trends as in column (4).
Columns (10) and (11) restrict the sample to 1999 and 2000. I exclude all other years to
prevent the serial correlation across years to lead to under-estimation the standard errors.
If we use information from many years around the coltan shock, we may indeed understate
the standard errors on the coefficient estimates (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
When I restrict the years to 1999-2000, the “treatment” spans only one period. I therefore
do not need to cluster the standard errors at the village level. The coefficient is still signifi-
cant, and as column (10) shows, the main effect is concentrated near airports. My baseline
estimate suggests that the coltan shock increased the attempted conquest attacks by 20%.
Turning to prediction P2, an increase in the price of coltan should have a larger effect
than an equivalent value per unit increase in the price of gold. The point estimates provide
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support for this prediction across columns. The gold price is negatively related to conquest
operations in gold villages in the whole period (columns 1-4). This negative relationship
turns zero when I consider only the years of the Second Congo War (columns 4-8). It is
also not robust to village linear time trends in the whole sample (yielding a p-value of 0.68),
suggesting it is likely due to unobservables.32 Confirming these results, a t-test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on coltan is smaller or equal than the coefficient on gold in the
baseline specification rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.03. However, while the
discrepancy in coefficients is consistent with the theoretical results, it is no evidence that the
underlying mechanism is the inability to tax gold output, since this result obtains even when
gold output can be taxed (because of its smaller volume productivity). I then implement a
test rescaling the estimated coefficients obtained from the baseline specification as derived
in Appendix A.1.3, and find evidence that the impossibility to tax gold output alone can
explain the magnitude of the coefficients. Indeed, I reject the null Hypothesis with p-value
0.00. In sum, the results on conquest attempts confirm predictions P1-P2.
I now turn to the results on pillages. Following predictions P1-P2, the price shock should
not increase pillages, and if at all, it should decrease pillages by the strong armed group.
Table 1.4 runs the analysis of Table 1.3, for pillages instead of conquests. Across all spec-
ifications, the estimates show that pillage operations are unaffected by the coltan shock.
Consistent with the model, an increase in the price of coltan increases fighting for control of
coltan villages, not pillaging.
Does this violence lead to new monopolies of violence? Figure 1.9 shows the proportion
of villages in which a stationary bandit is collecting regular taxes in the mining sector. As a
result of the coltan shock, the proportion of such villages increases from 0 to 50% in coltan
32While I report here results with linear trends during the Second Congo war, they are identical to the
results with time trends in the whole sample and are hence unreported.
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villages that did not have one in 1999, but only from 0 to 15% in gold villages that did
not have one in 1999. Table 1.5 considers all villages, and runs the analysis of Table 1.3
focusing instead on whether a new stationary bandit acquires the monopoly of violence in
the village. The “entry” variable I use here is thus the union of emergence of stationary
bandits in areas where there was previously no stationary bandit, and the emergence of a
new stationary bandit in areas where there was already one stationary bandit. The results,
across specifications, are identical. Thus, the price shock effectively leads to the entry of
new stationary bandits as a result of conquests.
Finally, Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present the same specifications for the complete set of out-
come variables that characterize the transitions of individual villages in and out of stationary
bandits occupation. I focus on the following variables: presence of a stationary bandit; tran-
sitions of villages from stationary bandit to no stationary bandit; presence of taxation by
armed groups in the village; acquisition of firearms by armed groups (which captures invest-
ment in deterrence of invaders).33 Since the coltan shock and the gold shock take place in
different years, I separate the estimations for each shock. For the coltan shock, I focus on
1999 and 2000, which is the most conservative set of years. For the gold shock, I use the years
2001-2008. Since the rise in the price of gold begins in 2002, this allows me to exclude the
contemporaneous effect of the coltan shock, as well as a major military intervention in 2009
and onwards by the Congolese Army (Kimia II).34 The results are invariant to the choice of
years. Across Tables 1.6 and 1.7, columns (1), (3), (5), (7), report the results considering
the baseline specification, while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), include the interaction with the
33While investment in deterrence should unambiguously increase in the presence of strategic interactions,
it may reflect an income effect. As the price rises, groups in coltan villages may have more means to
acquire weaponse. For that reason, acquisition of firearms is not unambiguously indicating that the value of
territorial control has increased.
34For a description of Kimia II, see Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014a).
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distance to airport dummy. The results are consistent with the interpretation of the findings
on conquest attempts: the coltan price shock increases the value of acquiring monopolies of
violence, especially near airports. When the village is empty, it is more likely that a station-
ary bandit emerges, while if the village already has a stationary bandit (which was the case
for 55% of cotlan villages already by 1999), armed groups attempt a territorial conquest.
These attempts are sometimes successful, in which case armed groups that dominate the
local resistance acquire the monopoly of violence, collect taxes, consistent with historical
accounts of state formation in medieval Europe. Table 1.7 shows that this effect is absent
in gold villages. Figures 1.10 and 1.11 present a summary of results in tree form. They
separate outcomes by whether the village already had a stationary bandit and otherwise.
I now consider the effects on taxation. In table 1.8, I use the baseline specification, but
use as dependent variable a dummy for whether a stationary bandits raise a given type of
taxes. I use dummies indicating the following tax instruments in columns (1)-(6) respec-
tively: Output tax at Roadblocks (mining output tax, per kilogram), Entry tax (labor input
tax levied to work in the mine, daily), Food sales tax (a daily tax levied on cassava pro-
ducers in the local market), Poll tax (periodic tax per household), Transit tax (tax to enter
and exit the village), Mill tax (tax on activity at the local mill, per day). Columns (1)
and (2) shows that the coltan shock led to a sharp increase in mining taxes (both input
and output). Column (4) shows that the coltan shock also drastically rose the probability
that a stationary bandit collects poll taxes. In addition, the effect of the gold price leaves
most taxes unaffected. It has a marginal positive effect on the probability that a stationary
bandit collects poll taxes, a a negative effect on the probability that a stationary bandit
collects taxes on transit. Turning to tax levels, Table 1.9 replicates Table 1.8 using instead
the level of taxes in a tobit regression model. Columns (1) and (4) confirm the main finding:
the coltan price shock attracted stationary bandits, who initiated tax collection on coltan
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output and on households (poll taxes). This is reasonable, since households are richer in
response to the coltan shock. I next consider alternative specifications.
1.6.2 Main predictions: results from alternative specifications
In addition, I implement three strategies to increase confidence in the main OLS estimates.
First, I implement conditional differences-in-differences matching, introduced by Heck-
man, Ichimura, and Todd (1998).35 As matching variables, I use distance to airports and
distance to roads, as well as upper level administrative divisions (Territoire). Since airport
areas might be more urbanized, and urbanization might affect the behavior of armed groups,
I also consider distance to roads. Finally, to control for constant unobserved heterogeneity
across regions (Territoires), I also match on Territoire. This procedure is thus equivalent
to conditional differences-in-differences within calipers defined by administrative divisions
(Cochran and Rubin, 1973). Figure 1.12 shows the yearly coefficients estimated on the
matched sample, based on the main outcome variables: conquest attempts, pillages, entry
of new stationary bandits, and acquisition of firearms. The results are identical.
Second, I account for the observation that conquest attempts are rare events. In that
case, OLS estimation could lead to biases in the estimated probabilities and standard errors
(King and Zeng, 2001). I therefore run a logistic version of the baseline specification, that
corrects for small sample and rare events in order to generate approximately unbiased and
lower-variance estimates, introduced in King and Zeng (2001). The results are unchanged.
Third I account for the spatial problem in regressions that include the distance to air-
ports. Neighboring villages have similar distances to the closest airport, and they are also
35This method is similar in spirit to case control methods, presented in Goldstone, Bates, Epstein, Gurr,
Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder, and Woodward (2010), where I select observations based on whether I observe
coltan endowment and then select matches.
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likely to be subject to common shocks stemming from their economic and social proximity.
The problem is not limited to villages in same clusters. Villages close to an airport, even
if they are close to different airports, may be subject to common shocks, if they are better
integrated in the regional and world economy. This error group structure can lead to drastic
under-estimation of standard errors in the OLS framework. One way to address this is to
cluster the standard errors at the level of “Groupements”*years, which could account for a
grouped error structure if errors are subject to common year shocks within “Groupements”.
As announced in Section 1.5.1, I implemented this for all regressions, and the results re-
main unchanged. However, the particular error structure is unknown, and therefore the
correct clustering is also unknown. Alternatively, one could use Conley standard errors,
which account for an error structure of AR(1) type (Conley, 1999). However, estimation of
a spatial AR(1) structure on the errors will not capture arbitrary correlations. This problem
is akin to imposing a serial AR(1) in the errors for panel regressions (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan, 2004). To exploit the spatial structure inherent in the data, I instead use
randomization inference, which I take from the statistics literature. While rarely used in
economics, it allows to exploit the structure of the data without making assumptions on the
data generating process. I generate 5,000 times 40 imaginary airports’ locations in the space
around the survey villages. For each of these simulated airport locations, I run the OLS
regression, where I interact the distance to airport dummy with the main regressor (Coltan
X Coltan Price). I then estimate the coefficient on the triple interaction for each simulation,
and plot the resulting distribution of coefficients in Figure 1.13. Since these airports are not
real, and thus have no effect in expectation, the distribution of the coefficients is centered
around 0. If a spatial structure leads to over-rejection, the distribution of coefficients esti-
mated through simulations should have a relatively high variance. My coefficient estimated
with real airports would lie within the 95% of the data around the mean. On the contrary, I
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find that only 9% of the coefficients obtained through simulations are larger in absolute value
than the coefficient estimated based on the real airports, a 0.09 p-value of a two sided test
of statistical significance. The main result, therefore, remains when I estimate the standard
errors using randomization inference.36
This section has shown that the coltan shock leads armed groups to acquire control of
coltan villages near airports and collect taxes. The later shock to the price of gold, which
can easily be hidden from taxes, does not. The next section examines the activity of armed
groups in the village where they are stationary bandits.
1.6.3 Auxiliary predictions: results
Table 1.10 reports the results of the auxiliary predictions. I regress a dummy variable
indicating whether a stationary bandit is present in the village on whether the village is
endowed with minerals, the size of the village (number of households, in hundreds), number
of immigrants in the past year (in hundreds of persons), number of emigrants in the past year,
in hundreds of persons. In columns (1)-(3), I implement a simple OLS, and in Column (4) I
add all regressors on the OLS. As shown in Columns (1) and (4) the presence of minerals in
the village is a strong predictor of whether a stationary bandit is present. Stationary bandits
are 15% more likely to be present in villages endowed with minerals.37 There are on average
200 households per village in the sample. As shown in columns (2) and (4), the coefficient on
current village size is not statistically significant. Its magnitude suggests, however, that an
increase in the number of households by one standard deviation (170 households) increases
36I also implemented this procedure simulating allocations of mineral endowments to villages as well as
price to years. Figure 1.13 shows that the estimated p-value with randomization inference is 0.065.
37The coefficient rises to 22% when I use instead as dependent variable stationary bandit who collects
regular taxes.
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the probability to have a stationary bandit by 4%, and has the expected sign. Columns (3)
and (4) reveal that last year immigration also predicts the presence of a stationary bandit.
Its coefficient suggests that an increase in past immigration of one standard deviation (63
persons) increases the probability to have a stationary bandit by 4 %.
1.7 Discussion
In this section, I demonstrate that the outcome variables compare surprisingly well with
known historical events, as well as with external data sources. I then discuss how expectations
might play a central role in the main estimates, and finally address how these results fit other
explanations from the literature on civil war.
1.7.1 Measurement error
Classical measurement error in the outcome variable might lead to noisy estimates and can
threaten identification of the parameters in the linear probability model (Hausman, 2001).38
In addition, if the data is of low quality, arbitrary correlations stemming from systematic
mistakes by enumerators might underlie arbitrary results unrelated with real effects. I first
provide reassuring graphical evidence and then compare the data to the other sources.
Figure 1.4 in Section 1.2 plotted the survey-based measures of armed groups’ occupation
on years. Since historical trends are known, this allows to verify the quality of the main
variables. The changes in the data correspond precisely to commonly known historical events.
stationary bandits emerge and substitute for the state in villages in 1996 and 1997 with the
AFDL rebellion, but particularly in 1998 with the RCD conquests. The data also coincides
38Classical measurement error in the explanatory variable leads to attenuation bias. However, to avoid
this source of bias, the specifications do not use local prices of coltan.
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with known dates of RCD occupation: it emerged in 1998 with the second Congo War and
retreats in in 2003/2004 following the 2002 peace agreements of Sun City. The timing of the
attacks also corresponds precisely to well known historical rebellions. Figure A.3 shows that
the data maps precisely to the known phases of the war: the AFDL led its rebellion in 1996
into 1997, the RCD between 1998 and 2003, and the CNDP in 2004. Finally, survey-based
recall prices closely track the international world price. Overall the data on prices, armed
groups, and attacks benchmarks extremely well to well-known historical events.
To verify the data quality a step further I also assigned violent events geo-coded by
an external dataset (ACLED) to circles around the survey villages. The ACLED dataset
contains 3,500 violence events since 1997, coded by perpetrator and type of event. As opposed
to the data collected in this survey, these data are based on reports. When an event falls in
circles assigned to more than one village, I allocated the event to all village circles in which it
fell. I then compare this data to my source that contains the number of attacks on villages.39
Figure A.4 shows that the ACLED dataset systematically reports less violence data around
the selected villages than what the current survey. While it is possible that this difference
is due to villagers over-reports of violence events, under-reporting by villagers in the survey
is more likely to be a concern, due to memory loss and fear of retaliation. If data from this
survey is more likely to under-report violent events, this suggests that my survey perfoms
well, possibly improving upon the ACLED dataset for the specific locations. To cross-
validate this survey data econometrically, I correlated the data to ACLED’s data in an OLS
framework. Regression estimates of the correlation between ACLED and survey conquest
attacks in the neighborhood of the village are positive, significant, but never larger than 10%
across all distances (Table A.1). In addition, attacks reported by this survey are less likely
39This source contains larger numbers of violent events than the other survey source because villagers
could not remember the details of some attacks.
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to be reported in ACLED when the villages were under RCD occupation (suggesting that
the source of under-reporting in ACLED could be obstruction of information), and when
the attacks were pillages (ACLED may specifically under-estimate the number pillages).40
The data collected in this survey also captures the well-known evolution in conflict intensity
in the region. Figure A.4 shows the increase in violence during the Second Congo War,
especially during the coltan shock, its decrease after 2003, and its drastic increase as a result
of the Kimia II operations, which consists mostly of FDLR pillages.
1.7.2 Expectations
First, if villagers anticipated the coltan shock, estimates of the coltan shock may be a lower
bound of the real effect. For instance, groups could have made the required investments
during 1999 knowing that the prise would rise. Second, following the price increase, if
local populations anticipated that the shock was going to be short-lived the estimates of
the effect of the shock will underestimate real effects of permanent price shocks, especially
if groups’ cost functions have non-convexities. Third, following the sudden price drop in
international markets, if populations expected that the price would rise back to its high
level, the persistence of the coltan shock on institutions will be overestimated and will be
led by wrong local expectations about future prices.
There is significant first-hand evidence on expectations about the coltan price level. This
anecdotal evidence has three implications. First, surprise innovations on the electronics
markets led to the rush to coltan. Second, the unexpected bad performance of Playstation II
on the market in Christmas led the demand for coltan to vanish. It is therefore very unlikely
that local populations expected a sudden drop in demand for this mineral of this magnitude.
40This result applies specifically to RCD perpetrated violent events, consistent with reporting bias.
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Third, following the sudden price drop in 2001, local traders expected the world demand to
rise back to its peak level of 2000, and engaged in mineral hoarding. This is confirmed by
the data on local prices.41
In order to strengthen the anecdotal evidence, the survey also collected retrospective
measures of expectations. The sudden increase and decrease were both unexpected. However,
there is variation in expectations about the duration of the shock. Figure 1.16 shows the
emergence of new stationary bandits. The upper quadrants show the entry of new stationary
bandits. I separate villages in which villagers declared that they had expected the shock
to be permanent, and villages in which villagers declared they had expected the shock to
be temporary.42 The price shock had an almost three times larger effect (entry of 50%
instead of 20%) amongst the villages that reported to expect that the price shock would
be permanent. Finally, the lower quadrant replicates the analysis by expectations on the
return to high prices. Of places where villagers expected a temporary decrease, stationary
bandits vacated 25% in 2001. Of places where villagers expected no return to the high price,
stationary bandits vacated progressively. This suggests that expectations may explain part
of the persistence, and that had the villagers expected the prise rise to be temporary, the
behavioral responses may have been dampened.
1.7.3 Alternative mechanisms
A large part of the conflict literature emphasizes the role of the trade-offs between produc-
tion and expropriation, in particular the opportunity cost of fighting (Collier and Hoeffler,
41United Nations Security Council (2002).
42I have defined a temporary shock to be 5 years or less, which constitutes less than 20% of all villages.
The rest report an expected duration of more years, or reported to expect the price to remain at high level
for an indefinite amount of time.
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2004, Dube and Vargas, 2013). My results suggest an additional constraint that determines
the choices of armed groups: their ability to tax. The shock to the price of coltan implied a
drastic increase in the economic opportunities from engaging in productive activities. There-
fore, if the opportunity cost of fighting was the determinant of violence, there should have
been a decrease in participation, and ultimately in violence, as found in Dube and Vargas
(2013). On the contrary, I find an increase in violence, aimed at gaining territorial control.
Hence, when the price of the labor intensive commodity increases, the relevant alternative
for armed groups might not be to engage in productive activities in a labor intensive sector,
but potentially to provide protection and extract revenue taxing output and labor. This
channel is absent in the opportunity cost of fighting literature.
Second, my results complement theories of civil war that emphasize the role of the in-
ternal organization of the group (Weinstein, 2007). As the revenues from stable extraction
increase, the stronger bandit acquires control of the valuable villages. In this case, a large
part of the effect (not all) is driven by the RCD. It is possible that the RCD had a better
disciplined internal organization that gave them dominance over uncoordinated Mayi-Mayi
groups. However, if recruitment of soldiers’ types is the only explanation for violence, it
cannot explain the effects of the Kimia II. As the FDLR lost access to its mineral tax base,
violence should have decreased if bad recruits had been replaced with better recruits. On
the contrary, violence increased. The armed group just changed their strategy to acquire
resources: they pillaged households’ assets. This result thus complements Weinstein (2007).
Once established, it is the fighters’ relevant alternative revenue generating activity that
determines the use of violence, which may not be production but alternative modes of ex-
propriation.
Finally, this paper ignores strategic interactions. Future work will examine how behavior
of armed groups is affected when other bandits can pillage production. If the stationary
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bandit does not have a sufficiently strong protection technology, this mechanism can unravel
uncoordinated roving banditry. However, this is also the case in the current decision the-
oretic framework. This framework captures well the dominance of the RCD against other
weaker groups.
1.8 Conclusion
The origins of the state have attracted scholars of all social sciences. However, a fundamental
fact is that prior to the state, there is no data collection capacity. The causes of state origins
have thus weak bases in the existing literatures.
I provide the first econometric evidence on the causes of state formation. To observe
state formation in its initial phases, I managed a team of data collectors in stateless and
war-torn areas of Eastern Congo and collect a village-level panel dataset of yearly activity of
armed groups. I develop a theory in which the ability to tax output plays a central role in the
decision of armed organizations to establish or acquire an existing “monopoly of violence”
in order to collect taxes.
Consistent with this theory, a drastic shock to the demand of coltan, a voluminous min-
eral easy to tax, leads armed groups to impose monopolies of violence in the proximity of
coltan extraction and trade routes. A shock to gold in the immediate aftermath, does not.
Since gold is easy to conceal, this reveals that taxation is a leading force in the decision to
form states. As additional support to this theory, I find that armed groups, even when they
are settled in gold villages, do not tax gold output.
This paper’s results contribute to a large literature in economics (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006, Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2006, Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002, Besley and
Persson, 2009, Grossman, 1997, North and Weingast, 1989), but also to disciplines outside of
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economics. The anthropological literature on early state formation suggests that economic
returns to circumscribed locations played a central role in the formation of states (Carneiro,
1970). I find that the effect of mineral demand is particularly strong in locations where
output can be traded. Furthermore, since price shocks have weaker effects on output that
can be easily hidden by producers, I am able to provide disaggregated evidence on the role
of the elasticity of the tax. This complements historical accounts of the role of population
mobility and fixed investments on state formation (Herbst, 2011, Scott, 2009).
This paper has implications for policy. Armed groups are a topic of growing interest
among Western governments because of the instability they generate. This study is the first
to provide econometric evidence of the relationship between violence and mineral endow-
ments in the DRC. While there are vivid debates and speculations around the motives of
armed groups, I find that price shocks lead to armed groups’ violence, between groups and
in order to acquire territory hosting the mineral (not to more pillages). This result is in line
with other reports based on qualitative data, such UN (2002).
Furthermore, understanding the origins of the state may help better understand the work-
ings of governments. Strong states are an exception in the process of historical development
(Bates, 2011). This paper demonstrates that states are more likely to emerge in locations
where there is a surplus that can be expropriated. Policies that aim at providing military
support to states who, conditional on current technology, have been created in locations
where they struggle to collect taxes as a result of historical accidents, may be misguided.
My findings suggest a fundamental similarity between violent organizations and states.
Like states, armed groups have a comparative advantage in violence, and they can exert
coercion in order to expropriate, but also to maintain a monopoly of violence and provide
protection. Their strategies might turn in favor of the population when the population can
be a profitable tax base, which may in some cases lead to the formation states.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
No minerals Coltan Gold
Mean Mean Mean
(sd) (sd) (sd)
Number of external attacks at the mining center . 0.64 0.02
. (2.21) (0.21)
Number of internal attacks at the mining center . 0.22 0.01
. (0.95) (0.11)
Number of external attacks at village 0.18 0.13 0.22
(0.38) (0.34) (0.42)
Number of internal attacks at village 0.02 0.04 0.03
(0.14) (0.20) (0.17)
Armed organization stationed at the village 0.40 0.37 0.30
(0.49) (0.48) (0.46)
Armed organization living inside the village 0.37 0.32 0.27
(0.48) (0.47) (0.44)
Armed organization sharing power with the village authorities∗ 0.26 0.52 0.47
(0.44) (0.50) (0.50)
Armed organization administering the village 0.07 0.19 0.07
(0.25) (0.40) (0.25)
Size of the village (Number of households in 2012) 187.15 172.13 102.56
(116.39) (101.38) (44.07)
Number of individuals immigrating per year 24.4 21.37 16.19
(69.67) (76.19) (60.10)
Number of individuals emigrating per year 15.22 15.20 13.57
(49.67) (59.42) (52.49)
Observations 460 368 207
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The sign * indicates that the variable was added after survey start.
This table presents the mean and standard deviation of the main outcomes, by endowment of minerals at
the village
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Table 1.2: Balance on observables: gold and coltan villages
Mean difference: Gold - Coltan
(t-statistic)
Distance to closest Road, 2010 0.642
(1.06)
100
Distance to Natural reserve -0.0254
(-0.01)
100
Distance to Lake -14.38
(-1.29)
100
Distance to Bukavu -7.357
(-0.87)
100
Distance to Rwanda -10.94
(-1.07)
100
Distance to closest river -0.343
(-0.32)
100
Distance to closest bridge, 2010 -8.048∗∗∗
(-4.16)
100
Distance to closest Airport, 2010 -1.845
(-0.94)
100
Accessible by car in 1999 0.0587
(0.70)
87
Access by moto in 1999 0
(0.00)
87
Access to phone coverage in 1999 -0.0190
(-0.38)
87
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the resulting t-statistics from a t-test of the
difference in levels between gold and coltan villages. A positive t-statistic indicates a larger average value in
gold villages.
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Table 1.3: Effects of price shocks, conquests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES
Coltan X Pc 0.25* 0.61*** 0.26* 0.58** 0.30** 0.60** 0.59** 0.60** 0.46* 0.30** 0.66***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.14) (0.20)
Coltan X Pc X Far -0.59*** -0.37*** -0.57* -0.56* -0.57* -0.32* -0.66**
(0.19) (0.14) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.17) (0.27)
Gold X Pg -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Gold X Pg X Far -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Congolese Army -0.06**
(0.03)
Constant 0.12*** -71.79 0.12*** 50.59 0.15* -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -3.84 0.09*** 0.09
(0.03) (51.69) (0.03) (54.78) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (63.34) (0.02) (0.20)
Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 732 732 678 732 732 244 244
R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.34 0.68 0.69
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village time trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Distance to road NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Sample 98-09 98-09 98-09 98-09 98-03 98-03 98-03 98-03 98-03 99-00 99-00
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the linear probability model for attempted conquests. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of the village. Pc is the US price of coltan, in US$ per kilogram, and Coltan indicates whether the village
is endowed with coltan. Pg is the US price of gold, in US$ per kilogram, and Gold indicates whether the village is endowed with gold.
Column (1) presents the baseline specification; column (2) adds the interaction of the main regressor with a dummy indicating whether
the village distance to the closest airport is in above the median of the sample; column (3) adds a control for the Congolese army; column
(4) controls for coltan time trends, allowed to differ in the pre-2000 and post-2000 period. Columns (5)-(9) restrict the observations to
the years of the Second Congo War (1998-2003); column (5) presents the baseline specification; column (6) adds the distance to airport
interaction; column (7) controls for the closest distance to the road interacted with year dummies; column (8) adds region*year fixed
effects; column (9) controls for coltan time trends, allowed to differ in the pre-2000 and post-2000 period. Columns (9) and (10) restrict
the years to 1999 and 2000; column (10) presents the baseline specification, and column (11) adds the distance to airport interaction.
This table includes all villages in the sample. When I include only villages in which there was already a stationary bandit prior to the
shock, the results are stronger and significant in all columns.
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Table 1.4: Effects of price shocks, pillages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES
Coltan X Pc 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.33 -0.67 0.11
(0.15) (0.22) (0.15) (0.28) (0.16) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.34) (0.93) (0.27)
Coltan X Pc X Far 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.12
(0.30) (0.17) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.24) (0.37)
Gold X Pg -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gold X Pg X Far -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Congolese Army -0.02
(0.04)
Constant 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 66.96 0.17 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 2.37 0.10 0.18
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (66.82) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (79.91) (0.17) (0.27)
Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 732 732 678 732 366 67 244
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.82 0.55
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village time trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Distance to road NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Sample 98-09 98-09 98-09 98-09 98-03 98-03 98-03 98-03 98-03 99-00 99-00
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the linear probability model for pillages. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of the village. Pc is the US price of coltan, in US$ per kilogram, and Coltan indicates whether the village is
endowed with coltan. Pg is the US price of gold, in US$ per kilogram, and Gold indicates whether the village is endowed with gold.
Column (1) presents the baseline specification; column (2) adds the interaction of the main regressor with a dummy indicating whether
the village distance to the closest airport is in above the median of the sample; column (3) adds a control for the Congolese army; column
(4) controls for coltan time trends, allowed to differ in the pre-2000 and post-2000 period. Columns (5)-(9) restrict the observations to
the years of the Second Congo War (1998-2003); column (5) presents the baseline specification; column (6) adds the distance to airport
interaction; column (7) controls for the closest distance to the road interacted with year dummies; column (8) adds region*year fixed
effects; column (9) controls for coltan time trends, allowed to differ in the pre-2000 and post-2000 period. Columns (9) and (10) restrict
the years to 1999 and 2000; column (10) presents the baseline specification, and column (11) adds the distance to airport interaction.This
table includes all villages in the sample.
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Table 1.5: Effects of price shocks, new stationary bandit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES
Coltan X Pc 0.50*** 0.84*** 0.49*** 0.70** 0.53*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.60* 0.51** 0.69**
(0.17) (0.26) (0.17) (0.33) (0.19) (0.29) (0.28) (0.31) (0.36) (0.21) (0.31)
Coltan X Pc X Far -0.63* -0.63*** -0.58 -0.40 -0.57 -0.53** -0.33
(0.34) (0.21) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.23) (0.43)
Gold X Pg -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.05* -0.09** -0.09** -0.09**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gold X Pg X Far 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.07
(0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Congolese Army 0.19***
(0.03)
Constant 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.31*** -74.52 0.52*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38** 159.34* 0.16*** 0.23
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (79.40) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (86.95) (0.04) (0.32)
Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 732 732 678 732 732 244 244
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.52 0.52
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village time trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Distance to road NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Sample 98-09 98-09 98-09 98-09 98-03 98-03 98-03 98-03 98-03 99-00 99-00
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the linear probability model for new stationary bandit.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the village. Pc is the US price of coltan, in US$ per kilogram, and Coltan indicates whether
the village is endowed with coltan. Pg is the US price of gold, in US$ per kilogram, and Gold indicates whether the village is endowed
with gold. Column (1) presents the baseline specification; column (2) adds the interaction of the main regressor with a dummy indicating
whether the village distance to the closest airport is in above the median of the sample; column (3) adds a control for the Congolese
army; column (4) controls for coltan time trends, allowed to differ in the pre-2000 and post-2000 period. Columns (5)-(9) restrict the
observations to the years of the Second Congo War (1998-2003); column (5) presents the baseline specification; column (6) adds the
distance to airport interaction; column (7) controls for the closest distance to the road interacted with year dummies; column (8) adds
region*year fixed effects; column (9) controls for coltan time trends, allowed to differ in the pre-2000 and post-2000 period. Columns
(9) and (10) restrict the years to 1999 and 2000; column (10) presents the baseline specification, and column (11) adds the distance to
airport interaction. This table includes all villages in the sample.
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Table 1.6: Effects of the coltan shock, all outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stationary Stationary Village Village Mining Mining Firearms Firearms
VARIABLES Bandit Bandit Vacated Vacated Taxes Taxes Acquisition Acquisition
Coltan X Pc 0.24* 0.54*** 0.08* 0.00 0.47*** 0.61*** 0.23** 0.24*
(0.14) (0.20) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14)
Coltan X Pc X Far -0.58** 0.15 -0.28 -0.01
(0.27) (0.09) (0.26) (0.19)
Constant 0.53*** 0.53*** -0.00 -0.00 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 234 234 244 244 234 234 234 234
R-squared 0.85 0.86 0.52 0.53 0.88 0.88 0.61 0.61
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample 99-00 99-00 99-00 99-00 99-00 99-00 99-00 99-00
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Years are restricted to 1999 and 2000 (the year preceding the coltan shock and the year of the
coltan shock). This table presents the results on the baseline specification for the following outcomes: presence of a stationary bandit,
whether the village transitions from having a stationary bandit to not having one, whether an armed group is collecting taxes in the
village, and a dummy variable indicating whether an armed group acquires weapons in this village. A stationary bandit is defined as an
armed group that is settled in the village for at least 6 months and has the monopoly of violence in the village. Pc is the US price of
coltan, in US$ per kilogram, and Coltan is a dummy indicating whether the village is endowed with coltan. Pg is the US price of gold, in
US$ per kilogram, and Gold indicates whether the village is endowed with gold. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the village.
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), report the results considering the baseline specification, while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), add the interaction of
the main regressor (Coltan X Coltan Price) with a dummy indicating whether the village distance to the closest airport is in above the
median of the sample. This table includes all villages in the sample.
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Table 1.7: Effects of the gold shock, all outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stationary Stationary Village Village Mining Mining Firearms Firearms
VARIABLES Bandit Bandit Vacated Vacated Taxation Taxation Acquisition Acquisition
Gold X Pg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Gold X Pg X Far -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant 0.70*** 0.86*** -0.01 -0.29*** 0.67*** 0.86*** 0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 936 935 976 975 936 935 936 935
R-squared 0.60 0.61 0.11 0.13 0.58 0.59 0.15 0.15
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample 01-08 01-08 01-08 01-08 01-08 01-08 01-08 01-08
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Years are restricted to 2001-2008 (the years following the coltan shock until the Kimia II
intervention). This table presents the results on the baseline specification for the following outcomes: presence of a stationary bandit,
whether the village transitions from having a stationary bandit to not having one, whether an armed group is collecting taxes in the
village, and a dummy variable indicating whether an armed group acquires weapons in this village. A stationary bandit is defined as an
armed group that is settled in the village for at least 6 months and has the monopoly of violence in the village. Pc is the US price of
coltan, in US$ per kilogram, and Coltan is a dummy indicating whether the village is endowed with coltan. Pg is the US price of gold, in
US$ per kilogram, and Gold indicates whether the village is endowed with gold. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the village.
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), report the results considering the baseline specification, while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), add the interaction
of the main regressor (Gold X Gold Price) with a dummy indicating whether the village distance to the closest airport is in above the
median of the sample. This table includes all villages in the sample.
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Table 1.8: Price shocks and taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output tax
VARIABLES roadblocks Entry tax Food sales tax Poll tax Transit tax Mill tax
Coltan X Pc 0.515*** 0.393*** -0.008 0.337** 0.080 0.057
(0.105) (0.093) (0.095) (0.138) (0.092) (0.054)
Gold X Pg 0.001 0.001 0.006* -0.006** 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Coltan 0.110** -0.083 -0.038 0.068 -0.070 -0.010
(0.043) (0.069) (0.057) (0.076) (0.069) (0.035)
Constant -0.026* 0.106** 0.118*** 0.237*** 0.189*** 0.051**
(0.015) (0.052) (0.039) (0.050) (0.047) (0.023)
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,342 1,586 1,586 1,586
R-squared 0.132 0.017 0.014 0.052 0.026 0.014
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the baseline specification for
dummies indicating whether armed groups collect a particular tax in the village as dependent variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy indicating
whether an armed group collects a tax on output at roadblocks outside the mine. The dependent variable in
column (2) is a dummy indicating whether an armed group collects a tax on labor at the mine (entry tax).
The dependent variable in column (3) is a dummy indicating whether an armed group collects a tax cassava
sales at the local market. The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy indicating whether an armed
group collects a tax on households (poll tax). The dependent variable in column (5) is a dummy indicating
whether an armed group collects a tax on transit of persons in and out of the village. Finally, the dependent
variable in column (6) is a dummy indicating whether an armed group collects a tax on a local mill in the
village. Regressions include all years in the 1998-2012 interval.
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Table 1.9: Price shocks and tax levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Output tax
roadblocks Entry tax Food sales tax Poll tax Transit tax Mill tax
Coltan X Pc 3.08*** 2.29 0.01 7.50*** 8.60** 5.03
(0.75) (2.56) (0.20) (2.06) (3.81) (5.99)
Gold X Pg -0.14** -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.06
(0.06) (0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.17) (0.27)
Constant -1.64*** -2.14** -0.37*** -0.29 -7.22*** -14.15***
(0.45) (0.92) (0.08) (0.60) (1.64) (0.53)
Observations 805 506 829 837 846 848
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the baseline tobit specification
for left-truncated variables indicating the level of different taxes dependent variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the tax on output at roadblocks
outside the mine, in US$ per kilogram. The dependent variable in column (2) is the tax on labor at the
mine (US$ per entry to the mine). The dependent variable in column (3) is the tax cassava sales at the local
market, in US$ per day of sale. The dependent variable in column (4) is the tax on households (US$ per
week). The dependent variable in column (5) the tax on transit of persons in and out of the village, in US$
per passage. Finally, the dependent variable in column (6) a tax on a local mill in the village, in US$ per
day of activity. Regressions include all years in the 1998-2012 interval.
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Table 1.10: Auxiliary predictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
VARIABLES Bandit Bandit Bandit Bandit
Minerals in village 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03)
Village Size 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Number of migrants (lag) 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Number of emigrants (lag) 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Observations 2,760 2,714 2,760 2,714
R-squared 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.24
Cluster Village Village Village Village
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the auxiliary predictions. The
dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a stationary bandit is settled in village i at year t. Column
(1) regresses stationary bandit on a dummy indicating whether the village is endowed with minerals. Column
(2) regresses stationary bandit on the number of households in the village, recorded in 2012 (in hundreds).
Column (3) regresses stationary bandit on the lagged number of immigrants and emigrants (in hundreds).
Finally, Column (4) includes all regressors in a same specification. To account for autocorrelation in the
dependent variable, all specifications include a lagged dependent variable. Results are unchanged when I
drop it. Furthermore, I cluster the standard errors at the level of the village in each specification.
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1.10 Figures
Figure 1.1: Timing of pillages and conquest attempts
Notes: This figure draws on the attacks level dataset collected in this survey. In total, there are 600 attacks.
The figure plots the distribution of the recorded hour of the attack. The horizontal axes indicate the hour
of the attack in 24h format. The vertical axes indicate the mass of observations. The left quadrant plots
the distribution for recored pillages, and the right quadrant plots the distribution for recorded conquest
attempts. The red, vertical lines indicate the hours at which the sun rises (left line) and sets (right line). In
the outer of these lines the village is in the dark.
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Figure 1.2: Labor real productivity and volume hidden by households
α∗i (pi, τi, ei)
H∗i (pi, τi) α˜iei
Hi
Notes: This figure represents the relationship between the volume of output hidden in sector i, Hi, and the
realized output in sector i, α˜iei derived from the household’s first order conditions. If the realized labor
volume productivity is below a certain threshold, the household is at a corner solution and hides all output.
If the realized labor volume productivity is above the threshold, the volume hidden is an interior solution.
Any additions to the realized volume productivity do not increase the volume hidden by the household.
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Figure 1.3: Villages in sample
Notes: This map presents the location of the survey villages across Sud Kivu. Thick lines indicate frontiers
between Provinces, dashed lines indicate fronteers between Territoires. Dark green indicates a natural reserve
(forest). Blue indicates the lake Kivu. The villages endowed with coltan only are indicated in black circles.
The villages endowed with coltan and gold are indicated as black dots with golden circles. Villages endowed
with cassiterite only are indicated with orange dots, and agricultural villages are indicated as crosses. In each
Territoire (Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, Kabare, Kalehe) the survey visited the population of coltan villages
that were accessible to the survey teams. In addition, it visited a sample of gold villages randomly selected
within the Territoire. In addition to this, in the Territoire of Kalehe, the survey visited all mining villages, as
well as a matched sample of agricultural villages. To match agricultural villages to the population of mining
villages in Kalehe prior to the survey, I matched multiple data sources, including SAESSCAM (Congolese
institute of mining), the Institute of Peace (Belgium), and data I collected with my own qualitative fiedlwork
in May-July 2012 with mining traders. After compiling the population of mining villages of Kalehe, I then
used their geographic coordinates to assign to each a distance to: the lake, the natural reserve (forest),
Bukavu, Goma, Rwanda, and the road. Since mining villages are likely to be more remote by the fact
that they are more valuable and populations self select into locations, I matched the resulting population
of mining villages on the population of villages based on the Mahalanobis metric on these variables. To
obtain geo-locations of the population of villages prior to the survey, I used publicly available data from
Re´fe´rentiel Ge´ographique Commun (2010), that I compiled with a dataset collected by the International
Rescue Committee and Humphreys, Sa´nchez de la Sierra, and Van der Windt (2012, 2013a), who mapped
all villages in most Territoires of Sud Kivu and collected geo-locations for each.
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Figure 1.4: Group affiliation of the village monopoly of violence
Notes: This figure graphs the share of villages in the sample under the control of a given armed group. The
vertical axis represents the number of villages, and the horizontal axis represents the years. The green (light
grey) line indicates the proportion of villages in the sample controlled by armed groups. The red (dark) line
indicates the proportion of villages in the sample controlled by the Congolese army. The data fits well-known
historical phases of the conflict and post-conflict periods. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start and
end of the rebellion by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie. The thick vertical line on the left
indicates the timing of the Kimia II operations, and the thick vertical line on the right indicates the timing
of the emergence of the Raia Mutombokis (Raias). The Congolese Army progressively replaces armed groups
after 2004, the end of the second Congo War. However, local armed groups were integrated into the national
army after 2003, without relocation. Armed groups structures of command and network remained intact.
The distinction between the Congolese Army and armed groups is thus blurred.
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Figure 1.5: Duration of stationary bandits
Notes: The upper figure plots the distribution of the duration for all episodes in the sample in which a
village was under the control of a given stationary bandit. The lower figure plots the distribution of the
duration for all episodes in the sample in which a village was under the control of no stationary bandit. For
both figures, the vertical axes represent the density and the horizontal axes indicate the number of years.
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Figure 1.6: World prices of coltan and gold, by year
Notes: This figure plots the yearly average price of gold and coltan in the US market, in USD per kilogram.
The left vertical axis indicates the price of coltan and the right vertical axis indicates the price of gold. The
horizontal axis indicates the years. Source: United States Geological Survey (2010).
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Figure 1.7: Main predictions: attacks on mining camps
Notes: This figure plots the proportion of mines that have been attacked, by year. The left quadrant
plots this relationship for gold mines, and the right quadrant for coltan mines. The thick line indicates the
proportion of villages in which an attack took place. The right vertical axis indicates the local price of gold in
USD per gram. The dashed line represents the price of gold and the vertical line indicates the timing of the
coltan shock. I include only mines in which there was a monopoly of violence established in 1999, collecting
regular taxes, since occupation of mines in which there is no monopoly of violence occurs peacefully.
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Figure 1.8: Main predictions: conquest attempts on villages
Notes: This figure plots the proportion of villages that experienced a conquest attempt, by year. The left
quadrant plots this relationship for gold villages, and the right quadrant for coltan villages. The thick line
indicates the proportion of villages in which a conquest attack took place. The right vertical axis indicates
the local price of gold in USD per gram. The dashed line represents the price of gold and the vertical line
indicates the timing of the coltan shock. I include only villages in which there was a monopoly of violence
established in 1999, collecting regular taxes in the mining sector, since occupation of villages in which there
is no monopoly of violence occurs peacefully.
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Figure 1.9: Main predictions: village stationary bandits
Notes: This figure plots the proportion of villages that have a stationary bandit, by year. The left quadrant
plots this relationship for gold villages, and the right quadrant for coltan villages. The thick line indicates
the proportion of villages in which a there is a stationary bandit. The right vertical axis indicates the local
price of gold in USD per gram. The dashed line represents the price of gold and the vertical line indicates the
timing of the coltan shock. I include only villages in which there was not a monopoly of violence established
in 1999, collecting regular taxes in the mining sector, since the creation of village monopolies of violence can
only take place in those villages that did not have one before.
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Notes: This graph summarizes the results on the coltan price shock (Prediction P1). At the time of the coltan shock, villages were either
occupied by an armed group (stationary bandit present) or not (Stationary bandit absent). For an occupied village, armed groups may
attempt a conquest (”Conquest attempt”) or not (”No conquest attempt”). The attempt may be successful, in which case the armed
group emerges as the new stationary bandit (”Entry”) or it may fail (”No Entry”). If there is no conquest attempt, the stationary bandit
present at the village may also decide to leave (”Exit”) or remain as stationary bandit (”Stay”). If no stationary bandit is present, an
armed group may emerge as the village stationary bandit (”Entry”) or the village may remain unoccupied (”No Entry”).
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Notes: This graph summarizes the results on the gold price shock (Prediction P2). At the time of the gold shock, villages were either
occupied by an armed group (stationary bandit present) or not (Stationary bandit absent). For an occupied village, armed groups may
attempt a conquest (”Conquest attempt”) or not (”No conquest attempt”). The attempt may be successful, in which case the armed
group emerges as the new stationary bandit (”Entry”) or it may fail (”No Entry”). If there is no conquest attempt, the stationary bandit
present at the village may also decide to leave (”Exit”) or remain as stationary bandit (”Stay”). If no stationary bandit is present, an
armed group may emerge as the village stationary bandit (”Entry”) or the village may remain unoccupied (”No Entry”).
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Figure 1.12: Main predictions: matching
Notes: These figures present the results from matching. I matched coltan and non-coltan villages on distances to airports and roads, and
on administrative divisions. I regress pair-level difference in outcomes on year dummies. The graphs present the coefficient on the year
dummies, and their 90% confidence intervals. The black line shows the yearly coltan coefficients. Dotted lines represent the confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level.
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Figure 1.13: Randomization Inference results
Notes: These figures present the results from the randomization inference exercise. The upper figure plots
the distribution of coefficients on the main interaction Coltan X Coltan Price obtained by randomly assigning
prices of coltan to different years. The vertical line indicates the value of the coefficient estimated using real
prices. The resulting p-value is 0.065. The bottom figure plots the distribution of coefficients on the variable
Coltan X Coltan Price X d, where d is a dummy indicating whether the village distance to the closest airport
is above the median distance to the closest airport in the sample villages. The resulting p-value is 0.09.
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Figure 1.14: Average tax on output, by year and mineral endowment
Notes: This figure plots the average output tax level on the mineral, collected at the roadblock at mine
exit, per year. The left quadrant plots this relationship for gold villages, and the right quadrant plots this
relationship for coltan villages. The solid line indicates the specific tax rate on output. The tax rate is
converted to USD per kilogram and its axis is reported on the left vertical axis. The local price of coltan,
represented as a dashed line, is expressed in USD per kilogram, and reported on the right vertical axis.
Output taxes are collected based on the fee that miners have to pay for each bag of coltan.
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Figure 1.15: Average tax on daily mining labor, by year and mineral endowment
Notes: This figure plots the average level for the tax on labor (fee to enter the mine), collected at the entry
at mine, per year. The left quadrant plots this relationship for gold villages, and the right quadrant plots
this relationship for coltan villages. The solid line indicates the tax level on mining labor, captured at the
entry of the mine. It is the fee paid for one day of work. The tax on labor is in USD per day and the values
are reported on the left vertical axis. The local price of coltan, represented as a dashed line, is expressed in
USD per kilogram, and its values are reported on the right vertical axis.
75
Figure 1.16: Expectations of price shocks and stationary bandits
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the year and the vertical axis on the right indicates the proportion of
villages in which an event takes place. The vertical axis in the middle indicates the price of coltan per gram,
in US$. The left vertical axis indicates the gold price per kilogram, in US$. The dashed line represents the
local price of coltan, the dotted yellow line indicates the world price of gold. In the two figures above, the
black, solid, line is the entry of a new stationary bandit. The left quadrant uses villages in which the price
rise was expected to be temporary, permanent on the right quadrant. In the lower figures, the black, solid,
line is the departure of a stationary bandit from the village. The left quadrant uses villages in which the
price drop was expected to be permanent and temporary in the right quadrant.
Chapter 2
When do Monopolies of Violence act
like States?
Evidence from Stationary Bandits
Rau´l Sa´nchez de la Sierra
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“The study of the economics of crime [...] promises to offer profound insights into the
origins and workings of governments, not as most of us know them, but like those that have
ruled the bulk of humanity in the past, and continue their sway in many countries today.”
William Baumol, 1995
2.1 Introduction
Is a “monopoly of violence” a satisfactory view of the state? Historical accounts of state
formation argue that its origins are coercive and define the state as “monopolies of vio-
lence”. The dominant view is that Lords and bandits with a “monopoly of violence” in their
locality protected economic activity and developed fiscal capacity to finance wars of defense
(Tilly, 1985), which evolved into the states of the current era.1 Supporting the view that
the origins of states lie in organized crime, Olson (1993) developed a criminal metaphor of
states as “stationary bandits”. Stationary bandits who control the “monopoly of violence”
are residual claimants on economic activity, and thus develop an “encompassing interest” in
growth. In contrast, “roving bandits”, lacking a “monopoly of violence”, engage in unco-
ordinated expropriations and discourage economic activity. However, statistics emerge only
with well functionning states. This absence of data on preliminary states has shaped our
conceptualization of the state, and biased it towards governments as most of us know them:
stable, bureaucratic, capable of taxing income, subject to the rule of law and enjoying (often)
legitimacy. But since there are no statistics before states as we know them today, there is no
statistical evidence of whether and when monopolies of violence develop state-like behavior.
1“The trimmed-down argument stresses the interdependence of war making and state making and the
analogy between both of those processes and what, when less successful and smaller in scale, we call organized
crime. War makes states, I shall claim.” (Tilly, 1985)
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In this paper, I confront the view of the state as a “monopoly of violence” to statistical
evidence. I provide unique evidence linking criminal organizations holding local “monopolies
of violence” to state-like behavior, and the conditions on which this relationship hinges. I
start by developing a theory that integrates state-like behavior by armed groups with the
theory of optimal taxation. The key insight of the model is that armed groups holding a
monopoly of violence should expropriate only partially through stable taxation, and promote
economic activity. This behavior, however, should unravel when their monopoly comes under
threat and their horizon shrinks. I test this theory using a novel dataset on armed groups
in 140 villages of East Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Congo state is absent. I
find that armed groups that are settled as “stationary bandits” consistently provide public
goods. They develop tax plans consistent with optimal taxation as well as with historical
accounts of taxation by medieval states with rudimentary fiscal capacity, which were unable
to observe income directly. Exploiting the timing of a peace agreement, I find that their
activity has positive impact on economic activity. Finally, I use the timing of a military
threat to show that stationary bandits who relied on stable taxation and protection turn
instead into violent arbitrary expropriations when their monopoly of violence comes under
threat.
As a foundation for this paper, I managed a team of data collectors in stateless and
war-torn areas of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in order to collect a village-level
yearly panel dataset of activity of armed groups. The data allows me to identify types of
violence, armed groups’ monopolies of violence at the village level, types of taxes levied by
armed groups, and various types of public goods provision by armed groups since 1995.
Eastern Congo is a well-suited environment to examine states at their early stages. The
state is considered a “failed state”. As a result, armed groups have proliferated in the East,
where they implement violent robberies but also control individual villages, removed from
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the state.2 They fight to control territory, in which they administer “monopolies of violence”,
collect taxes, provide public goods, and even enjoy popular support, as in historical accounts
of European state formation.
In the first result of the paper, I examine the patterns of taxation, and find that armed
groups’ taxes are consistent with optimal taxation theory, and with the historical accounts
of taxation strategies of medieval European states with low fiscal capacity. They tax observ-
able mineral output, households, population transit, observable market activity, labor, and
develop elaborate tax plans at production sites that reflect optimal taxation. Furthermore,
they consistently provide public goods, such as protection, justice, and village administra-
tion, and they enjoy high levels of popular support.
If armed groups holding a monopoly of violence are residual claimants of economic ac-
tivity through taxation, they should promote economic activity in order to tax it. In the
second result of the paper, I examine the impact of armed groups’ control on economic ac-
tivity. I exploit the heterogeneous effects of price shocks, as well as the timing and targeting
of a national peace agreement to establish that settled armed groups may have a positive
impact on growth. In 2003 the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD) agreed
to vacate the villages under its control, leaving these villages unprotected. I find that the
withdrawal of the RCD led to a decrease in economic activity in the villages it formerly con-
trolled, compared to similar villages. This suggests that armed groups holding a monopoly
of violence can have a positive effect on output in a context where their alternative is close
to anarchical.
However, armed groups’ “state-like” behavior depends on their ability to defend their
monopoly of violence. In the third result of the paper, I exploit the timing, and the spatial
2See United Nations Security Council (2002), Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani (2011), Stearns (2011) and
Verweijen (2013). See also the RRMP program evaluation reports http://www.rrmp.org.
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targeting, of a large military intervention against an armed group. In 2009, the Congolese
Army led a large-scale operation aimed at eradicating the Forces de Libe´ration du Rwanda
(FDLR), which drastically reduced their time-horizon. Using this shock, I establish that
in response to the intervention, the FDLR abandoned partial expropriation through regular
taxation and increased arbitrary and violent expropriations in the villages they controlled
(pillages). This result confirms that a “monopoly of violence” is not a satisfactory view
of the state. The stability of the monopoly of violence is a necessary condition to observe
state-like behavior.
This paper’s findings have important implications for existing scholarship in economics
and other disciplines.3 The state at its origins has been studied across disciplines. Volun-
taristic theories argue that states emerged as a result of a mutually beneficial social contract
(Hobbes, 1651, Rousseau, 1762). On the other hand, conflict theories of the state, which
are the dominant view, trace the origins of states to the motives of organized crime of max-
imizing their revenues from expropriation of the private sector. They suggest that states
arise from violent organizations able to secure monopolies of violence (Carneiro, 1970, Tilly,
1985). Olson (1993) endowed this work with theoretical foundations, justifying why orga-
nized crime should develop state-like behavior. This paper also expands a large body of work
in economics which rationalizes the behavior of states (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Ace-
moglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2006, Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002, Besley and Persson, 2009,
Grossman, 1997, North and Weingast, 1989). Despite having been studied across all social
sciences, nascent states and their links with organized crime are unexplored with formal
statistical methods, since the formation of states precedes the creation of statistics. As Tilly
(1985), I identify organized criminals that use coercion to maintain states and develop fiscal
3The literature on state formation is separated between early and modern state formation. The literature
on early state formation is reviewed in Claessen and Van de Velde (1991) and Claessen and Skalnik (2011).
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capacity in order to extract surplus. As Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996), I use
optimal taxation to explain why organizations of violence holding a “monopoly of violence”
would exhibit state-like behavior. I then challenge this view, and question under what condi-
tions the “monopoly of violence” can be a sufficient characterization of the state. However, I
go a step further: I am able to test these predictions and their refinements on disaggregated
data about criminal “monopolies of violence”. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013) use
village level data to show that Colombia does not hold a monopoly of violence, and instead
relies on alliances with paramilitaries to maintain its sovereignty. In so doing, they demon-
strate that a monopoly of violence is not a necessary feature of a state that is recognized
by the international community. In this paper, I do the reverse exercise: I provide evidence
suggesting that a monopoly of violence, if uncontested, can be a sufficient characterization
of the state.
This paper also contributes to the civil-war literature. Blattman and Miguel (2010) con-
clude that the study of civil war is limited by the absence of high quality disaggregated data.
The data I was able to collect contributes to this literature. Furthermore, I introduce taxa-
tion to the set of armed groups’ choices that have been considered to date in this literature.
By showing that the ability of armed groups to sustain their monopoly of violence reduces
violence against civilians, this paper has implications for explaining violence as well as the
types of violence.
While the political economy of institutions literature takes the “monopoly of violence”
as given, the civil war literature explains the motives that lead individuals to use violence -
assumed to be for a detrimental purpose (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Humphreys and Wein-
stein, 2006, Weinstein, 2007). In this paper, I link these two strands of literature by showing
that actors that have access to violent means may reduce levels of expropriation and promote
economic activity in a particular location if they hold a sustainable “monopoly of violence”,
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leading to state-like behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the setting and
Section 2.3 presents the theory. Section 2.4 describes the data and data collection strategy.
Sections 2.5 to 2.7 present the three results. Section 2.5 describes the patterns of taxation
and public goods provision of armed groups that control local monopolies of violence. Sec-
tion 2.6 presents the results on the economic impacts of armed groups. Section 2.7 presents
the results on the time horizon. Section 2.8 provides a brief discussion and Section 2.9
concludes.
2.2 Background
Benefiting from the collapse of the central state, armed groups in the Democratic Republic of
Congo have proliferated since the 1990’s.4 To finance their operations, they collect taxes on
the mineral sector and other activities. Currently, there are 39 identified armed groups. My
data spans two historical phases: the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and the “post-conflict”
period (2003-2013).
The Second Congo War (1998-2003) involved a large number of armed groups. In 1998,
the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD) launched an offensive to overthrow
the former DRC president in office, Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila.5 The coup did not succeed, but
a divided RCD units controled the Eastern provinces, and the Congolese state defended the
West. In rural areas, the RCD was opposed by the self-defense groups known as the Mayi-
Mayi and by the Forces De Libe´ration du Rwanda (FDLR). These groups were internally
divided and their local strategies decentralized. Ultimately, nine foreign armies and thirty
4The country was named Zaire until 1997.
5The First Congo War lasted from 1996 to 1997. It ended with the overthrow of President Mobutu.
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local militia participated in the war mostly in the East.
In the “post-conflict” period (2003-2013), the Congolese state, assisted by the United Na-
tions Peacekeeping force (MONUSCO), struggled to regain control over the East. In a peace
agreement signed in Sun-City (South-Africa) in 2003, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la
De´mocratie (RCD) agreed to vacate the East of the Congo in order to integrate the national
government. This left its former villages without protection and exposed to predation by
other armed groups. In the aftermath, the Forces De Libe´ration du Rwanda (FDLR) and
local self defense groups regained territorial control until 2009, when the Congolese army,
the United Nations peacekeeping force and Rwanda, removed them from a large part of
the East. This operation, named Kimia II, relocated the FLDR to the forest. Currently,
however, armed groups still control up to 95% of the territory in some Eastern district.6
Between May 2012 and November 2013, the armed group named M23 established its own
administration in a large territory, and formed numerous Ministries. These groups are ani-
mated by ideology, self-defense, as well as economic interests. Economic motives stand out
as one of the major motivations across the two periods.7
2.3 A theory of stationary bandits
“It is normal. Everyone who occupies a village develops strategies to maximize the revenues
in the village. When we know that we are going to be relocated out of the village, we make
sure to steal as much as possible [...]. This is why the armed man is never friend if he finds
6In Shabunda, an administrative divsion in Sud-Kivu that this survey visited, the Raia-Mutombokis con-
trol 95% of the territory. See for instance http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/02/28/shabunda-la-milice-
raia-mutomboki-occupe-95-du-territoire-selon-son-administrateur/
7See the following historical accounts: Clark (2002), Nest (2011), Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani (2011),
Ngonzola-Ntalaja (2002), Stearns (2011), Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005), Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers
(2004), Van Reybrouck (2008), Autesserre (2006), Autesserre (2007), Autesserre (2008), Verweijen (2013).
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no interest in it.” Interview with armed group member.
In this section, I develop a model where an armed group (henceforth, the bandit) can
acquire resources by taxing households’ activities. The model generates three insights. First,
when income is not observed, taxes should be levied on observable economic activity and be
inversely proportional to tax base elasticities; in particular, since gold is easy to hide, the
tax on gold output should be very small, or absent. Second, when they control a monopoly
of violence, stationary bandits can have a positive effect on economic activity. Third, the
time horizon increases the returns to refrain from full expropriation (pillages) and to protect
economic activity. The model is similar to Besley and Persson (2013), although it ignores
dynamics.
Anecdotal observation dictates the following modeling choices. First, the model considers
taxes on inputs and outputs. Armed groups indeed levy taxes on mineral output, taxes on
mining labor inputs, taxes on food sales, taxes on transit of persons, taxes on village mills and
poll taxes. I focus on labor taxes and output taxes for parsimony, and because they capture in
essence the behavioral responses in all other activities. Second, the model considers a static
framework where bandits can choose between acquiring civilian assets through uncoordinated
pillage or instead attempt to impose a “monopoly of violence”, in which case they may extract
revenue through taxation, which is announced to the households. These extreme forms of
expropriation also reflect the anecdotal observation of armed groups’ behavior in Eastern
Congo. Of 600 recorded violent events in the sample villages, 56% are pillage operations,
aimed at capturing village assets. On the contrary, 40% are conquest attempts, aimed
at gaining the monopoly of violence in a village, by defeating a competing armed group.
Once established, armed groups collect taxes. Figure 2.1 supports the empirical distinction
between the two types of expropriation. The figure shows that conquests take place early
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in the morning, possibly to surprise the defense force, and pillage operations take place at
sunset, consistent with a crime deterrence hypothesis (Becker, 1968).
2.3.1 Model setup
Consider one village economy and a mass of roving bandits. roving bandits engage in uncoor-
dinated expropriation of households’ assets and output. They are roving because they have
a short time horizon, and do not internalize future production in the village. One bandit,
however, has superior force, and can choose to impose his “monopoly of violence” in the
village, turning into a stationary bandit. If he acts as stationary bandit, he announces his
theft plan to households (a tax plan) so as to maximize his taxation revenue. The village is
composed of k of identical households, j = 1, 2, ..., k. In what follows, I drop the household
identifiers. Households are endowed with assets and choose the level of the following vari-
ables in N sectors i = 1, 2, . . . , n: labor supply, the amount of labor to hide from the tax on
labor, and the volumes of output to hide from the tax on output. The stationary bandit is
a Stackelberg leader and households are uncoordinated followers.
At step 0, the strong bandit chooses whether to compete over village assets by means
of pillaging (as a roving bandit) or to acquire the monopoly of expropriation at the village
(become a stationary bandit), at a fixed cost F. The fixed cost captures the costs incurred
in the attempt to conquer the village (waging troops, logistics, and expected losses for the
group), the investments made to maintain the control of the village, and potentially, the
costs of administering the village. At step 1, the stationary bandit expropriates. If, in step
0, the strong bandit chooses to acquire resources by pillaging, he competes with other roving
bandits for expropriation. For simplicity, I assume that roving bandits, since they do not
have a long term relationship with households, can’t commit not to fully expropriate village
assets and output. When there are only roving bandits, therefore, households anticipate
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that they will be expropriated with probability 1 and do not produce. Therefore, roving
bandits can only acquire household assets. If, in step 0, the strong bandit chooses instead
to acquire the monopoly of violence (and becomes a stationary bandit), I assume he is able
to develop a relationship with the households that allows him to commit to his promise of
theft.8 The stationary bandit expropriates using taxes on output τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn), taxes
on labor inputs t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn). He announces how much he plans to steal (tax) such as
to maximize his revenues taking into account behavioral responses by the households. I first
present the households’ and stationary bandit’s problems in step 1, when the strong bandit
has acquired the monopoly of violence. In a second part, I derive testable implications re-
flecting the relationship the stationary bandit and the economy. I focus on the three sets
of implications: properties of optimal taxes; economic impact of the stationary bandit, and
effect of the time horizon.
2.3.2 The stationary bandit’s economy
This section lays out the optimization problems of households and the stationary bandit,
and discusses under which conditions it will not be possible to tax gold output.
Labor volume productivity, α˜ ∈ Rn, is stochastic, and has the cumulative distribution
function F (α˜). The sector volume productivities, α˜i ∈ R are independent across sectors, and
have a known cumulative distribution function Fi(α˜i). Output in sector i, y˜i is a linear func-
tion of labor inputs and volume productivity: y˜i = α˜iei. Households are residual claimants.
They sell the output they produce in the world markets, where the prices of outputs, pi, are
8The assumption of binding commitment by the stationary bandit reflects features of a repeated relation-
ship between the bandit and households. Without this assumption, the bandit will never be able to commit
and will always expropriate 100% after production. Anticipating this, the households would not produce.
However, this scenario leads back to anarchy. Analogous behavior can be obtained by simply introducing a
cost in the bandit’s payoff from deviating from the taxation plan. For similar treatment of the future, see
Dixit (2004)
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exogenous. Households’ Bernoulli utility is concave in the unique consumption good, and
the disutility from labor, c(e), is separable across sectors as well as convex in each sector
labor supply.
Prior to the realization of uncertainty, but knowing the distribution of real labor produc-
tivities and the vectors of taxes and prices, the households choose how much labor to supply
to each sector ei, i = 1, 2, ...n and how much labor to hide from labor taxes e
H
i , i = 1, 2, ...n.
Then, upon observing realized production, households choose the volume of output they
conceal from taxes Hi, i = 1, 2, ...n, given the sector tax on output τi and the output price
pi. The stationary bandit expropriates after households have allocated labor supply, hidden
labor, and concealed output.
Households’ revenues from production in sector i take the following form:
pii = (1− τi)piα˜iei + τipiHi − ti
(
ei − eHi
)−Gi(Hi, pi)− Ei (eHi , pi)
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where L is the household’s total time endowment, and α˜ ∈ Rn is the vector of labor pro-
ductivity realizations. The problem is akin to a portfolio allocation problem, albeit here the
household allocates its labor to sectors with uncertain volume productivities α˜i; investment
is costly (the disutility of labor supply); investment is taxed (the taxes on labor inputs); the
returns to investment are taxed (the taxes on output); and the household can conceal part
of the returns to investment (by concealing output). The household’s first order condition
implies conditions under which the household will conceal the totality of output produced.
For a given combination of taxes, prices, labor supply, and volume productivity realization,
the household will conceal all output produced if and only if the marginal revenue from
concealing an additional unit exceeds its marginal cost, i.e. when τipi > G
i
1(α˜iei, pi). In that
case, the optimal volume concealed is a function of τi, pi, ei, but also of the productivity
realization α˜i, i.e. H
∗
i = Hi(pi, α˜iei, τi). However, when the household conceals only part of
the output he produced (at interior solutions), the volume concealed is independent of the
realization, i.e. H∗i = Hi(pi, τi). The volume concealed, as a function of realized output has
the shape represented in Figure 2.2. The household’s optimal choice is characterized by the
following functions: e∗i (p, Fα, τ, t), e
H∗
i (pi, ti), H
∗
i (pi, α˜iei, τi). The sector i labor supply, e
∗
i ,
is decreasing in pj, ∀j 6= i. In the absence of income effects, it is increasing in pi and in Eαi.
Finally, with sufficient prudence (large u′′′), e∗j is decreasing in V ar(αj).
The stationary bandit chooses taxes to maximize his tax revenue.9 Since taxes are commu-
nicated to households before they make their choices, the stationary bandit internalizes the
households’ behavioral responses at the time of choosing the taxes. The stationary bandit’s
problem is:
9If the bandit would instead maximize a social welfare function, such as a Bergson-Samuelson functional,
the optimal taxes would lie between the revenue maximizing taxes and zero. Revenue maximizing optimal
taxes can be derived from the maximization of a social welfare function when the weighted average of the
social marginal utilities is zero. For a review of the optimal taxation literature, see Salanie (2011) and
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When input taxes are not available, the revenue maximizing tax rates on output (optimal


















is the elasticity of observable output in the sector, and Y˜i = (αiei −Hi) pi. Define
sei =
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i . This formula
captures that the optimal tax is proportional to the inverse of factor elasticities, a well-
established result of optimal taxation (Ramsey, 1927). In the absence of distributional
concerns, the indices of relative discouragement do not enter the optimal tax formula. The
higher the elasticity of the sector’s taxable output, the smaller the optimal tax rate. The last
term in the denominator captures the fiscal externalities arising in the presence of multiple
taxable activities. Increasing the tax rate in sector l might induce reallocation of labor to
other sectors raising the optimal tax.
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2.3.3 Testable implications
In this section, I first derive properties of the armed group optimal tax and discuss impli-
cations for the provision of public goods. I then discuss the effects of stationary bandits on
economic activity. Finally, I discuss the importance of the time horizon.
stationary bandits, Taxation and Public Goods: seeing like a state
It is straightforward from the inverse elasticities formula that the stationary bandit will only
tax economic activity that cannot be fully hidden. Were a tax to be levied in activities that
can be perfectly hidden, households would leave no taxable revenue to the stationary bandit.
As a result, the stationary bandit’s taxation is limited to the following activities: observable
transit, observable output, observable labor, sales of agricultural products at markets (where
they can be observed), and taxes per household in the village (poll tax). Indeed, if the cost
of migrating is high, the elasticity of households’ location is low. Poll taxes are common
among medieval Western states (Ardant, 1975), in which income was not observed.
If possible, the stationary bandit will increase the households’ cost of concealing output
or hiding labor. By increasing the cost of sheltering activities, bandits decrease elasticities,
increase the optimal tax rate, and increase tax revenues. To increase the tax revenues from
the transit of persons, the stationary bandit may regulate village entries, since regulation of
transit decreases the elasticity of activities related to transit. To increase the tax revenues
from agricultural produce, the stationary bandit may prohibit access to alternative markets
to the one they tax. These actions are consistent with evidence on early modern states
(Ardant, 1975). Three auxiliary predictions follow from the optimal tax.10
First, the stationary bandit taxing optimally one sector will offer a mix of labor input
10The proofs of these predictions are in the Appendix.
91
and output taxes. This result obtains whenever the household and the bandit are risk-averse,
or when labor and outputs can be partially hidden from taxes by the household. Absent
uncertainty and with perfect monitoring of labor or output, a tax on output is perfectly
equivalent to a tax on labor. In the case of risk aversion, since output is stochastic and the
bandit can tax both output and non-stochastic labor input, the optimal tax is an insurance
contract. The risk from variable output is shared between the household and the bandit.
The higher is the tax on output, the more risk is transfered away from the household to the
bandit. The optimal mix with thus rely more on the output tax the more risk averse the
household is relative to the bandit. In the case of imperfect monitoring of output and labor
input, the bandit will maximize tax revenues by designing a mix of output and input taxes
(even if there is no uncertainty). Since both risk aversion and hiding activities are plausible,
a first auxiliary prediction is that tax plans at mining sites should involve a mix of output
and labor taxes.










This captures the role of reallocation of factors of production across sectors. If the stationary
bandit collects taxes in various sectors, raising the tax in one sector leads to a reallocation
of factors towards other sectors, which he may be able to tax, increasing his tax revenues
from other sectors. This “fiscal externality” raises the stationary bandit’s optimal tax.
Third, when there is only one sector, and in the absence of income effects, a rise in the
price of output, by decreasing the elasticity of labor supply, may under certain conditions
increase the optimal output tax.
I do not provide a formal treatment of the optimal provision of public goods here. As in
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Bates and Lien (1985) and McGuire and Olson (1996) the “monopoly of violence” will have an
interest in increasing the provision of public goods up to the point where the additional dollar
spent on public goods equates the marginal impact of public goods on output, discounted
by the rate of taxation. Public goods provision, therefore, will be suboptimal since the
stationary bandit is only a partial residual claimant on economic activity - he only internalizes
a percentage of output through the optimal tax. However, the stationary bandit should
provide public goods in order to increase tax revenues. The public goods I consider in
this paper are protection, provision of order (Justice), and provision of infrastructure (road
construction and cleaning), which are the most common public goods needed in the area
under study.
Economic impact of stationary bandits
Stationary bandits are residual claimants on economic activity since they are in principle
the sole actor able to expropriate systematically. Therefore, through taxes, they internalize
economic activity, and develop an “encompassing interest” (Bates and Lien, 1985, McGuire
and Olson, 1996, Olson, 1993). While their expropriation distorts economic incentives, they
have an interest in providing security and increase economic activity to increase their tax
collection. If the gains from protection by the stationary bandit overcome the distortions
generated by his taxation, stationary bandits can have a positive impact on economic ac-
tivity. Since he also introduces a distortion by taxing observable economic activity, the
stationary bandit will be more likely to have a positive impact on economic activity when
there is anarchy in his absence.
Under the assumption that in the absence of the stationary bandit, households are ex-
propriated with probability one, e∗R = 0 and yR = 0. Suppose, furthermore, that the costs of
hiding output are prohibitive, so output cannot be hidden (G1(H, p) = +∞ ∀H, p). In this
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case, the households’ labor supply under a stationary bandit are positive. Since production
is zero when there is no protection by a stationary bandit, the stationary bandit leads to
increases in output.
Of course, the village may not be expropriated with probability 1 in the absence of a
stationary bandit, and crime may also occur by roving bandits in villages with a stationary
bandit. Suppose that an unprotected village may be expropriated by roving bandits with
some positive probability, q. When households are risk neutral, output with a stationary
bandit is larger than output without a stationary bandit if and only if the probability to be
expropriated, q, is larger than the optimal tax rate under the stationary bandit. Introduc-
ing risk aversion reinforces the impact of the stationary bandit on economic activity, since
by having the monopoly of violence, he can reduce uncertainty by developing a predictable
and credible taxation plan. When households’ preferences are such that they have sufficient
prudence, they will respond to the reduction in uncertainty generated by the predictable
expropriation plan by increasing their labor supply and thus output.
Therefore, when a village has a stationary bandit, production is likely to be higher than
otherwise, especially in a context of anarchy.
Stationary bandits and the time horizon
“If an armed man knows he must live in a village, he needs the population. Groups who
prefer to pillage, it’s because they know they are transitory. Thus, pillage is the opposed of
settling. ” Interview with armed group’s member.
Consider a stationary bandit with infinite periods. Let p˜i = piβ be the the effective time
discount factor, where β is the time discount factor, and pi is the contemporaneous probability
that the stationary bandit loses its monopoly, identical for all periods. When the effective
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time horizon shortens, for instance from a decrease in the contest success probability, pi, the
returns from sustaining a monopoly of violence net of the costs of maintaining it decrease.
In this case, pillage becomes relatively more attractive. A reduction in p˜i can arise from
strategic interactions, if the stationary bandit’s monopoly of violence in the village comes
under threat.
To see this, let V (p, Fα, a0) be the stationary bandit’s value function. The bandit chooses
to be stationary if:
p˜iV (p, Fα, a0)− F > Vr
Clearly the left hand side is monotonically increasing in the effective time discount factor p˜i
and ∃ pi such that: ∀ p˜i ≥ pi, the bandit chooses to be stationary bandit; ∀p˜i < pi, the bandit
chooses to be roving bandit.
The role of the time horizon can also be elicited through its effect on the optimal tax.
Suppose now that the bandit is stationary forever. Let the contemporaneous tax revenue be
R. Suppose that taxes today affect production tomorrow. This is reasonable, for instance,
if households’ production and assets are complementary, or if households may migrate out
of the village in response to high taxes, and a migration response is slow. Let this state
variable be nt, where nt+1 = n(nt, τt) and
∂n(nt,τt)
∂τt
< 0. The stationary bandit’s value
function is:




By the principle of optimality, this can be rewritten as:
V (n0, p, Fα, a0) = max{τ0}
{R (τ0, n0)}+ p˜iV (n1, p, Fα, a0.)
= max
{τ}
{R (τ, n)}+ p˜iV (n (n, τ) , p, Fα, a0)
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λ = −∂n (nt, τt)
∂τt
> 0
















Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the optimal tax decreases with the size
of the the time horizon,
∂τ∗(p˜i)
∂p˜i < 0 and
∂V (n0,p,Fα,a0,L)
∂p˜i > 0. Therefore, when the time
horizon shrinks, or when the monopoly of violence comes under threat by a challenging armed
group, an established stationary bandit will increase the rate of expropriation and may even
lose interest in maintaining the monopoly of violence. But when the monopoly of violence
breaks down, the bandit is no longer residual claimant. This unravels the collection of stable
taxes and protection, and induces arbitrary, full expropriation by the same stationary bandit.
2.4 The data
This section describes the data. I first describe how I collected the data. I then describe
how I defined the main variables in the survey and present the summary statistics.
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2.4.1 Data collection
In order to obtain data on armed groups’ violence and taxation, I designed a data collection
project in Eastern Congo. I trained and monitored 11 local surveyors who collected the
data between May 2012 and October 2013. In each village, the surveyors trained a group
of village history specialists (village chiefs, elders, and mining sector experts) for the collec-
tion of non-sensitive historical data under adequate compensation (henceforth, the village
specialists). The data collection activities followed a strict protocol, designed to last 7 days
per village. During the day, the surveyors implemented retrospective household surveys, in
private. In the evenings they provided guidance and corrected the progress of the village spe-
cialists. In the last day of data collection activities in each village, after having implemented
8 household surveys, the surveyors held a day-long meeting with the village specialists. In
this meeting, the researchers and village specialists confronted the data gathered from the
different sources, and surveyors collected additional sensitive data based on the information
they gathered in the household surveys. The data from this meeting compiles information
from all activities and is the main source of data used in this paper.
Since armed groups are mostly active around mining activity, this study focuses on vil-
lages endowed with minerals. I also sampled a subset of agricultural villages, which I selected
matching agricultural villages to all mining villages based on all geographic characteristics,
prior to data collection. In each administrative division, I drew a random sample of gold
villages, and the population of coltan villages. Figure 2.3 maps the villages in the sam-
ple based on their endowment of minerals. The villages endowed with coltan and gold are
well distributed across the various administrative divisions, with no clustering of villages by
mineral endowment.11
11To identify the villages endowed with gold, coltan, or other minerals, I used the data from a mapping
implemented in 2009 by IPIS, a Belgian research institute, and SAESSCAM, a local mining institute. To
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2.4.2 Measurement
This section defines the variables I use in this paper .
I define the presence of a stationary bandit in a given village as whether an armed person
or group had a monopoly of violence in the village for at least 6 months in a given year.
stationary bandits are common in Eastern Congo, and villagers faced no difficulties identify-
ing stationary bandits from roving bandits; the former have no intention to leave the village
in the short-term, and usually provide protection to the whole village. The language used
to identify stationary bandits is “organization of security”. Therefore, implicitly, stationary
bandits always provide security.
To measure violent events, I focus on two major types of attacks, consistent with the
anecdotal evidence. I measure conquest attempts by whether an armed group engages in vi-
olence with another armed group, with the aim of acquiring the monopoly of violence of the
village. I define pillages as violent events on the village aimed exclusively at capturing assets.
Local populations were able to distinguish the purpose of the attacks unambiguously. Pil-
lages also differ from conquest attempts on observable characteristics, which facilitates their
distinction for the local population. In a pillage, armed groups usually arrive at sunset and
flee with the village assets within a narrow period of time. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution
verify these lists, I interviewed in Bukavu a large number of mineral dealers working through Sud-Kivu,
during 3 months of preparatory work. Based on the compiled dataset, I endowed the surveyors with a list
containing all mining villages of each administrative division. In order to strengthen the representativeness
of the sample to be selected, I designed a strict prospection protocol. Following this protocol, in the first week
of work in each administrative division, the surveyors verified the existence and endowments of the villages
in the list, and added mining villages they discovered to exist. Upon finishing prospection work, and in areas
where they had access to electricity, the surveyors communicated the cross-checked lists by satellite phone.
I then implemented random sampling of gold villages using a statistical package and communicated the
selection using satellite phone. In areas without access to electricity, the surveyors followed a strict protocol
for selecting gold villages, based on a list of random numbers I previously generated using a statistical
package.12
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of attack times, separating conquests from pillages.13
To measure taxes, I collected both the intensive and extensive margin of taxation on dif-
ferent activities. There was always consensus on whether an expropriation was a tax. Local
populations are familiar with distinct types of expropriation by various actors. Empirically,
the distinction was straightforward: a tax is always anticipated and perceived part of an im-
plicit contract with the population, but other types of expropriation (pillages, or arbitrary
expropriations, known as “tracasseries”) are neither anticipated nor agreed upon.
To measure public goods, I collected data from three sources. First, the definition of sta-
tionary bandits implies that they provide protection. Second, to go a step further, and since
the provision of security may just be a claim, I asked the villagers whether the armed group
was effectively providing protection. This captures the difference between the running level
of security and the level of security that would otherwise have occurred in the absence of
effort by the stationary bandit to maintain security. Third, I collected data on the provision
of justice, as well as the establishment of new administration of justice by armed groups.
Fourth, I collected yearly data on public works by armed groups, and public works under
the demands of armed groups - road construction and road cleaning.14
The next section describes the strategies implemented to address measurement error and
potential reporting biases at the data collection phase.
13The following quote is extracted from an interview with an armed group’s member. “In case of fast
pillage, such as FDLR operations, it is only 30 minutes. Certain goods are not pillaged (heavy goods: cows,
beans, heavy minerals, household members). It is when the pillager is certain that there will be no external
intervention that he can take all and can use some village members for their transport.”
14The village mineral endowment was already identified during prospection work. I did not record any
discrepancy between the mineral endowment from prospection and survey data indicating whether the village
had exploited a given mineral. I use yearly prices of minerals from United States Geological Survey (2010).
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2.4.3 Design based strategies to minimize measurement error
To address measurement error at the design phase, I used three strategies. First, I designed
the village protocols so that surveyors extracted multiple signals on the village history from
private conversations in 8 household surveys. During the last day meeting, surveyors then
confronted the information collected in household surveys to the information they collected
with the assistance of the village specialists. This strategy was highly effective as an averaging
method. It also helped surveyors correct information provided by the village specialists
during the final meeting. Indeed, households were overwhelmingly willing to reveal armed
groups’ data in private, and there was consensus that this was not problematic.15 To increase
confidence in the survey measures, Section 2.8.2 compares the data to other data sources,
as well as well-known political events. Second, as suggested in (de Nicola and Gine, 2012), I
developed an exhaustive set of time cues, based on information gathered in the survey pilot,
and on well known regional and national political events. Time cues allowed respondents
and surveyors to assign with years to regional events known to all. Third, survey questions
focused on events easy to memorize. For instance, there are two types of bags that carry the
heavy minerals (50kg and 75kg). To measure the output tax, surveyors obtained the fee paid
on one bag and bag size used. I then compute the tax per kilogram based on these variables.
To measure the tax on labor input, surveyors obtained the fee paid to obtain the right to
work one day in the mine. These fees are stable. Because mining taxes are the heavier daily
expense of miners, they were straightforward to collect. The responses of households and
village specialists were highly correlated at time of the interviews.
15Armed groups were absent in most villages. The Congolese army already protected a large number of
the sampled villages. In the Territoire of Shabunda, certain villages were under the control of the Raia-
Mutombokis at time of the interview. The Raia-Mutombokis did not consider sensitive the information
collected by this survey. This armed group had existed for less than one year. Surveyors collected historical
data on events preceding the Raias and about the Raias without problems. Surveyors were confident that
they achieved the same degree of quality as in other villages, including for data on the present years.
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2.4.4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2.4 shows armed groups’ presence in the sample. There are 18 armed organizations.
Most of the variation is concentrated in four groups: the Congolese Army (40% of control
year*villages and 5% of attacks), Mayi-Mayi’s (20% of control year*villages and 21 % of
attacks), RCD-Goma (15% of control year*villages and 11% of attacks), and FDLR (12%
of control year*villages and 45% of attacks). The RCD and the Mayi-Mayi’s were the main
actors during the Second Congo war. The Congolese Army and the FDLR are 85 % of the
occupation year*villages after 2006. Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of stationary bandits
episodes duration. The median duration of each stationary bandit is 4 years, so is the median
unprotected episode. Table 2.1 shows summary statistics.
The next sections establish three results. First, Section 2.5 reveals that the stationary
bandits tax is consistent with optimal taxation when households’ income is unobserved, and
provide public goods. This behavior is comparable to feudal European states strategies to
maximize tax revenues, as described in Ardant (1975), and provides support to Tilly (1985)
and Olson (1993)’s criminal account of states. Second, Section 2.6 shows that control by
stationary bandits has positive impacts on economic activity. Third, Section 2.7 establishes
that stationary bandits limit their expropriation rate and commit to taxation plans only
when their monopoly of violence is not under threat.
2.5 Stationary bandits’ taxes and public goods: seeing
like a state
This section examines the taxation and public goods provision patterns of stationary bandits.
I demonstrate that stationary bandits’ expropriation strategies, taxation, is comparable to
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medieval European states and consistent with optimal taxation. Furthermore, I observe that
stationary bandits consistently provide basic public goods and enjoy some popular support.
2.5.1 Stationary Bandits’ Taxation
Armed groups use taxes on various observable economic activities. Table 2.2 shows all taxes
that I was able to observe in this study. I report the proportion of village*years in the sample
in which armed groups collect any of the observed taxes. There are 1,977 such observations
since 1998.
As shown in Table 2.2, in 30% of observations in which a stationary bandit controls a
mining village, stationary bandits raise taxes on the mining sector, where they focus on
taxing mining output and mining labor. To tax mining output, they create barriers at the
exit of the production site, where workers carrying mineral are asked to pay a fixed fee that is
tied to the size of the bag they carry. These results provide support to the inverse elasticities
rule: while the elasticity of gold concealing activities is high, the tax on gold output is low.
As shown in Table 2.2, to tax mining input, stationary bandits create barriers at the
entry of the production site, where workers intending to work are required to pay a fee per
day of work. This is a tax on observable labor inputs, albeit implemented in dollars per day
of work. In Section 2.3.3, I argued that stationary bandits, as European feudal states, should
attempt to take actions that increase the cost of concealing economic activity. Furthermore
qualitative evidence I collected demonstrates that at production sites, stationary bandits
make efforts to increase the costs of hiding mineral output. They use violence in order to
racket mineral output when civilians are hiding it, and confiscate clothes in order to inspect
them.
Table 2.2 also shows that in 24% of observations with a stationary bandit, the stationary
bandit raises taxes on sales of agricultural output in the local market. To collect these taxes,
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stationary bandits station at the local market where traders of cassava are asked to pay a
daily tax for the right to sell cassava in the market. While taxes differ by the type of good
sold at the market, I collected only taxes on cassava for parsimony. This tax is similar to
taxes raised by European feudal states in rural markets. Furthermore, as documented in
Ardant (1975), in order to increase tax revenues, medieval states imposed the location of
rural fairs so as to diminish the elasticity of observable economic activity that they could tax.
I find that the stationary bandits in my sample engage in the same practice. The qualitative
evidence collected by the surveyors and myself demonstrates that settled armed groups create
and impose local agricultural markets in order to collect taxes. They prohibit households
to use alternative markets. This decreases the tax elasticity of observable economic activity
and raises the tax revenues.
In addition, Table 2.2 reveals that in 35% of observations in which a stationary bandits
is present, the stationary bandits raises a tax on transit of persons. To implement this tax,
they impose roadblocks at the village entries and exits, where they require a regular fee per
passage. Furthermore, the qualitative data reveals that to maximize the tax collected from
this activity, they regulate population movement, and only allow the population to transit
through a limited set of checkpoints. This behavior is analogous to European feudal states’
strategies to raise taxes on economic activity when income was unobserved. As described in
Ardant (1975), states used to regulate population movements in and out of towns by creating
town walls and collect taxes on transit at the town major entry and exit doors. This tax is
levied disproportionately in agricultural villages, in which income is lowest and a large mass
of the population lives at subsistence.
Table 2.2 also shows that stationary bandits collect regular poll taxes in 65% of the
observations in which they are settled in the village. This is consistent with the discussion
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in Section 2.3.3.16 This strategy compares to modern states, which used to collect poll taxes
when income was difficult to observe. This tax is levied disproportionately in mining villages,
possibly because the population is wealthier.
I now turn to the strategies stationary bandits employ to collect poll taxes. As discussed
in Section 2.3.3, the village Chief is a useful intermediary between stationary bandits and
the population to collect taxes. This can lead armed groups, like European feudal states
and colonial powers, to delegate tax collection to village Chiefs and to indirect rule. The
following explains why armed groups rely on village Chiefs to collect poll taxes: the Chief
knows the distribution of wealth of his village and enjoys legitimacy. The second challenge
is that poll taxes generate resentment by the population if they are collected by armed
groups. The following quote is an extract from interviews implemented on armed groups’
members: “If they ask the [poll] tax themselves they can be poisoned by the households who
give against their will. The only difficulty is that in the village there are rich and poor
households, the latter have nothing to give. The groups do not know who are the wealthy
taxpayers.”17 Stationary bandits thus collect poll taxes using the Chief as intermediary to
maximize tax revenues, as European feudal states. Furthermore, the level of the poll tax is
often decided collectively, with the participation of villagers. In 9.7 % of the observations
with a stationary bandit for which I have data, the villagers report to participate in the
decision of the tax level and allocation. It is thus no surprise that in 8.9 % of observations
16Poll taxes are defined as periodic taxes collected per head or per household. These taxes were also
called head taxes, or capitation taxes.
17Next are additional quotes supporting this view. “If the group prefers to delegate tax collection to the
Chief it is to avoid to be considered as beggers. If they ask themselves for the tax, the population can quit
the village.” “If the armed men prefer to use the channel of the Chief [to collect the poll tax], it is first for
strategic reasons. If they ask the population directly, the latter will be scared and will leave the village, but
the population is a necessary potentiality to their survival in the village.” “If the armed men prefer to pass
by the Chief [to collect the poll tax] it is for two big reasons. First, if this is a group that will stay in the
village, they are afraid that the tax will be considered as a “tracasserie”. Second, the group does not know
the number of households in the village, they can tax some and miss other households”.
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in the sample, the population perceives the tax level to be fair. The strategy of delegating
the allocation of the tax burden to the communities was frequently used in feudal states,
as described in Ardant (1975). This system, experimented in the Paris district in the year
1781, allowed to exploit local information so wealthier tax payers were charged more, but
also to discipline the incentives of individual tax payers to comply to the taxation plan -
since non-compliance was easy to monitor by the community.
In what follows, I test the three auxiliary implications presented in Section 2.3.3.
First, the mix of input and output taxes is consistent with the theoretical predictions
under the standard assumptions on risk aversion and imperfect monitoring. Table 2.2 shows
that armed groups provide a mix of input and output taxes around coltan mines. This
elaborate contract is consistent with optimal taxation if both the bandits and the producers
are risk averse and their incomes are tied to mineral extraction. Alternatively, it is also
consistent with imperfect monitoring and hiding activities. Both risk aversion and hiding
activities match the anecdotal and qualitative evidence on the mining sector.18
Second, I find evidence that the stationary bandit’s taxes are consistent with the fiscal







, I computed the day equivalent
tax in dollars in various sectors. For the mining sector, I used taxes at the mine of the
village, while for the agricultural sector I take taxes at the market on cassava sales. I then






18With non-linear tax instruments, bandits could set tax rates that depend on production. It is however
unlikely that this type of contract is implementable, especially with the technology at hand.
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where Yˆi is the estimated average volume product per worker for one day of work, τi is sector
i tax on output, ti is sector i tax levied on one day of work, and pi is the local output price
in sector i.19 Since the daily tax indexes have a large mass of observations at 0, I use a
tobit regression of daily tax index in the relevant mining sector, on the daily tax index in
agriculture, clustering standard errors at the village level. Table 2.3 presents the result.
There is a positive association between the mining tax index and the estimated tax revenues
from agriculture, consistent with the prediction from the model.
Third, Table 2.4 shows the OLS results of the extensive margin of taxation regressed
on mineral prices and endowments. Positive shocks to both gold and coltan lead to the
emergence of taxes on mineral activity. Table 2.5 shows the OLS results of the intensive
margin of taxation regressed on mineral prices and endowments. Positive shocks to both gold
and coltan lead to higher tax rates, consistent with a reduction of labor supply elasticities.
2.5.2 Stationary Bandits’ Public Goods Provision and popular
support
Figure 2.5 presents the provision of public goods by armed groups in the period. Since the
collapse of the DRC state in 1997, stationary bandits emerged and occupied consistently
around 70% of villages in the sample. However, their behavior is not limited to expropria-
tion.
If armed groups have a concern with economic activity, they should protect property
rights and guarantee physical security. Figure 2.5 shows that in 50% of the villages they
controlled in 2004, stationary bandits were considered to provide “effective” security services.
19Since I do not observe taxes on output for gold and since the tax on cassava is charged on one day of
sales at the market, τi = 0 in gold and agriculture. I therefore only need to estimate production for heavy
minerals, coltan and cassiterite. Based on the average production reported in all year-village observations,
I imputed 20 kilograms both for cassiterite and coltan.
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As discussed in Section, stationary bandits should have an interest in promoting order
by providing their location with a functioning judiciary. As shown in Figure 2.5, in 50% of
villages they controlled in 2004, stationary bandits provided Justice in the village by admin-
istering village disputes. These disputes include marriage disputes, land disputes, and other
bilateral conflicts. I collected qualitative data that supports this result. The following quote
is extracted with one interview with an armed group member: “Once they established it, all
civil and penal affair must pass by their hands. They required a lot of money to the plaintiff
and the defendant”.20
In 50 % of the villages they controlled, stationary bandits developed rudimentary bureau-
cracies, which they used to administer the entire village affairs. It is unclear what type of
activities this administration entails. There is no evidence that any stationary bandit in the
sample participated to, or initiated public goods works. This does not mean that stationary
bandit are not maximizing. The following quote, extracted from an interview with an armed
group’s member shows why the road decreases armed groups’ revenues: “The one who knows
he is doing bad things must hide. Such is the case of armed men who can rise barriers on
the road. The armed men are afraid that the authorities will catch them. Plus, on the main
road, there are many people passing; they can reveal these practices to the hierarchy”.21
Figure 2.5 also reports the proportion of villages in which stationary bandits faced pop-
ular support. To measure popular support, I asked in the household and experts’ survey
whether the villagers opposed the stationary bandit that was present in the village, for each
year in which a stationary bandit was present. The figure reveals that on two-thirds of
20The following quote suggests that the administration of justice was motivated by extraction of rents:
“If for instance, two persons had a conflict, the moment one came to ask us to kill their opponent, they
would give us a lot of money. Either we executed the mission, or we would communicate it to the other one,
so he also gives us a lot of money.”
21Another armed man revealed: “[...] the armed men must fear to be seen in such [taxation] practices.
They can settle in some areas and operate, but not in the main road”
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villages in which a stationary bandit is present, there are no popular oppositions agains the
stationary bandits. This share decreases slightly during the Second Congo War (1998-2003)
as a result of conquest by external armed groups (especially the Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Democratie), but the share of villages in which the population does not oppose the
stationary bandit is always above 50%.
This section has shown that armed groups’ taxation is consistent with the predictions
associated with optimal tax, as well as with the documented taxation by medieval states who
were unable to observe income. Furthermore, armed groups provide basic public goods. This
has an important implication: settled armed groups internalize the behavioral responses of
the population and intend to minimize distortions, as speculated in Olson (1993). If, absent
stationary bandits, there is anarchy, then stationary bandits should have a positive impact
on economic activity. The next section provides empirical support to this prediction.
2.6 Economic impact of stationary bandits
This section examines empirically the economic effects of stationary bandits in the village
they occupy. If armed groups internalize the value of economic activity they can extract in
taxes, they should provide protection and promote growth. If property rights are sufficiently
insecure in the absence of a stationary bandit, his protection will have a positive effect on
output. Control by a stationary bandit has ambiguous distributional implications: indeed,
while they provide protection, they also maximize tax revenues for their own consumption.
2.6.1 Estimation using heterogeneous effects of price shocks
At the beginning of the year 2000, Playstation, a subsidiary of Sony, announced the sale
in Christmas Playstation II which relied on processed columbite-tantalum (coltan). Coltan
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extraction was at the time mostly done in Australia, and required large investments. In
response to the announcement, coltan processing firms rushed for coltan from other areas
where supply could respond, leading the daily price of coltan to skyrocket from $90 per
kilogram to $590 per kilogram, where it persisted until year end. Most of the supply response
came for Eastern Congo.
I exploit the timing of this price shock and the fact that 55 villages in the sample were
endowed with coltan to identify the heterogeneous effect of the price shock on coltan villages
with and without stationary bandits. If stationary bandits promote economic activity and
there are no unobserved variables determining both the location of stationary bandits and
output, then the output effect of the price shock should be larger in villages with a stationary
bandit. Figure 2.7 shows the estimates of output for coltan villages in the period (in kilograms
per miner per day). The left quadrant shows this estimate for villages that did not have a
stationary bandit in 2000 and the right quadrant shows this estimate for villages that had a
stationary bandit in 2000. Clearly, the price shock led to massive output response in villages
that had a stationary bandit. Since stationary bandits may have selected the villages with
largest output in response to the price shock, I then plug the residuals of output regressed
on village and year fixed effects, and year dummies interacted with distance to the airport.
In Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014b) I show that the impact of the year 2000 price shock is
concentrated in villages in the proximity to airports because coltan is bulky and requires
air transportation and distance to the airport is a major determinant of the effect of the
price sock. The residuals are reported in the dashed line. Clearly, even after controlling
for observables determining the potential value of a coltan village, the residual effects of
the price shock is larger in villages where a stationary bandit is present than otherwise.
However, this analysis relies on selection on observables only. The next section exploits a
different identification strategy with a shock to the presence of a stationary bandit directly.
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2.6.2 Estimation using using the timing of a peace agreement
The intervention: the 2003 Sun-city peace agreement
In order to estimate the impact of stationary bandits on the local economy, I exploit the
timing of a Peace agreement singed in 2003 that affected all villages controlled by the Rassem-
blement Congolais pour la De´mocratie equally. This agreement led the RCD to abandon the
villages it used to control. The withdrawal of the RCD resulted in a security vacuum. The
villages that were under the control of the RCD in 2003 are sparsely distributed across the
survey area. By 2005, the RCD had abandoned all villages.
Econometric strategy
To identify the Intention to Treat Effect, I can Difference in Differences to estimate the
impact of RCD affiliated stationary bandits on economic activity. However, compliance is
partial: the RCD did not vacate all villages immediately. Difference in Differences would lead
me to underestimate the causal impact of stationary bandits on economic activity. I therefore
instrument presence of the RCD with the timing of the Sun-City agreement interacted with
the dummy indicating the presence of the RCD in 2002.22 The two stage least squares model
is:
Yit = αi + βt + a ˆRCDit + εit
RCDit = ηi + γt + bPOSTt ∗RCD2002i + uit
where i indicates the village and t indicates the year. POSTt is a dummy taking the value 1
for all observations after 2002 and 0 otherwise, and RCD2002i a dummy indicating whether a
22I do not report the Difference in Difference results here but they are identical, smaller in magnitude.
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village was under the control of the RCD in 2002. Yit are village level outcomes, in particular,
dummies indicating mining activity and recorded output; αi are village fixed effects, and βt
are year fixed effects. Since the RCD location is potentially endogenous, I use the timing
of the RCD withdrawal interacted with its initial location as an instrument. The coefficient
of interest, a captures the changes in economic indicators in RCD villages since the Sun-
City Peace agreements (henceforth, treated villages), compared to the respective changes in
economic indicators in non-RCD villages, under the identifying assumption that the timing
of the agreement did not coincide with time trends that affected villages under the RCD
control differentially. In particular, it may be that the RCD was occupying mostly coltan
villages, and that the world price of coltan decreased at the same time of the agreement.
This is particularly worrisome if the agreement was signed in anticipation of a decrease in
prices. To account for this, I include controls for mineral endowments interacted with their
prices as well as geographic controls. A test of the prediction on the impact of stationary
bandits is thus H0: a ≤ 0, estimated using the timing of the RCD withdraw as an instrument,
against the alternative H1: a > 0, estimated using the timing of the RCD withdraw as an
instrument.
Results
Figure 2.8 provides a graphical representation of the first stage and the reduced form. The
timing of the Sun-City peace agreement is clearly associated with a mild decrease in eco-
nomic activity in the villages formerly controlled by the RCD.
Table 2.6 reports the corresponding IV estimates, in which I include village and year fixed
effects across specifications. Since the price of certain minerals was falling at the time of the
agreement, it is possible that the agreement may reflect omitted variables associated with
anticipation of the mineral prices. One may also worry that the RCD will have vacated first
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the villages of lowest economic potential. Since all specifications include village fixed effects
the result cannot be due to selection out of villages of particular constant characteristics.
Furthermore, since all specifications include year fixed effects, the results cannot be due to
a downward trend common to all villages. However, the potential tax revenues of certain
villages may vary differently over time. To control for this, Table 2.6 also includes speci-
fications with controls for mineral endowments interacted with the world price of minerals
and other geographic controls interacted with year dummies. The results are unchanged,
although turn marginally significant in some specifications. The results suggest that the
RCD presence had mild, positive effects on economic activity.
2.7 Stationary bandits and the time horizon: effect of
a military intervention
“This is why the armed man is never friend if he finds no interest in it.”
This section shows that when stationary bandits’ time horizon shrinks, their state-like
behavior breaks down to full violent expropriation of the villages under their control.
2.7.1 The intervention: the Kimia II military operation
To identify the causal impact of a reduction in the time horizon of a stationary bandit,
I exploit the timing at which a military strategy that targeted aggressively the Forces De
Libe´ration du Rwanda (FDLR) went under way and credibly threatened the FDLR control.
In 2009 and 2010, the Congolese Army, with the help of United Nations forces and the
Rwandan army, targeted villages under FDLR control in order to weaken their link with the
tax base. The Congolese army scaled up the operation in 2010 and thereafter, and renamed
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it Amani Leo. Henceforth, I refer to both as the Kimia II operations, consistent with the
villagers’ parlance.23 On the one hand, the threat posed by Kimia II abruptly reduced the
time horizon of the FDLR. On the other hand, consistent with historical accounts of the
formation of fiscal capacity during war (Tilly, 1985), the FDLR might have had incentives
to increase tax collection in order to secure their territorial control. The second effect is
implausible. The FDLR was very weak and had no hope of resisting the operation. It is
natural to interpret the operation as a shock to the time horizon. I collected qualitative
data that supports this interpretation. The following is an extract from an interview with
an armed group member: “Kimia II was a large operation targeted against the FDLR. The
latter, knowing that they could not face the government coalition, before the coalition arrived,
attacked multiple times the villages to have something to eat”.
2.7.2 Econometric strategy
The main outcome variable I use is a dummy indicating whether village i in year t was
pillaged by the FDLR. I also considered other variables, such as evidence of FDLR taxation
and FDLR public goods provision and the results are identical, so I just report the results
on pillages. As introduced in Section 2.4.2 pillages are an extreme form of expropriation.
This view is reflected in the following interview extract with an armed group member: “In
case of fast pillage, such as FDLR operations, it is only 30 minutes. Certain goods are
23“In South Kivu, Kimia II operations also resulted in some important successes as FARDC gained
control of much of Kalehe, Kabare and Shabunda territories after years of domination by FDLR. On 28 July,
FARDC succeeded in dislodging FDLR from Kashindaba, its main headquarters in South Kivu. In August,
FARDC operations challenged FDLR strongholds in Walungu, Mwenga and Sange and around Uvira. On 20
August, FARDC successfully concluded operations to clear FDLR presence from the Kahuzi-Biega National
Park as well as Tchivanga and Nindja areas in Kabare territory”. Following Kimia II, the Congolese army
continued its implementation under the label of Amani Leo. “Amani Leo also aims to regain control of
mining sites from the FDLR and combat illegal trafficking in minerals and other natural resources.” Source:
monusco.unmissions.org.
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not pillaged (heavy goods: cows, beans, heavy minerals, household members). It is when the
pillager is certain that there will be no external intervention that he can take all and can
use some village members for their transport.” The presence of a pillage by the stationary
bandit signals the collapse of the proto-state. This is visible in the following interview: “To
pillage is a negative sign signifying that we have no more interests in the village. To settle
is a sign that we find a village eligible according to our criteria. We must collaborate with
the population”. I hence use pillage as an indication of state collapse.24 The econometric
specification is:
Yit = αi + βt + aPOSTt ∗ FDLR2008i + εit
where i indicates the village and t indicates the year. Yit are village level pillages by the
FDLR. αi are village fixed effects, βt are year fixed effects, POSTt is a dummy taking the
value 1 for all observations after 2008 and 0 otherwise, and FDLR2008i a dummy indicating
whether a village was under the control of the FDLR in 2008. The coefficient of interest,
a captures the increase in pillages since Kimia II operations in FDLR villages (henceforth,
treated villages), compared to the increase in pillages since Kimia II operations in non-FDLR
villages. A test of the prediction is thus H0: a ≤ 0 against the alternative H1: a > 0.
2.7.3 Results
Figure 2.9 presents graphical evidence on the intervention. Following the Kimia II interven-
tion, FDLR taxation drops from 100% to 20% in the former FLDR villages within 2 years.
24The following quote, also from an interview with an armed group member suggests that the maximiza-
tion of revenues is a powerful tool to explain the transition from taxation to pillage: “It is normal. Everyone
who occupies a village develops strategies to maximize the revenues in the village. When we know that we
are going to be relocated out of the village, we make sure to steal as much as possible [...]. This is why the
armed man is never friend if he finds no interest in it.”
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Figure 2.9 also presents the results. While the number of FDLR pillaging operations
remains around 10% of villages in the control group, it rises from 0% to 30% in the treated
group (the former FDLR villages). Table 2.7 provides Difference in Differences estimates.
Pillaging operations by the FDLR increase drastically against their formerly controlled vil-
lages. They can therefore be implemented despite the presence of the Congolese Army in
neighboring villages, while stable taxation cannot. It is well documented that during the
Kimia II operations, the FDLR relocated in the neighboring forests, and increased their
pillages on the villages they used to control in order to guarantee access to resources. These
results are also strongly supported by the qualitative reports elaborated by the surveyors.
The villagers narrations collected in the surveyors’ qualitative reports indicate that the in-
crease in pillages was caused by the arrival of the Kimia II operations, which shortened the
hopes of the FDLR to perpetuate taxation. Before fleeing, the FDLR pillaged. Judiciary and
journalistic evidence also supports this finding.25 This result suggests that the time horizon,
by affecting the expected revenues from taxation, is a necessary condition for stationary
bandits to tax and provide public goods like states. The next section provides a discussion.
25See http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1225453.pdf. The following quotes are taken from inter-
views with armed group’s members: “These attacks, it was before the Congolese Army often. When they
appreciated that the Congolese Army was going to arrive, they started being atrocious towards their pop-
ulation only to have something to eat where they were going.” “I told you that if armed men know they
will lose the battle, before leaving, they pillage. Kimia II was a large operation targeted against the FDLR.
The latter, knowing that they could not face the government coalition, before the coalition arrived, attacked
multiple times the villages to have something to eat”. “In some villages, the Congolese Army battled the
FDLR. But most times, when the FDLR learnt that the operations were approaching, they let their families
go first and they followed. On their way, they pillaged before the arrival of FARDC. Sometimes, after the
passage of the latter, the FDLR would come back to attack the village.”
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2.8 Discussion
In this section, I discuss whether my results fit alternative explanations and then compare
the outcome variables to various benchmarks.
2.8.1 Alternative mechanisms
A large part of the violence literature emphasizes the role of the trade-offs between produc-
tion and expropriation, in particular the opportunity cost of fighting (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004, Dube and Vargas, 2013). My results suggest an additional determinant of armed
groups’ behavior: their ability to commit to complex taxation plans over a long horizon
when they own a monopoly of violence. In what follows, I discuss the two causal empirical
results of this paper in light of alternative explanations: the impact of the Sun-city peace
agreement, and the impact of Kimia II.
First, I find that in response to the timing of a peace agreement, stationary bandits aban-
don a large number of villages and this leads economic activity to plummet. While I am not
able to identify the exact channel through which presence of stationary bandits causes eco-
nomic activity, I find support for a causal explanation. This result provides support to Olson
(1993) criminal metaphor, especially in areas where the alternative to stationary bandits is
anarchical. Another implication of the peace agreement could be that since a major armed
group is required to leave, a large mass of criminals that had previously been mobilized by
the armed group as stationary bandits may suddenly become unemployed. Since the RCD
was the major employer of violent labor, its departure would have depressed the returns
to engage in violent activities. If the opportunity cost of fighting is a relevant explanation
for violence, the peace agreement would have increased the supply of labor in productive
activities, rising output. This prediction does not find support in the data: I find on the
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contrary that indicators of economic activity plummet after the departure of the stationary
bandits.
Second, I find that in response to a large military operation against the FDLR, pillages
by the FDLR in the former FDLR villages increase. This result is consistent with a con-
testation/time horizon channel: as the FDLR sees their monopoly of violence under threat,
they have no incentives to refrain from full expropriation, provide public goods and maintain
the village states. Another implication of the military intervention could have been that the
returns to mobilize fighters in FDLR villages increase in response to the external threat, as
described for instance in accounts of European state formation (Tilly, 1985). As a result,
villages may have increased efforts to recruit fighters, which would have increased the re-
turns to fighting relative to production. This would have increase the mass of fighters and
violence. However, it is unlikely that an increase in the number of fighters recruited to fight
the Congolese Army coalition would have resulted in more pillages against the population
they were recruited to protect. Furthermore, I find no spike in recruitment following hte
Kimia II intervention.26 This interpretation, furthermore, goes against all evidence collected
in interviews auxiliary to this paper, which suggests the FDLR was too weak to fight and
their time horizon was depressed by Kimia II.27
26Unreported here.
27“I told you that if armed men know they will lose the battle, before leaving, they pillage. Kimia II was
a large operation targeted against the FDLR. The latter, knowing that they could not face the government
coalition, before the coalition arrived, attacked multiple times the villages to have something to eat”. “In
some villages, the Congolese Army battled the FDLR. But most times, when the FDLR learnt that the
operations were approaching, they let their families go first and they followed. On their way, they pillaged
before the arrival of FARDC. Sometimes, after the passage of the latter, the FDLR would come back to
attack the village.” Interviews with armed groups’ members.
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2.8.2 Measurement error
Classical measurement error in the outcome variable might lead to noisy estimates and
can threaten identification of the parameters in the linear probability model (Frisch, 1934,
Hausman, 2001). Worse, if the data is of low quality, arbitrary correlations stemming from
systematic mistakes by enumerators might underlie arbitrary results unrelated with real
effects. I first provide reassuring graphical evidence and then compare the data to the
alternative data sources.
Figure 2.5 in section 2.2 plotted the survey-based measures of armed groups’ occupation
on years. Since historical trends are known, this allows to verify the quality of the main
variables. The changes in the data correspond precisely to commonly known historical events.
Stationary bandits emerge and substitute for the state in villages in 1996 and 1997 with the
AFDL rebellion, but particularly in 1998 with the RCD conquests. The data also coincides
with known dates of RCD occupation: it emerged in 1998 with the second Congo War and
retreats in in 2003/2004 following the 2002 peace agreements of Sun City. The timing of the
attacks also corresponds precisely to well known historical rebellions. Figure A.3 shows that
the data maps precisely to the known phases of the war: the AFDL led its rebellion in 1996
into 1997, the RCD between 1998 and 2003, and the CNDP in 2004. Finally, survey-based
recall prices closely track the international world price. Overall the data on prices, armed
groups, and attacks benchmarks extremely well to well-known historical events.
To verify the data quality a step further I also assigned violent events geo-coded by
an external dataset (ACLED) to circles around the survey villages. The ACLED dataset
contains 3,500 violence events since 1997, coded by perpetrator and type of event. As opposed
to the data collected in this survey, these data are based on reports. When an event falls in
circles assigned to more than one village, I allocated the event to all village circles in which it
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fell. I then compare this data to my source that contains the number of attacks on villages.28
Figure A.4 shows that the ACLED dataset systematically reports less violence data around
the selected villages than what the current survey. While it is possible that this difference
is due to villagers over-reports of violence events, under-reporting by villagers in the survey
is more likely to be a concern, due to memory loss and fear of retaliation. If data from this
survey is more likely to under-report violent events, this suggests that my survey perfoms
well, possibly improving upon the ACLED dataset for the specific locations. To cross-
validate this survey data econometrically, I correlated the data to ACLED’s data in an OLS
framework. Regression estimates of the correlation between ACLED and survey conquest
attacks in the neighborhood of the village are positive, significant, but never larger than 10%
across all distances (Table A.1). In addition, attacks reported by this survey are less likely
to be reported in ACLED when the villages were under RCD occupation (suggesting that
the source of under-reporting in ACLED could be obstruction of information), and when
the attacks were pillages (ACLED may specifically under-estimate the number pillages).29
The data collected in this survey also captures the well-known evolution in conflict intensity
in the region. Figure A.4 shows the increase in violence during the Second Congo War,
especially during the coltan shock, its decrease after 2003, and its drastic increase as a result
of the Kimia II operations, which consists mostly of FDLR pillages.
28This source contains larger numbers of violent events than the other survey source because villagers
could not remember the details of some attacks.
29This result applies specifically to RCD perpetrated violent events, consistent with reporting bias.
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2.9 Conclusion
While the the state has attracted scholars of all social sciences, a fundamental fact in all
disciplines is that prior to the state, there are no statistics. There is therefore no formal
statistical evidence of states before they have developed a bureaucracy capable of collecting
data. This absence of data on preliminary states has shaped our conceptualization of the
state, and biased it towards governments as most of us know them: stable, bureaucratic,
capable of taxing income, subject to the rule of law and enjoying (often) legitimacy.
I question the view of the state as a “monopoly of violence” and provide econometric
evidence linking organized crime to the actions that characterize states. To observe nascent
states, I managed a team of data collectors in stateless and war-torn areas of Eastern Congo
and collect a village-level panel dataset of yearly activity of armed groups. I develop a the-
ory, similar to Olson (1993) in which the ability to hold a “monopoly of violence” in order
to expropriate induces armed groups to develop stable, reasonable taxation, and promote
economic activity such as medieval states did (Ardant, 1975, Tilly, 1985).
Consistent with this theory, I find that armed groups, in villages where they hold a
monopoly of violence, develop elaborate taxation plans that are consistent with optimal
taxation and similar to medieval European states, provide public goods, and enjoy some
popular support. This result challenges normative and sensationalist accounts of armed
groups’ behavior by providing a rational explanation for their choices, and grounds it on a
unique dataset of armed groups’ behavior.
I take advantage of two natural experiments during the time period observed to go a step
further. First, I exploit a political agreement that resulted in the withdrawal of a settled
armed group, I show that the presence of criminal “monopolies of violence” is associated
with higher economic activity. Second, I show that a large military intervention aimed
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against a large number of village criminal “monopolies of violence”, and which reduced their
time-horizon, induced the “stationary bandits” to revert from state-like stable taxation and
protection, to arbitrary full expropriation - violent pillage on populations they formerly pro-
tected.
This paper’s results contribute to a large literature in economics (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006, Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2006, Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002, Besley and
Persson, 2009, Grossman, 1997, North and Weingast, 1989), but also to disciplines outside
of economics. The conceptual similarity between states and organized crime has been es-
tablished by historians, anthropologists and sociologists (Hintze, 1906, Tilly, 1985). Olson
(1993) endowed this analogy with theoretical foundations. However, none of these studies
was able to provide systematic evidence to establish this link, or to demonstrate empirically
the causes that lead criminals to engage in state-like behavior instead of pillaging, or to
demonstrate their palpable effects on economic activity when they choose to do so. This
paper is the first to provide empirical support this conceptualization of the state - by show-
ing that even criminal “monopolies of violence” collect regular taxes, provide public goods,
enjoy legitimacy and can be beneficial to growth. However, I go a step further and show that
this not alone sufficient: the state collapses if its time horizon is short. This refines existing
scholarship that reduces states to “monopolies of violence”.
This paper has implications for policy on armed groups, weak states, and development
aid.
Armed groups are a topic of interest among current governments. This study is one of the
first to provide econometric evidence of the relationship between conflict and mineral en-
dowments in the DRC. While there are vivid debates and speculations around the motives
of armed groups, I establish a systematic link between the mining sector and armed groups’
taxation. This result is in line with other reports based on qualitative data, such UN (2002).
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Furthermore, I show that the benefits that armed groups can extract from the mineral trade
depend on physical properties of the mineral that affect their ability to tax: while coltan is
easy to tax, gold is not. This result should help refine mineral specific policies aimed at tar-
geting armed groups. Second, I find that interventions aimed at constraining armed groups’
revenues increase violence against civilians in the short-run. Interventions that attempt to
weaken armed groups finances have become dominant among policy circles. In particular,
the United States issued the Dodd-Frank legislation in 2012, aimed at constraining purchases
of minerals whose trade is a source of finance to armed groups. Governments interested in
“cleaning” the mineral chain, thus, may need to protect civilians in the aftermath of these
interventions, and provide alternative occupations to combatants who lose access to revenues
from taxes as a result of these interventions.
Weak states are a major threat to global stability and a major concern for the security
of Western governments. First, developing the Congolese state capacity to collect taxes can
be a powerful deterrent of violence against civilians by the state. The findings illustrate
the role played by expected taxation revenues on government stability, reflecting existing
academic scholarship on the determinants of state predation (Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002,
Besley and Persson, 2008). Second, interventions aimed at improving the Congolese state’s
capacity to pay salaries to armed state officials are a promising avenue to reduce violence
and pillaging. Armed state officials lacking a stable source of revenue may engage in violent
expropriations in order to secure revenue.
With 5,532 Million USD received in 2011, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was
the second largest receipient of international aid flows in 2011, and the fifth in 2012 (World
Bank, 2013). First, this paper suggests that development aid disbursed in this area provides
a potential source of revenue to armed groups. This paper’s findings demonstrate that armed
groups often settle in individual villages, and systematically raise taxes on a large number of
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economic activities, not only on the mineral trade, contrary to what is commonly believed.
Therefore, delivery of aid that does not take into consideration the revenues it can generate
to armed groups may counteract policies aimed at weakening armed groups. Second, the
findings of this paper also suggest how to design aid in order to reduce this risk. Aid that
translates into unobservable or intangible assets, may be harder to tax. This is the case
of education and health. Attention needs to be paid to the process in which these services
are delivered. This also implies that the returns from aid delivery will be larger if armed
groups are not taxing in targeted villages, suggesting that aid delivery and interventions that
eradicate armed groups are complementary. Third, aid may increase civilian exposure to risk
of violence if wealth can be converted to portable assets. The findings of this study indeed
suggest that pillages target specifically portable assets. This finding is consistent with the
findings of Nunn and Qian (2012).
The “stationary bandits” I am able to observe are a mixed blessing. On the one hand,
they challenge the authority of the state by holding alternative “monopolies of violence” and
abuse civilians. On the other hand, they develop relationships of mutual dependency with
civilians, provide services that the state is unable to provide, and may even have positive
economic impacts if their territorial monopoly is not under threat. In addition, through
the period I examine, armed public servants, like criminal groups, engage also in abuse of
civilians, protection, and public goods provision. This suggests that academic and policy
thinking that distinguishes stationary bandits from the state might lack a fundamental sim-
ilarity between them: having comparative advantage in violence, they will choose among
various forms of expropriation. These strategies might benefit the population when there is
an economic surplus that can be taxed and when the criminal is not under threat, which
may in some cases lead to behavior that characterizes states as most of us know them.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
No minerals Coltan Gold
Mean Mean Mean
(sd) (sd) (sd)
Number of external attacks at the mining center . 0.64 0.02
. (2.21) (0.21)
Number of internal attacks at the mining center . 0.22 0.01
. (0.95) (0.11)
Number of external attacks at village 0.18 0.13 0.22
(0.38) (0.34) (0.42)
Number of internal attacks at village 0.02 0.04 0.03
(0.14) (0.20) (0.17)
Armed organization stationed at the village 0.40 0.37 0.30
(0.49) (0.48) (0.46)
Armed organization living inside the village 0.37 0.32 0.27
(0.48) (0.47) (0.44)
Armed organization sharing power with the village authorities∗ 0.26 0.52 0.47
(0.44) (0.50) (0.50)
Armed organization administering the village 0.07 0.19 0.07
(0.25) (0.40) (0.25)
Size of the village (Number of households in 2012) 187.15 172.13 102.56
(116.39) (101.38) (44.07)
Number of individuals immigrating per year 24.4 21.37 16.19
(69.67) (76.19) (60.10)
Number of individuals emigrating per year 15.22 15.20 13.57
(49.67) (59.42) (52.49)
Observations 460 368 207
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the mean and standard deviation of the main
outcomes, classifying villages by whether they were endowed with coltan, gold or no minerals. * indicates
that the variable was added after survey start.
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Table 2.2: Frequency of tax collection, by type of tax
Heavy minerals Gold only Agriculture
Mining: per mineral output 0.30 0.00 0.00
Mining: per labor input 0.30 0.25 0.00
Poll taxes 0.67 0.70 0.33
Transit of persons 0.36 0.25 0.53
Tax on cassava sales 0.24 0.25 0.16
Village mill 0.11 0.18 0.03
Notes: This table presents the taxation results. Since I am interested in the behavior of existing stationary
bandits, I condition the sample to observations where a stationary bandit is present in the village. The
numbers indicate the proportion of villages in which any of the following taxes was collected by a stationary
bandit: tax on mineral output (first line), tax on mining labor inputs (second line), poll tax on households
(third line), tax on transit of persons (fourth line), tax on sale of cassava at the local market (fifth line), tax
on village mill (sixth line).
Table 2.3: Test of the fiscal externality channel
(1) (2)
VARIABLES model sigma





Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results of a tobit regression of the index
of taxes on one day of labor in the mining sector of the index of daily taxes on cassava sales at the local
market. The indexes are the estimated day equivalent tax in dollars in each sector. For the mining sector,
I use taxes at the mine of the village, while for the agricultural sector I use taxes at the market on cassava





is the estimated average volume product per worker for one day of work, τi is sector i tax on output, ti is
sector i tax levied on one day of work, and pi is the local output price in sector i. Since I do not observe
taxes on output for gold and since the tax on cassava is charged on one day of sales at the market, τi = 0 in
gold and agriculture. I therefore estimate production for heavy minerals, coltan and cassiterite. Based on
the average production reported in all year-village observations, I imputed 20 kilograms both for cassiterite
and coltan. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table 2.4: Price shocks and taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output tax
VARIABLES roadblocks Entry tax Food sales tax Poll tax Transit tax Mill tax
Coltan X Pc 0.515*** 0.393*** -0.008 0.337** 0.080 0.057
(0.105) (0.093) (0.095) (0.138) (0.092) (0.054)
Gold X Pg 0.001 0.001 0.006* -0.006** 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Coltan 0.110** -0.083 -0.038 0.068 -0.070 -0.010
(0.043) (0.069) (0.057) (0.076) (0.069) (0.035)
Constant -0.026* 0.106** 0.118*** 0.237*** 0.189*** 0.051**
(0.015) (0.052) (0.039) (0.050) (0.047) (0.023)
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,342 1,586 1,586 1,586
R-squared 0.132 0.017 0.014 0.052 0.026 0.014
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the baseline specification for
dummies indicating whether armed groups collect a particular tax in the village as dependent variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy indicating
whether an armed group collects a tax on output at roadblocks outside the mine. The dependent variable in
column (2) is a dummy indicating whether an armed group collects a tax on labor at the mine (entry tax).
The dependent variable in column (3) is a dummy indicating whether an armed group collects a tax cassava
sales at the local market.The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy indicating whether an armed
group collects a tax on households (poll tax). The dependent variable in column (5) is a dummy indicating
whether an armed group collects a tax on transit of persons in and out of the village. Finally, the dependent
variable in column (6) is a dummy indicating whether an armed group collects a tax on a local mill in the
village.
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Table 2.5: Price shocks and tax levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Output tax
roadblocks Entry tax Food sales tax Poll tax Transit tax Mill tax
Coltan X Pc 3.08*** 2.29 0.01 7.50*** 8.60** 5.03
(0.75) (2.56) (0.20) (2.06) (3.81) (5.99)
Gold X Pg -0.14** -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.06
(0.06) (0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.17) (0.27)
Constant -1.64*** -2.14** -0.37*** -0.29 -7.22*** -14.15***
(0.45) (0.92) (0.08) (0.60) (1.64) (0.53)
Observations 805 506 829 837 846 848
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the baseline tobit specification
for left-truncated variables indicating the level of different taxes dependent variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the tax on output at roadblocks
outside the mine, in US$ per kilogram. The dependent variable in column (2) is the tax on labor at the
mine (US$ per entry to the mine). The dependent variable in column (3) is the tax cassava sales at the local
market, in US$ per day of sale. The dependent variable in column (4) is the tax on households (US$ per
week). The dependent variable in column (5) the tax on transit of persons in and out of the village, in US$
per passage. Finally, the dependent variable in column (6) a tax on a local mill in the village, in US$ per
day of activity.
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Table 2.6: Economic impact of stationary bandits: IV estimates of RCD impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Output Output Output Output Output
RCD 0.220** 0.174* 0.202** 0.169* 0.162
(0.0877) (0.0899) (0.0972) (0.0884) (0.111)
Coltan X Coltan Price -10.70*** -10.64*** -9.723** -13.48***
(3.815) (3.846) (3.869) (4.418)
Gold X Gold Price 0.0129
(0.00992)
Observations 436 436 436 436 400
R-squared 0.024 0.068 0.067 0.183 0.083
Number of panel units (mines) 109 109 109 109 100
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region*Year FE NO NO NO YES NO
Distance to airport NO NO NO NO YES
Mineral controls NO YES YES YES YES
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the 2SLS regression of the
main welfare outcomes on presence of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie. The endogenous
regressor RCD is a dummy variable indicating whether the RCD controlled the village in a given year. The
first stage regresses RCD on an interaction of a variable indicating whether the observation is posterior to
the year 2003, and a dummy indicating whether the observation is a village that was under the control of the
RCD in the year 2002, the year prior to the Sun-City agreement. All regressions include year fixed effects
and village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the village. Column (1) presents the
baseline 2SLS regression. Column (2) includes as control control the interaction between a dummy indicating
whether the village is endowed with coltan and the US price of coltan in US$ per kilogram (Coltan X Coltan
Price). Column (3) adds to this control the interaction between a dummy indicating whether the village
is endowed with gold and the US price of coltan in US$ per kilogram (Gold X Gold Price). Column (4)
includes region*year fixed effects to the baseline specification. Column (5) includes as control the distance
to the airport, interacted with year dummies.
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Table 2.7: Stationary bandits and the time horizon
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES FDLR taxbase Village taxes FDLR Attack Pillage Pillage Pillage Pillage Pillage
KIMIA2 -0.741*** -0.389*** 0.278*** 0.259*** 0.250*** 0.228** 0.196** 0.259***
(0.0936) (0.116) (0.0827) (0.0792) (0.0759) (0.0893) (0.0952) (0.0632)
Constant 0.140*** 0.494*** 0.0763*** 0.0903*** 0.0916*** 0.0992*** 0.120*** 0.0903***
(0.00643) (0.00959) (0.00568) (0.00544) (0.0250) (0.0259) (0.0311) (0.0125)
Observations 786 654 786 786 786 726 600 262
R-squared 0.788 0.703 0.335 0.279 0.320 0.292 0.290 0.601
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Distance to road NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Accessibility NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the OLS regression of FDLR behavior. The regressor
Post*FDLR interacts Post and FDLR. Post is a dummy variable indicating whether the observation is after 2008, and FDLR is a dummy
variable indicating whether the village was controlled by the FDLR in 2008, and hence a target of the Kimia II operation. All regressions
include year and village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level The regressors Post and FDLR are thus absorbed
by the fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) use the following variables as dependent variables, respectively: FDLR tax base (a dummy indicating
whether the FDLR collects taxes in the village in that given year); Village taxes (a dummy indicating whether any group collects taxes
in the village in that given year); FDLR attack (a dummy indicating whether the village received an attack by the FDLR in that given
year). Columns (4)-(8) present variations to the baseline specification, using as dependent variable a dummy indicating whether the
village was subject to pillages in that given year. Pillages are defined as a violent event in which an armed group enters the village in
order to acquire household assets and leaves the village after. Pillages tend to be very violent and are straightforward to identify. Column
(4) presents the results on pillage for the main specification; column (5) adds region*year fixed effects, column (6) adds distance to the
road, interacted with year dummies; column (7) adds a time-varying control dummy indicating whether the village has access to the road;
column (8) collapses all observations by treatment status and by time period (pre and post), thus ignoring the time-series information.
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2.11 Figures
Figure 2.1: Timing of pillages and conquest attempts
Notes: This figure draws on the attacks level dataset collected in this survey. In total, there are 600 attacks.
The figure plots the distribution of the recorded hour of the attack. The horizontal axes indicate the hour
of the attack in 24h format. The vertical axes indicate the mass of observations. The left quadrant plots
the distribution for recored pillages, and the right quadrant plots the distribution for recorded conquest
attempts. The red, vertical lines indicate the hours at which the sun rises (left line) and sets (right line). In
the outer of these lines the village is in the dark.
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Figure 2.2: Labor real productivity and volume hidden by households
α∗i (pi, τi, ei)
H∗i (pi, τi) α˜iei
Hi
Notes: This figure represents the relationship between the volume of output hidden in sector i, Hi, and the
realized output in sector i, α˜iei derived from the household’s first order conditions. If the realized labor
volume productivity is below a certain threshold, the household is at a corner solution and hides all output.
If the realized labor volume productivity is above the threshold, the volume hidden is an interior solution.
Any additions to the realized volume productivity do not increase the volume hidden by the household.
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Figure 2.3: Villages in sample
Notes: This map presents the spatial location of the survey villages across Sud Kivu. Thick lines indicate
frontiers between Provinces, dashed lines indicate fronteers between Territoires. Dark green indicates a nat-
ural reserve (forest). Blue indicates the lake Kivu. The villages endowed with coltan only are indicated in
black circles. The villages endowed with coltan and gold are indicated as black dots with golden circles. Vil-
lages endowed with cassiterite only are indicated with orange dots, and agricultural villages are indicated as
crosses. In each Territoire (Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, Kabare, Kalehe) the survey visited the population
of coltan villages that were accessible to the survey teams. In addition, it visited a sample of gold villages
randomly selected within the Territoire. In addition to this, in the Territoire of Kalehe, the survey visited
all mining villages, as well as a matched sample of agricultural villages. To match agricultural villages to
the population of mining villages in Kalehe prior to the survey, I matched multiple data sources, including
SAESSCAM (Congolese institute of mining), the Institute of Peace (Belgium), and data I collected with my
own qualitative fiedlwork in May-July 2012 with mining traders. After compiling the population of mining
villages of Kalehe, I then used their geographic coordinates to assign to each a distance to: the lake, the
natural reserve (forest), Bukavu, Goma, Rwanda, and the road. Since mining villages are likely to be more
remote by the fact that they are more valuable and populations self select into locations, I matched the
resulting population of mining villages on the population of villages based on the Mahalanobis metric on
these variables. To obtain geo-locations of the population of villages prior to the survey, I used publicly
available data from Re´fe´rentiel Ge´ographique Commun (2010), that I compiled with a dataset collected
by the International Rescue Committee and Humphreys, Sa´nchez de la Sierra, and Van der Windt (2012,
2013a), who mapped all villages in most Territoires of Sud Kivu and collected geo-locations for each.
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Figure 2.4: Group affiliation of the village monopoly of violence
Notes: This figure graphs the share of villages in the sample under the control of a given armed group. The
vertical axis represents the number of villages, and the horizontal axis represents the years. The green (light
grey) line indicates the proportion of villages in the sample controlled by armed groups. The red (dark) line
indicates the proportion of villages in the sample controlled by the Congolese army. The data fits well-known
historical phases of the conflict and post-conflict periods. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start and
end of the rebellion by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie. The thick vertical line on the left
indicates the timing of the Kimia II operations, and the thick vertical line on the right indicates the timing
of the emergence of the Raia Mutombokis (Raias). The Congolese Army progressively replaces armed groups
after 2004, the end of the second Congo War. The Congolese Army progressively replaces armed groups
after 2004, the end of the second Congo War. However, local armed groups were integrated into the national
army after 2003, without relocation. Armed groups structures of command and network remained intact.
The distinction between the Congolese Army and armed groups is thus blurred.
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Figure 2.5: Stationary bandits taxes, public goods, and popular support
Notes: This figure graphs the share of villages in the sample in which an armed group coded as stationary
bandit implements the following activities: is a stationary bandit and secures the village, collects taxes,
administers justice, administers the village, his security provision is perceived to be effective, initiates road
works, and enjoys legitimacy. I measured legitimacy by whether there were any oppositions to the group
inside the village. Armed groups were coded as stationary bandits when they had the monopoly of violence
at the village for at least 6 months. The vertical axis represents the share of villages, and the horizontal axis
represents the years. Labels for activities are included in the legend.
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Figure 2.6: Duration of stationary bandits
Notes: The upper figure plots the distribution of the duration for all episodes in the sample in which a
village was under the control of a given stationary bandit. The lower figure plots the distribution of the
duration for all episodes in the sample in which a village was under the control of no stationary bandit. For
both figures, the vertical axes represent the density and the horizontal axes indicate the number of years.
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Figure 2.7: Economic impact of stationary bandits: using the coltan price shock
Notes: This figure presents estimates of output collected from the survey for villages endowed with a coltan
mine. The thick black line shows the average output produced by one miner per day of work, for villages
in which a stationary bandit was not present in 2000 (Left) and villages in which a stationary bandit was
present in 2000. To control for coltan village potential value, I then include in the regression controls for
the value of a coltan village identified in Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014b). The dashed line shows the residuals,
after regressing output on village fixed effects, year fixed effects, and year dummies interacted with distance
to the nearest airport. Conditional on selection on observables, stationary bandits have a positive impact
on the effect of the coltan price shock on output.
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Figure 2.8: Economic impact of stationary bandits: using the timing of a peace agreement
Notes: These figures present the evolution of economic indicators by year. The left figure presents the
villages that were not under the control of the RCD in 2002, and the right figure presents the evolution for
villages that were under the control of the RCD in 2002. The solid line indicates the proportion of villages
in which mining is active, and the dashed line indicates whether there is evidence of positive mining output.
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Figure 2.9: Stationary bandits and the time horizon: effect of the Kimia II operation
Notes: The first two figures (upper-level) show the proportion of villages controlled by the FDLR and the
Congolese Army between 2002 and 2012. I split the sample into villages targeted by the Kimia II operations
(left) and villages that were not targeted (right). Kimia II targeted all FDLR villages. I define a Treated
village as to whether it was under the control of the FDLR in 2008. The proportion of these villages is
indicated on the left axis. The red (dark) line, marked with squares, indicates the proportion of villages
controlled by the Congolese Army; the grey line, marked with diamonds, indicates the proportion of villages
under the control of the Congolese army. In the bottom figures, I use the same classification (left, right) to
show the proportion of villages pillaged by the FDLR. The proportion is on the left axis.
Chapter 3
On the Impact of the State:
Contract Enforceability and Ethnic
Institutions in Eastern Congo
Rau´l Sa´nchez de la Sierra
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3.1 Introduction
What is the impact of the state on economic exchange? Absent states, societies may de-
velop group-based mechanisms to generate trade when commitment problems prevail (Greif,
1993). However, groups are often fragmented, resulting potentially in large inefficiencies. As
a monopoly of violence, the state can enforce contracts, and thus induce trade that would
otherwise not occur.
In this paper, I provide evidence of the impact of expanding the state system of formal
contract enforcement. To do so, I consider the existing social groups. I create a home de-
livery sector with commitment problems that replicate the holdup problem that is frequent
in trade (Williamson, 1983), in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Taking as given the
existing social divisions, I deploy traders of different groups to offer trades to households of
different salient groups. I randomly assign access to state-backed contracts to a subset of
the sales offered. In state-backed contracts, drafted by a local lawyer and certified by the
Provincial Administration, the trader who promises delivery in the future exposes himself to
the existing sanctions applicable by the Congolese legal system in the case that he does not
deliver as promised. I find that social groups (shared ethnicity) and state-contracts increase
trade in the presence of commitment problems. Furthermore, using randomization of the
time in which the trader will deliver the good offered (immediate or future delivery), I find
that contracts increase trade by improving the expectations about the behavior of the agent
- the likelihood that the trader will deliver the good if he promised it for the future. But are
contracts really enforceable, or is this result driven by, for instance, signaling effects? I go a
step further, and using a design a`-la Karlan and Zinman (2009), I demonstrate that, even in
one of the world’s weakest states, contracts improve the expectations about the behavior of
the agent because they are effective at changing his incentives: they are enforceable. How-
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ever, contracts discipline incentives only if the claimant belongs to a group that has access
to the state. When contracts are used to protect claimants of marginalized minorities, they
do not decrease the incentives to cheat on them.
This paper’s findings advance the existing literature by testing a solution to the wel-
fare losses associated with social divisions and proposing a new explanation for why social
divisions affect trade. There is a large literature documenting how individuals and groups
solve commitment problems (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999, Greif, 1993, Habyarimana,
Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein, 2007, Hjort, 2013, Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). How-
ever, this literature focuses on analyzing how groups solve commitment problems, and how
they are unable to do so across groups, but does little to explore how commitment problems
across groups can be addressed by expanding access to the state, and how this might affect
the group mechanisms.
A first mechanism stressed by the literature is reputation and monitoring. Greif (1993)
describes how the threat of collective punishment and concern with reputation sustained
trust and trade among Maghrebi traders in XI th century Mediterranean trade. Related,
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) document the extent to which past relations predict current
supply of risky trade credit among firms in Vietnam. If repeated interaction within groups
can sustain cooperation, distance between group members can unravel this mechanism (Dixit,
2003). Distance among group members could be especially large when groups are fragmented
into separate networks, for instance along ethnic lines. The effect of heterogeneity on pub-
lic goods provision has indeed been extensively documented in the literature: Alesina and
Ferrara (2004) show, using data on US neighborhoods, that ethnic heterogeneity depresses
public goods provision. Similarly, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) describe how participatory
public goods provision in Kenyan villages decreases with ethnic diversity. They suggest and
document that ethnic divisions undermine public goods provision due to the difficulty to
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sanction defectors across groups. If cooperation and trust within groups is sustained by re-
peated interaction and group sanctions, state contracts should increase trade across groups
by providing a commitment device based on the threat of legal sanctions. However, by pro-
viding an exit option, entry of third-party contract enforcement can reduce the threat of
losing business opportunities in the future. With contracts available, past defectors are no
more likely to defect. This can weaken group-based mechanisms of contract enforcement.
A second mechanism identified by the literature are preferences. If individuals’ payoffs
are allowed to be interdependent, group members may be more altruistic towards groups,
and value more the payoff of group members. In the extreme, individuals may even value
the dis-utility of out-group members in contexts of inter-group hostility. Alesina, Baqir,
and Easterly (1999) argue that ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods are less effective at
providing public goods because group members have different preferences for public goods.
Chen and Li (2009) draw on a large literature in social psychology (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)
and find evidence in a laboratory setting that artificially created group identities generate
strong in-group altruism. However, by signaling lack of trust, requesting to sign a contract
could generate negative reciprocity, crowding-out the preference-based mechanism through
social preferences.
A third mechanism documented in the literature is internalized group level norms and
conventions. Fehr and Gaechter (1999) show that individuals are willing to forgo their own
consumption in order to sanction members of their own group who have defected. However,
in this framework, the introduction of incentives can potentially crowd-out social norms or
information and thus pre-existing equilibria (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003, Bowles and Polania-
Reyes, 2012, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Thus, contracts could even decrease trade if the
incentive effects are outweighed by crowding-out effects.
My findings contribute to these literature by demonstrating that a low-cost interven-
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tion that provides access to state-backed contracts can increase trade in situations where
commitment problems prevail across social groups. Furthermore, I am able to identify that
state-backed contracts improve trade only by affecting trust (expectations that the seller will
deliver), and that they are enforceable, even when the state is weak.
However, I go a step further and introduce and test a new mechanism: groups have differ-
ent bargaining power that allows them to enforce contracts. In doing so I place this question
back in a political economy context. Most scholarship on contracts and trade ignores that
the state legal enforcement system can be influenced by certain groups. However, if the legal
enforcement system is captured, providing access to state-backed contracts increases the bar-
gaining power of the groups who have captured it. In this context, expanding access to state
contract enforcement can worsen pre-existing imbalances. My findings provide support for
this ethnic institution view. I find that state-backed contracts only protect from defection
claimants belonging to groups which have captured the state. State-backed contracts are
ineffective at decreasing cheating on members of marginalized groups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the social and
institutional context. Section 3.3 presents the experiment design. Section 3.4 introduces
the behavioral predictions and Section 3.5 presents the results. Finally 3.6 provides a brief
discussion of the experiment and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Context
I implement the experiments in the Province of Sud-Kivu, Eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC). The DRC state collapsed in the 1990’s, which left economic governance
to informal networks. Ethnicity is a major factor of these informal networks, and has been
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an important vector of mobilization and conflict.1 Indeed, since the state collapse in the
1990’s, a myriad of armed groups has emerged. Many of these groups use ethnic networks
to mobilize recruits.2
The population of Sud Kivu is composed of the following ethnic groups, who speak differ-
ent languages: Bashis, Bahavus, Balegas, Batembos, Bafuliros, Pygmies, and Rwandophone
populations (mostly Banyamulengues and Banyarwandas). Bashis and Bahavus’ languages
(Shi and Havu) belong to the Shi-Havu family. They have 70% lexical similarity, and their
speakers perceive each other as members of the same group.3 Historically, they have been
politically active in similar groups. Unsurprisingly, Bashis and Bahavus is not a salient social
division. Balegas have good relationships with the Shi-Havus. Balegas are mostly present
in the Territories of Mwenga and Shabunda. Batembos’ language (Kitembo) also belongs
to the Shi-Havu family. Batembos, however, are mostly found in remote areas of Sud-Kivu,
mainly in Shabunda and Western parts of Kalehe (Bunyakiri). Batembos have been affected
by conflict, there is therefore a large population of displaced Batembos in other villages of
Sud Kivu. Historically, Batembo’s grievances are opposed to Shi-Havus and they have been
a major force in local rebellions known as Mayi-Mayi groups. The divide between Shi-Havus
and Batembos is salient. While they recognize their distinct ethnic affiliation, they perceive
each other as close neighbors culturally and historically.4 Bafuliros originate mostly from
Uvira. Like the Balegas, they consider the Shi-Havus as close to them and this is not a
1See the following accounts of recent history: Clark (2002), Nest (2011), Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani
(2011), Ngonzola-Ntalaja (2002), Stearns (2011), Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005), Vlassenroot and Raey-
maekers (2004), Van Reybrouck (2008), Autesserre (2006), Autesserre (2007), Autesserre (2008), Verweijen
(2013).
2This is the case of the AFDL, RCD, CNDP, M23 in particular, but also the FDLR and a large number
of ethnic based self-defense groups.
3https://www.ethnologue.com/language/shr
4Surveyors in this project further report considering them as their “brothers”.
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salient division.
Rwandophones (language Kinyarwanda) are historically cattle herders from Rwanda who
live in the highlands of the Kivus and belong to both Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa groups. In con-
trast with the other groups, Rwandophone populations are sharply marginalized and their
affiliation is very salient. Rwandophones first recorded migration wave took place well be-
fore the colonial period, in the seventeenth century, fleeing taxes in Rwanda (today these are
called Banyarwanda - the people of Rwanda). A second migration wave took place in 1880
(today these are called Banyamulengue - the people of the Mulengue mountain). The Bel-
gian colonial administration orchestrated subsequent waves in the 1930’s and 1940’s, sending
workers to coffee plantations in DRC. In the second half of the twentieth century, large num-
bers of Rwandophones fled conflicts in Rwanda to the Congo, culminating in the migration
of 2 Million refugees in the 1994 Rwanda crisis. This continuous influx exacerbated the
ethnic tensions with Rwandophones.
Historically, the Rwandophones have been discriminated against, and are a minority that
tends to be excluded from the benefits provided by the state. They were a major mobilizing
force in armed conflict in the region, and Congolese populations perceive the Rwandophone
populations with hostility. While Banyarwandas are mostly Tutsi and Hutu, Banyamu-
lengues are mostly Tutsi.5
In this paper, I first focus on the major divides: Shi-Havus and Batembos, Shi-Havus
and Rwandophones, Batembos and Rwandophones. In the first part of the paper I refer to
coethnic interactions those interactions between Shi-Havus, Regas, and Fuulirus. I refer to
non-coethnic interactions those interactions between Shi-Havus and Rwandophones and Shi-
5See Stearns (2011), Ngonzola-Ntalaja (2002), and Newbury (1992) for accounts of current ethnic rela-
tions in Sud-Kivu and their historical foundations.
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Havus and Batembos.6 I abuse the term ethnicity, since I focus on existing salient divides
and do not aim to provide an abstract effect of ethnicity removed from its social context.
This is consistent with the aim of this paper. I take the social structure as given, focus on
the major divisions, and examine the impact of contracts. As I show in sections below, this
classification is consistent with the empirical results.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
This section describes the field experiment design.
3.3.1 The home delivery sector
In order to shape the design of a real economic activity, I designed and managed a business
of home delivery of household basic consumption goods. After three months of qualitative
fieldwork, I hired a group of ten young men to deliver soaps in randomly selected households
in 140 villages in Sud Kivu (and cell phone minutes in the experiment extension). Soaps
are particularly attractive because they are highly demanded. The focus on a real world
economic activity is important, because the context in artificial environments can alter be-
havior in unknown ways.7 There are four important features of this economic activity.
First, in the baseline experiment, the sales were implemented on credit (sale on credit,
henceforth). Traders visit randomly selected households and offer 5 soaps at a discount,
promising to deliver the soaps in the new future (two days after purchase). However, traders
require immediate payment. The household can choose to accept or reject the offer. If he
6Since I am unable to observe interactions between Batembos and Rwandophones.
7Haley K. J. (2005) show that cooperation in anonymous games was significantly affected by the addition
of payoff-irrelevant cues (earplugs and images of eyes).
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accepts, he must pay immediately. The trader then may deliver the soaps as he promised.
While traders’ defection does not affect the main outcome (whether the household accepts)
this could affect the viability of the project. I thus designed the project to prevent traders’
defection. Based on a monitoring system I developed, I record no occurrence of deception by
traders. I provide more information on traders’ incentives in this section. An important fact
is that households did not know if traders would deliver the soaps with certainty. Therefore,
this design allows me to introduce a commitment problem: the holdup problem (Greif, 1993,
Williamson, 1983). Absent informal or formal mechanisms that provide incentives to the
trader to deliver the soaps, the household would proceed by backward induction and should
refuse the offer. He would anticipate that it is in the trader’s best interest not to deliver the
soap. Since the exchange is socially desirable, this commitment problem can lead to ineffi-
ciencies if left unsolved. In the second experiment, I added sales on the spot. In sales on
the spot, the trader offers to provide the soaps at the same time as he receives the payment.
In the third experiment, I added sales on debt. In sales on debt, the trader first provided
the good, requiring the household to pay by cellphone within a few days. I describe each
experiment in detail in Section 3.3.2.
Second, soaps (and cell phone minutes) were sold at a discount. Traders offered 5 soaps
for the price of 3 in each household (and so for cell phone minutes) in the last experiment.
Third, after the offer was introduced, households were invited to answer questions of an
exit survey. The survey contains information on demographics, ethnicity, and measures of
perceptions.
Fourth, traders selected households randomly within every village. In their first day in
the village, traders established a village census with the assistance of the village authori-
ties, aimed for a separate research project. Using this census, traders selected households,
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as well as their treatment assignment, randomly.8 Households main economic activities is
agriculture and mining. The total sample of the main two experiments contains 2,684 house-
holds composed of 20 ethnic groups. The ethnic composition of the selected households is as
follows: Regas (n=1,208), Shi-Havus (n=993), Batembos (n=188), Rwandophones (n=161),
Other groups (n=134.2). To minimize variation induced by gender bias, all respondents were
randomly selected males within the selected households. Another 2,000 households were part
of a third experiment, in which traders offered cell phone credit.
I now turn to the traders. I hired 10 traders of various ethnicities for the first two ex-
periments, and 20 for the third experiment. Traders were recruited and trained prior to
implementation.9 The traders in the first experiments are mostly Shi-Havus. In the last
experiment, I added an equal number of Rwandophones - resulting in a team composed of
ten non-Rwandophones and ten-Rwandophones.10 When I refer to the coethnicity effect in
Experiments I and II, thus, I identify the household ethnic group effect. I designed the eco-
nomic activity so that traders are residual claimants. Traders’ incentives are thus a central
element of the design.
Traders may have incentives to cheat. For instance, traders had incentives to defect on
their promises of delivery. To prevent trader defection, I implemented the following mea-
sures. First, traders provided households with a project cell phone number, and instructions
for complaints. Furthermore, to allow monitoring, traders collected their cell phone num-
ber at the exit survey. Traders were informed that the supervisor would contact a random
8For each village, a list of randomly selected numbers was previously drawn using a statistical package,
conditional on village size. Traders then selected the households based on these numbers. Each household
was then allocated to a treatment status randomly.
9Traders in the first experiment were also hired as surveyors for a related projects in the villages in which
they sold soaps. See Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014a).
10In most of the analysis of the first two experiments, I focus on Shi-Havu traders to minimize biases
arising from individual effects among Batembos, Regas and Fulirus. The results are qualitatively identical.
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sample of respondents to check whether the trade was implemented as planned.11 Fur-
thermore, the supervisor planned to visit randomly selected villages and verify the traders’
activity.12 More importantly, traders work in a long-term basis for various research projects
for Columbia University and attribute a strong value of implementing their work without
cheating. Despite this monitoring system, I designed the project so that the research was
incentive compatible.
In what follows, I describe the strategies to make the design incentive compatible for
traders. A first concern is that traders may not have incentives to sell the good, decreasing
the realism of the observed transactions. To provide incentives to the traders to sell the
soaps, I made traders residual claimants on all sales, in addition to providing them with a
fixed daily payment.13 Traders had therefore real profits to make from successfully selling
the soaps, and they considered the revenues from the sales to be a non-negligible part of
their income.14 A second concern is that traders, in an attempt to increase profits, could
be tempted to violate the random allocation of households and extract higher surplus from
richer households. However, a village contains hundreds of households, which makes dis-
covering the wealth distribution in the village a costly exercise.15 Furthermore, I informed
11This threat was only implemented in experiment III, but was present in all three versions. I recorded
no instance of fraud or cheating by traders, among all households in which the Supervisor implemented the
verification.
12Although the project functioned with this threat, the project Supervisor ultimately never implemented
this back-checking in rural areas. However, every team had a team Supervisor that monitored the activity
of the other team in real time.
13The fixed component was set after discussions with traders and surveyors, so that their profit, adjusted
for uncertainty, was equal to the market wage they would otherwise obtain as surveyors, or as school teachers.
14In experiments I, II and III, if all trades were successful during the selling day, they would generate
3USD of profits per trader.
15See Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2014a) for a description of how even armed groups settled in the village
struggle to know the wealth distribution.
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traders during training that the researcher could use statistical techniques to verify violations
of implementation, such as randomization.16 A third concern is that, traders may may be
tempted to accept payments below the price set by the research project, hence extracting
strictly positive surplus from households that would otherwise have refused a purchase at
the price set by the research. To avoid this, I imposed “supply marginal costs” on traders.
For each soap that traders claimed to have sold, they were required to pay a cost, lower
than the sale price. The supervisor verified the stock of soaps and traders had thus to pay
for the missing soaps at the cost established by the project. This reduced the margin that
traders would get by selling at prices below the price set by the research, and thus the range
of potential households in which cutting prices would be a viable strategy to increase their
profits at the cost of the quality of the research. Based on the monitoring structure just
described, I recorded no downward violations of this price policy. Finally, traders may be
tempted to sell above the price set by the research project, and extract additional surplus
from the visited households. I implemented a number of measures to prevent this from
affecting the quality of the research. To start with, traders were allowed to sell above the
price set by the project if a particular household would accept to pay above the price. This
would not have affected the main outcome - whether the household accepts the deal - since
a household that accepts to pay at their potential bargained price would also accept to pay
at the lower price set by the research. However, the option to sell above the price set by
the research could induce traders to limit sales in households unable to pay high prices and
choose to sell only in rich households instead, in which they would extract a disproportion-
ately higher price. To reduce risks that traders would choose reallocate soaps to households
that offered high prices, I endowed traders with soaps for all households that they had to visit.
16Traders report that they believed violations of random sampling would be identified was very high.
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3.3.2 The three experiments
In this section I describe the three versions of the field experiment.
Experiment I
Experiment I is the baseline field experiment. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation
of the experiment setup. Each trader is allocated to randomly selected households and offers
the soaps at a discount. In exchange for immediate payment, he promises to deliver the
soaps in the next few days, after he is done taking the orders. Households decide to accept
or reject the deal. A few days after, the traders deliver the soaps, although households are
uncertain that they will. While the sale is made on a randomly selected individual of the
household, in what follows, I refer to them as households. I randomly assign two treatments.
Within the ethnic families of households, I randomize traders to households. Traders
identified the ethnicity of the households during the village census.17 This allows me to
create sales in which the trader and the household are coethnics, and sales in which they are
not co-ethnics.
I also randomly allocated access to state-backed contracts, stratifying by trader and
ethnicity of the allocated household. I randomized both treatments at the household level
within village and within trader. The original contract was drafted by a local lawyer and
was backed and stamped by the Ministry of Interior of Sud Kivu. Traders carried copies of
the original contract. The contract stipulates the following:
“I, the undersigned... , recognize to have received... Congolese Francs from... in antici-
pation of ... soaps of type... , for a value of 200 Congolese Francs per unit. I hereby commit
17Village authorities were informed that in order to better implement the research project, surveyors
needed to know which language the households were most familiar with. Since language is almost identical
to ethnicity, this provided an ethnic based census.
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to deliver... soaps of the type... and of value 200 Congolese Francs per unit to... in the
interval of TWO days at most. I am ready to bring this contract, if necessary, to a legal
representative. I recognize that in case of no delivery, I am exposed to the prosecutions and
sanctions that the Congolese law considers for these cases. Done in... . Date... . Signature
of debtor... Signature of creditor... Signature of witness... .”
Figure 3.4 shows the original contract. Based on preparatory fieldwork, the stamp was
important to signal the legal validity of the contract. In what follows I refer to state-backed
contracts and contracts interchangeably. The factorial design is presented in Table 3.1.
This design allows me to identify the marginal effect of contracts among coethnics and
non-coethnics interactions on trade, in the presence of commitment problems. Furthermore,
it allows me to identify how coethnicity affects trade. However if contracts or coethnicity
increase trade, even upon finding that contracts improve trust on the trader, one may worry
they do so through other channels than by affecting expectations of delivery. In particular, it
could be that households value more trading with coethnics, because of social preferences; or
there may be a norm of cooperation among coethnics. In a similar fashion, households may
prefer to trade with traders who have access to contracts because access to contracts may
signal the type of the trader, and this may affect the private valuation that the household
derives from accepting the transaction. To rule out these interpretations, and separate the
effect of contracts and coethnicity on trust, I designed Experiment II.
Experiment II
In Experiment I, traders always offered the sale on credit. To disentangle whether contracts
and coethncity increase households’ trust, I introduced sales in which traders provided the
soaps immediately during payment in a random sample of households (sales on the spot,
henceforth). This allows me to identify the effect of contracts and coethnicity for sales with
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and without commitment problems. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation of the
experiment setup. As in Experiment I, I randomized at the household level within village
and within trader. The design in Experiment II is a factorial design as shown in Table 3.2.
If contracts and coethnicity improve expectations about trader delivery in the sale on credit,
then their marginal effect on trade should be significantly larger for sale on credit than for
sale on the spot.
Experiments I and II allow me to estimate the marginal effect of contracts and coethnic-
ity and whether this effect is larger for sales on credit. Such a result would suggest they are
effective at improving trust (expectations of trader delivery). But are contracts enforceable?
One may indeed worry that even if contracts improve trust, they are not enforceable. Simi-
larly, coethnicity may not produce credible sanctions upon traders’ defection. In particular,
since traders are unknown to the households, households may just update their beliefs about
the type of trader upon observing a contract. This belief effect can confound the incentive
effect of contracts and coethnicity. For instance households could have better priors about
traders who demonstrate to have access to contracts, even when contracts are not enforce-
able. This would increase trust in traders who demonstrate to have access to a contract,
through a signaling channel.18 To identify whether contracts and coethnicity do reduce the
incentives to defect, I designed Experiment III. Experiment III allows me to capture the
causal effect of signing a contract on actual cheating.
Experiment III
Experiments I and II allow to identify whether contracts, or coethnicity, are effective at
increasing trade. To identify whether contracts and coethnicity work through signaling
18This is plausible if trader types select into occupations of different proximity with the state institutions,
and if proximity to the state is associated with other factors that motivate good reputation.
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(households believe that traders with contracts and coethnics are different types) or incen-
tives (contracts and coethnicity are effective at disciplining traders’ incentives), Experiment
III focuses on cheating behavior in a similar setting. Using a design a`-la Karlan and Zinman
(2009) I am able to causally identify the impact of state-backed contracts, and coethnicity,
on cheating behavior.
I next describe the experiment design. Figure 3.2 provides a graphical representa-
tion of the experiment setup. A team of twenty traders (ten Rwandophones, ten non-
Rwandophones) visits 2,000 households in a semi-urban neighborhood (Nguba) of the town
where the traders of Experiments I and II were selected. They offer a household consump-
tion good. Traders deliver cell phone minutes, which is in high demand in this population.19
I randomly allocated traders of the two groups to households. In each household traders
offered a sale at a discount (cell phone minutes), providing the good on the spot, but re-
quired that the household pays by cellphone within a few days (henceforth, sales on debt).
To identify the incentive effects of contracts, I used a design a`-la Karlan and Zinman (2009).
If I required only some households to sign a contract, the pool of households who accept the
deal with a contract condition would differ from the pool of households who refuse the deal
without a contract condition. Thus, to separate these selection effects from incentive effects,
traders offered the sale with the condition to sign a contract to all households. However,
upon noting whether the household accepted or refused, the traders proceeded to ask the
household signature in the contract only to randomly selected households. In the rest of
households, randomly selected, the traders communicated that the stock of contracts avail-
able did not allow them to ask the contract to be signed in this household. The differences
19In this experiment, I changed the household good from soaps to cell phone minutes because of lo-
gistical limitations. Experiment III is implemented in semi-urban neighborhood, because there is a larger
concentration of households, and because Rwandophone traders cannot travel across villages for security
reasons.
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in payment rates of households in which traders ultimately required to sign the contract and
households in which they did not identifies the incentive effect of contracts.
There are three important features to the design of Experiment III.
First, traders implement the sales on the household’s debt : traders offer 5 cell phone cards
(with a market value of .6 USD each) at a discount, but require the households to pay by cell
phone within two days. In the first step, the trader presents the offer. The household can
then choose to accept or reject the deal. In the second step, the households that accepted
the deal may choose to implement the payment by cell phone or to defect. This design
allows me to introduce a commitment problem. Absent informal or formal mechanisms that
provide incentives to the household to pay, it is in the household’s best interest not to pay.
Second, after the offer was introduced, traders implemented an exit survey. Third, within
street of each neighborhood, households were randomly assigned to different treatments. I
allocated teams to randomly selected streets (henceforth avenues), which were easy to iden-
tify. I randomly allocated households (and treatments) in each avenue to each trader, using
a statistical package prior to implementation.
To identify the impact of contracts on households’ incentives, I executed the request to
sign the contract only in a random sample of households. The contract was drafted by the
same lawyer as in Experiments I and II and was also backed and stamped by the Ministry
of the Interior. The text of the contract reads as follows:
“ I, the undersigned... , recognize to have received ... cell phone units of the company
... from ... , for a value of 500 Congolese Francs per unit. I hereby commit to pay ... in
exchange of these cell phone units to ... in the interval of TWO days at most. I am ready
to bring this contract, if necessary, to a legal representative. I recognize that in case of no
payment, I am exposed to the prosecutions and sanctions that the Congolese law considers for
these cases. Done in... . Date ... . Signature of debtor... Signature of creditor... Signature
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of witness... .”
In what follows, I describe the steps of the transaction:
Step 1: In all households, traders offer the deal with the request that households sign
a contract, in which households commit to pay by cellphone in a few days. Households can
then accept (Bt=1 = 1) or reject (Bt=1 = 0) the deal, and the trader coded the response of
the households.
Step 2a: After noting the answer, in a random sample of households traders withdraw
the requirement to sign a contract. Since they had initially requested a contract, their script
specified that they did not have a sufficient number of contracts to give to the household,
and that the deal would now hence require no contract.20 This creates two random samples:
those who had accepted the offer with the contract and sign the contract (F=1), and those
that had accepted the offer with the contract and do not sign the contract (F=0).
Step 2b: Now that traders have withdrawn the contract requirement for a subset of
customers, they allow the households who refused the offer initially (Bt=1 = 0) to reconsider
their decision. This step allows to identify screening effects, and leaves Step2a unaffected.
To analyze the incentive effect of contracts, I condition on the households who accepted the
offer initially (Bt=1 = 1) and compare their payment rates. To analyze the screening effect of
contracts, I condition on the households who accepted the offer after Step 2a (Bt=2 = 2) and
that were not requested to sign a contract (F=0), and compare payment rates by who those
20“Forgiving” the requirement to sign a contract could induce reciprocity, and bias behavior. To avoid this,
the script specified that traders did not have sufficient contracts to pursue with the signature of the contract.
Since the traders had already committed to sell the good, this reduces concerns about the information that
this decision can convey and the biases it can generate.
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that had initially accepted (Bt=1 = 1) to payment rates by those that had not (Bt=1 = 0).
Step 3: Traders provide the cell phone cards on the spot to the households who accept
the deal. Traders provide instructions to the household on how to execute payment. These
explanations are also written in a payment coupon that they give to each household. I
present the payment coupon in Figure 3.3.
In addition to sales on debt, I implemented sales on the spot for all households prior to
the debt sale in order to isolate ethnic preferences from expectations about future behavior.
3.4 Behavioral predictions
Allow the household’s utility to depend on the monetary payoff of the trader, with a, sep-
arable, social preference parameter a`-la Charness and Rabin (2002). I assume separability
of consumption and social preferences for clarity, but this assumption does not affect the
main predictions. This social preference weight may indicate that the household values the
trader’s payoff, but it could also indicate dis-utility from violating a social norm of surplus-
sharing with the trader. Let E ∈ R, F ∈ {0; 1}, C ∈ {0; 1} indicate respectively the degree
of ethnic proximity, whether the transaction is formalized by a contract, and whether the
sale is on credit.
3.4.1 Experiments I and II:
In this section, I derive testable predictions for Experiments I and II.
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Sales on the spot:
With on the spot sales, the buyers utility is:
UB = B(v − ℘+ λ(E,F,C)(℘− ℘a))
where B = {0; 1} is 1 if he buys the good and 0 otherwise. The term v is the private
valuation of acquiring the good and ℘ is the sale price. The term λ(E,F,C) is the weight
that the buyer assigns to the monetary payoff of the trader. I allow the social preference
weight to depend on the trader’s ethnic proximity, E, whether the sale is formalized, F ,
and whether the sale is on credit, C. Finally, ℘a is the alternative monetary revenue to the
trader in case the household rejects the purchase. I assume ℘ > ℘a, so that the trader makes
positive profit if he sales the good. I normalize the household utility of not purchasing to












When the buyer has ethnic biased social preferences,
∂λ(E,F,C)
∂E |F=0,C=0 > 0, coethnic-
ity in sales on the spot increases the buyer valuation of the transaction - since the trader is
making positive profit. The marginal effect of contracts when a sale is with a non-coethnic












If the household has a preference for the payoff of traders who formalize transactions,
∂λ(E,F,C)
∂F |E=0,C=0 > 0, the use of contracts in sales on the spot increases the buyer’s
valuation of the purchase. If contracts crowd out the existing ethnic preferences,
−∂λ(E,F,C)∂F |E=1,C=0 > −∂λ(E,F,C)∂F |E=0,C=0. This effect would be larger among coethnics
if contracts signal deviation from in-groups norms of behavior, which are weaker or absent
across groups.
Sales on credit
When sales are made on credit, households discount the future value of consumption by
their subjective probability that the trader will deliver the good η (E,F,C) and by their
discount factor, β (E,F,C). I have allowed both the subjective probability of delivery and
the discount factor to depend on the ethnic proximity and formalization. For instance,
households may be more impatient with delivery lags by non-coethnics traders and when the
trader signed a contract; in addition, households may assign a different probability of delivery
to coethnics and to sales that were formalized with a contract. In sales on the spot, there
is no uncertainty of whether the trader will provide the good, η (E,F,C = 0) = 1, ∀E,F
and since the delivery is immediate β (E,F,C = 0) = 1, ∀E,F . In what follows, for both
functions, I omit the argument C, and omit them altogether whenever the sale is on the
spot, C = 0 (they are equal to 1). The general formulation of the household’s utility is:
UB = B(β(E,F )η (E,F,C) v − ℘+ λ(E,F,C)(℘− ℘a))
The effect of credit on the buyer’s utility:
UB (E,F,C = 1)− UB (E,F,C = 0) = −v(1− β(E,F )η(E,F ))
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Unambiguously, introducing sale on credit reduces the expected payoff households derive
from the deal. This is a function of both the discount factor and the subjective probability
that the trader will deliver the good as promised.
I now compare this quantity for coethnics and non-coethnics, and for formalized sales and
not formalized sales. If trust is higher among coethnics, ie, if η(E = 1, F ) > η(E = 0, F ),
then it must be that, whenever v > 0:
∆C (E,F ) =
∣∣∣∣∂UB∂C |E=0,F=0 − ∂UB∂C |E=1,F=0
∣∣∣∣
= v (β(E = 1, F )η(E = 1, F )− β(E = 0, F )η(E = 0, F ))
> 0
The marginal effect of the credit variation decreases the utility of purchasing less among
coethnics than among non-coethnics. Assuming the discount factor is independent on the
ethnic proximity of the trader, E, and on formalization, F , this is equivalent to η(E = 1, F =
0) > η(E = 0, F = 0). Comparing the effect of ethnicity among sales on the spot to the
effect of ethnicity among sales on credit, thus, allows to isolate the effect of ethnic ties on
preferences from its effect on trust, η(E,F ).
If contracts are effective at improving expectations about trader’s delivery (increasing η),
then it must be that η(E,F = 1) > η(E,F = 0), ∀E. Thus:
∆ (E) = ∆C (E,F = 1)−∆C (E,F = 0) = vβ(η(E = 0, F = 0)− η(E = 0, F = 1))
< 0
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Furthermore ∆ (E = 0) > ∆ (E = 1) if and only if:
η (E = 0, F = 0)− η (E = 0, F = 1)− (η (E = 1, F = 0)− η (E = 1, F = 1)) < 0
This will be the case if η(E = 1, F = 0) is already 1, for instance, or whenever a larger mass
of households believe that η(E = 1, F = 0) = 1. In words, if this condition is true, among
coethnics contracts affect less the impact of whether the sale is implemented on credit.
If the effect of ethnicity on trust is larger when contracts are absent, then it must be that
∂∆(E)
∂E > 0. The effect of contracts on the decrease in trust provoked by making transactions
on credit would thus be smaller among co-ethnics.
Econometric strategy for Experiments I and II
The main outcome is whether household i visited by trader j buys the soaps, Tradei,j ∈
{0; 1}. I refer to this event as “trade occurs”. To identify the effect of individual treatments, I
compare trading rates in each cell of Tables 3.1 and 3.2. While the traders offer prices below
market prices, I expect that households will reject the offer for multiple reasons, including
liquidity constraints. Since treatments are randomized, the unobservables affecting rejection
are orthogonal to the treatments, so OLS is an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
I estimate the average treatment effect using a linear probability model in all regressions
below. Let Ei,j ∈ {0; 1} denote whether the interaction is coethnic, Fi,j ∈ {0; 1} whether
formal contracts are used, and Ci,j ∈ {0; 1} whether the sale is made on credit, all of which




Table 3.3 presents the testable implications.
3.4.2 Experiment III
In this section, I derive testable predictions for Experiment III.
Analytical framework
In Experiment III, the seller first provides the good (cell phone minutes), and the buyer can
choose whether to buy it, as well as whether to implement the payment. The buyer’s utility
is therefore now indexed by B = {0; 1} as previously and P = {0; 1}. The choice variable P
indicates whether the buyer implements the payment. Finally F = {0; 1} indicates whether
a contract was used to formalize the transaction and L ∈ R denotes the expected loss of
cheating stemming from the legal system. The buyer’s utility is now:
uBP |θ, v = B(v − P℘− (1− P ) (θ + FL))
I normalize utility to 0 if he does not purchase the good. If he purchases the good, B = 1,
he derives v from the consumption of the good. If he has chosen B = 1, he then chooses
whether to pay, P = 1, or not, P = 0. If he pays, he incurs the monetary loss ℘. However,
if he does not pay, he can save ℘, but this comes at a cost: θ indicates the cost incurred by
the buyer upon non-payment. This cost could be internalized, such as utility losses arising
from guilt or from social preferences as in Section 3.4. It could also be generated by extrinsic
motivations in his social context: he could suffer shame, or he could suffer other sorts of
social sanctions. Whichever is the source of the dis-utility from not payment, θ indicates the
losses incurred upon cheating (P = 0) if he chooses B = 1. Table 3.4 provides a mapping of
the parameter space onto the two-dimensional optimal choice of the household. There are 3
possible strategies: (B = 1, P = 1), (B = 1, P = 0), (B = 0, P = .), divided in four cells.
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Table 3.4 maps the parameter space onto the strategy set. Figure 3.5 provides a graphical
representation.
The terms αi ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the mass of agents in each of the relevant cells. I
consider the following partition of the parameter space. In each set, buyers’ strategies are
identical, with and without contracts. For instance, while α3 and α4 display the same
behavior in the absence of contracts, α3 values the good enough that he would be willing
to accept a purchase in which he is required to sign an enforceable contract. In contrast,
α4 would not not. Finally, I refer to each set according to two dimensions. First, if the
cost of not paying θ is sufficiently high (this depends on the individual v) I refer to them
as honest. This reflects that they have a relatively high θ given v so that they would never
defect (forgo payment). Second, if the valuation of the good purchased is higher than the
monetary cost, I refer to them as peach (lemons otherwise). The peach/lemon terminology
captures that trade is only socially optimal when the customer has a sufficiently high private
valuation, which is unobserved. It does not capture whether customers are of high quality, in
contrast to the standard adverse selection literature (Akerlof, 1970). I use the peach/lemon
terminology from the lens of a social planner deciding where to implement trades.
Assume first that the state contract is sufficient to motivate payment: ℘ < θ + L for all
households. In that case, α2 and α4 reject the offer, since they don’t value the good enough
to pay for it. Once customers have accepted or rejected the offer, the trader announces in
a random sample of households that he cannot offer a contract because he does not have
enough contracts (F = 0). The remaining are still required to sign the contract. Among
the households in which the contract requirement was withdrawn randomly, α3 will prefer
to avoid payment. Table 3.5 presents the selection and incentive effects.
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Testable implications in Experiment III
I now describe the main testable implications of Experiment III. I allow v and θ to depend
on the ethnicity of the trader (Rwandophone or non-Rwandophone) and whether a contract
was signed. Therefore, I consider the functions v(E,F ) and θ(E,F ). These determine the
mass of customers in each cell: α1(E,F ), α2(E,F ), α3(E,F ), α4(E,F ).
First, within each ethnic group of traders (Rwandophones and Shi-Havus), contracts
have incentive effects if α3(E) > 0. Indeed α3(E) is the mass of customers who would like to
forgo payment but pay if they were requested to sign a contract. I allow θ(E,F ) to depend
on F , so that social norms/sanctions can be crowded out or complemented by contracts. I
also allow the expected judiciary sanctions to depend on the ethnicity of the trader L(E).
This is important if Rwandophone traders have different ability to enforce contracts than
non-Rwandophone traders. Once I allow the expected legal sanctions, L, to depend on the
ethnicity of the trader, E, the effect of ethnicity, and the comparison of the marginal ef-
fects of contracts across ethnicities, are ambiguous. While coethnics may share norms of
no defection, which would decrease the effect of contracts among co-ethnics, non-coethnics
(Rwandophones) may have weaker access to the judiciary, decreasing the effect of the con-
tract when the trader is Rwandophone.
Second, contracts have screening effects. In particular, the quality of the pool of cus-
tomers that accepts the offer when the contract is not requested, α1(E) + α3(E) + α4(E)
contains a larger fraction of customers who would not pay than the pool who accepted when
the contract is requested, α1(E) + α3(E). Indeed α4(E) is the mass of customers who value
the good and would like to forgo payment but for whom purchasing is not worth if they
were requested to sign a contract. If contracts have a screening effect, it must be that,
conditioning on the sample of households in which the contract requirement was withdrawn
randomly -and hence among which the αi’s are present in the same proportions as in the
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main population-, payment rates are higher among those who initially accepted the offer
when the contract was requested α1(E) + α3(E), than among those who had rejected, but
accepted once they found out that the contract was not requested, α4(E).
Third, the pool of households who accept the deal is likely to be different for Rwando-
phone traders and non-Rwandophone traders. Indeed, the screening effect is likely to be
different across ethnic groups. I can identify the incentive effects of contracts within each
group. However, selection of households into B = 1 confounds any comparison of the effect
of contracts across groups. To see this, note that the choice of accepting or rejecting the sale
is affected by θ(E,F ), v(E,F ), and L(E). Ethnicity of the trader has thus an ambiguous
effect on the quality of the pool of households who accept the sale. These effects affect the
average θ of the customers who accept the sale in ambiguous directions.













, I use the sub-sample of sales on the spot. In sales on the spot, the
decision to buy or not, B = 1 or B = 0, is only affected by v(E) and ℘ since there are
no contracts involved. Therefore, if ∂v(E,F )
∂E
< 0, the mass of customers who accept the sale
when the trader is Rwandophone will be lower than when the trader is not Rwandophone,
in sales on the spot. In the absence of ethnic preference bias, but if Rwandophones are less
able to activate legal sanctions among the main ethnic groups, Rwandophone traders may
be associated with lower θ (group disciplining technology) and lower L (group access to the
judiciary). For constant L, lower θ increases the screening effect of contracts - contracts lead
to a larger increase in pool quality, since in the absence of contracts, there are less informal
mechanisms. For constant θ, lower L decreases the screening effect of contracts - contracts
lead to a smaller increase in pool quality, since they are less likely to be enforced. There-
fore, in the absence of evidence suggesting ethnic preference bias, if the increase in customer
quality resulting from the request to sign a contract is smaller for Rwandophone traders, it
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must be that L is smaller for Rwandophones - since θ can only be smaller for Rwandophone
traders and affects the quality of the pool of households who accept the sale in the opposite
direction.
Econometric strategy for Experiment III
Let Bi,j ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the customer accepts to buy. For sales on debt, B(t =
1)i,j indicates whether the customer accepted the sale initially (when signing the contract
was requested) and B(t = 2)i,j indicates whether the customer accepted the sale after the
randomization was implemented and they were asked to reconsider their choice. Let Pi,j ∈
{0, 1} indicate whether the customer pays for the transaction. This is only observed if the
customer accepted the purchase. Let Rj ∈ {0, 1} denote whether the trader is Rwandophone,
Fi,j ∈ {0, 1} whether formal contracts are used, and Di,j ∈ {0, 1} whether the sale is made
on debt. In sale on debt, the trader provides the good immediately, and asks the customer
to implement payment in the future by cell phone. In addition, let Ta ∈ {0, 1} be avenue
fixed effects and Te ∈ {0, 1} denote team fixed effects.21 Trader teams of two are randomly
assigned to avenues. Within each avenue, traders are randomly assigned to households.
Finally the contract treatment is randomly assigned within avenue for each trader.
To capture the incentive effects of contracts, I run the following linear probability model
in the subsample of sales on debt:
Pi,j = c0 + c1Fi,j + c2Ri,j + c3Fi,jRi,j + Aa + Te + ei,j
21To differentiate it from the time index, t, team fixed effects are indexed by e, which stands for team in
French (equipe).
166
where I condition the sample on Di,j = 1 and B(t = 1)i,j = 1.
To capture ethnic preference bias, I run the following linear probability model in the
subsample of sales on the spot:
Bi,j = b0 + b1Ri,j + Aa + Te + ei,j
where I condition the sample on Di,j = 0.
Let Si,j ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the customer was initially screened by the request to
sign a contract (Si,j = B(t = 1)i,j). To capture the screening effects of contracts, I run the
following linear probability model in the subsample of sales on credit:
Pi,j = d0 + d1Si,j + d2Ri,j + d3Ri,jSi,j + Aa + Te + ei,j
where I condition the sample on Di,j = 1 and Fi,j = 0. Table 3.6 presents the testable
implications of Experiment III.
3.5 Results
In this section I present and discuss my results. The analysis of the data of the main
experiment in Section 3.5.1 reveals that, in a sector where the holdup problem prevails,
households who are of the same ethnicity as the trader are more willing to engage in trade
than traders who are not. Contracts also increase trade among non-coethnic up to the
coethnic level, which are unaffected by contracts. In Section 3.5.2, I demonstrate that the
increase in trade stemming from contracts and shared ethnicity is driven by exclusively by
their effect on trust. This confirms that both coethnicity and state-contracts can solve hold-
up commitment problems leading to welfare gains. Finally, Section 3.5.4 exploits a field
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experiment design a`-la Karlan and Zinman (2009) to reveal that signing a contract reduces
cheating, but only when the claimant is of an ethnic group that has captured the state.
3.5.1 Main result: Experiment I
This section presents the results in Experiment I. I first present the behavioral results. I
then report the effects of contracts on self reported beliefs about social sanctions, in order
to confirm that the main effect on trade is not confounded by crowding out of social norms.
Effect of contracts on trade: experimental evidence
Figure 3.6 presents the main result. Non coethnic households trade in 48% of the cases.
However, when households are coethnics, 62% accept the deal. If the trader uses a state-
backed contract to commit to future delivery, the coethnic bias disappears: the proportion of
non-coethnics who accepts the sale rises from 48% to 69%, while the proportion of coethnic
households who accepts the deal remains unchanged.
Table 3.7 replicates Figure 3.6 in a linear probability model with the Tradei,j dummy
as dependent variable. When trade occurs, I coded the variable as 1, and 0 otherwise.
All specifications in Experiment I include village fixed effects, because I implemented the
randomization at the household level within village. Column (1) presents the baseline speci-
fication, Column (2) adds trader fixed effects, Column (3) includes controls for age, Column
(4) includes controls for wealth (family size), and Column (5) includes a wealth index, avail-
able only for a sub-sample of households. The results are identical accross columns. As can
be seen from Column (1), the coefficient on Contract is .19 and significant, suggesting that
contracts increase trade by 19% among non-coethnics. Furthermore, the coefficient on Co-
ethnic is .19 and significant, suggesting that coethnics are 19% more likely to accept the deal
when a contract is absent than non-coethnics. Finally, the interaction Contract X Coethnic
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is −.17 and significant. This shows that state-backed contracts increase trade when traders
and buyers are of different ethnic groups, that coethnicity is equally effective as state-backed
contracts among non-coethnics, and that state-backed contracts are less effective among co-
ethnics. When I test the null hypothesis βContractXCoethnic + βContract = 0, I cannot reject
that contracts have no effect on trade among coethnics. Figure 3.7 replicates Figure 3.6,
disaggregating sales by all ethnic groups.
Effect of contracts on social norms: survey evidence
This section shows that the main effect of contracts is not dampened by crowding-out of
social norms among in-groups. As a measure of beliefs about prevailing social norms, I
asked the households at the end of the offer which informal sanctions will be activated if the
trader does not deliver as promised. The question was open-ended, but the traders collected
the response by coding it in a list of predetermined options. I identified informal sanctions
in preparatory activities and consist of: Shame, Loss of friends, Physical violence. If the
option was not available, traders wrote the answer literally. Traders were able to classify the
universe of answers using these categories.
Table 3.8 presents the results of a linear probability model of the measure of prevailing
social sanctions on whether the contract was used. Column (1) presents the effect of contracts
on perceived occurrence of any informal sanction, and columns (2)-(4) disaggregate informal
sanctions by the classification presented above. Among all households visited, 50% believe
that informal sanctions apply. The magnitude of the coefficient on Contract has insignificant
magnitudes across columns. Furthermore, except for column (3), the coefficient on the
Contract dummy is statistically insignificant. Table 3.8 suggests that contracts do not crowd
out beliefs about social sanctions. If contracts improve the incentive of traders but crowd-out
social norms, the main effect identified in Section 3.5.1 is an underestimate of the incentive
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effect of contracts.
Fehr and Gaechter (1999) show that in-groups are more likely to sanction defectors. If
state-backed contracts crowd out norms of cheating, then households would be less willing to
expend resources to sanction the trader upon no delivery. In order to capture the willingness
to sanction traders who defect, I asked the following question at the end of the offer: “Imagine
the trader will not deliver the good as promised. Would you be willing to pay so that he
gets sanctioned? If so, how much would you be willing to pay?”. To capture the willingness
to incur private losses in order to sanction, I coded strictly positive answers as 1 and the
rest as 0. In Table 3.9, I report the results of a linear probability model of this variable on
the contract treatment. The coefficient on the Contract dummy is positive and significant
across specifications, suggesting that contracts do not crowd-out social norms.
3.5.2 Why do contracts work?
Experiment II: disentangling trust from preferences
The results in Section 3.5.1 did not establish why coethnicity and contracts improve trade.
For instance, some households could have social preferences that are biased in favor of co-
ethnics ( ∂λ
∂E
> 0) or in favor of traders who reveal to have state-backed contracts ( ∂λ
∂F
> 0).
This alone could explain the result, but would have different implications than if contracts
or coethnicity solve the holdup problem ( ∂η
∂E
> 0).
To elicit whether contracts and coethnicity affect the expectations of traders’ delivery,
this section reports the results of Experiment II. In this experiment, I randomly assigned
whether the sale was made on credit or on the spot, in addition to contracts and coethnicity.
This allows me to identify the effect that state-backed contracts or coethnicity have on sales
on the spot, and their effect on sales on credit separately. If coethnicity or state-backed
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contracts affect trade on the spot as much as they affect trade on credit, this would suggest
they do not affect trust.
Table 3.10 reports the effect of contracts, sale on credit, and coethnicity on trade. I
use a linear probability model with village fixed effects, since I randomized within village.
Column (1) presents the main effect of sale on credit on trade in the whole sample. Column
(2) restricts the sample to sales made on the spot and reports the main effect of Contract.
Column (3) restricts the sample to sales made on credit and reports the main effect of Con-
tract. In columns (4) and (5), I restrict the sample similarly, but focus on the effect of
Coethnicity. Column (6) presents the coefficients in the fully saturated model and Column
(7) adds household level controls to the fully saturated model (age, age squared, and number
of children in the household as a proxy for household wealth).
The coefficient on Sale on Credit is −.16 in the whole sample, validating the random-
ization of sale on credit. This suggests that households were 16% less likely to accept the
trade when delivery was postponed to a future date. Columns (2) and (3) demonstrate that
contracts increase trade when delivery is in the future, and not when delivery is on the spot.
While the coefficient on Contract is insignificant for trades on the spot, it is .1 and significant
for trades on credit.
Scrutiny of columns (4) and (5) reveals that coethnicity increases trade only when de-
livery is in the future (sale on credit). The coefficient on Coethnic is positive significant for
the subsample of sales on credit, neither so in the subsample of sales on the spot.
Column (6) shows the fully specified model. Contract and coethnicity increase trade,
only when trade is on credit. Indeed, the coefficients on Sale on Credit X Contract and Sale
on Credit X Coethnic are respectively .28 and .29 and are statistically significant. However,
the coefficients on Contract and Coethnic are negative and insignificant, suggesting they do
not affect trade when sale is on the spot. Finally the coefficient on the triple interaction Sale
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on Credit X Contract X Coethnic is negative marginally significant, and equal to -.28. This
suggests that contracts have a weaker effect on expectations of delivery among coethnics.
Furthermore, inspection of the coefficient magnitude suggests that contracts do not change
expectations of delivery among coethnics: the magnitude is exactly the inverse of the Sale
on Credit X Contract coefficient. Results are unchanged when I add household level controls
in Column (7).
Section 3.5.1 showed that coethnicity, or alternativey, state-backed contracts, can in-
crease trade. In Section 3.5.2, I go a step further. I establish that contracts and coethnicity
work exclusively through their impact on expectations of delivery, trust. This suggests that
there can be welfare gains from expanding access to state-backed contracts among members
of different ethnic groups. By solving a holdup problem that coethnicity already solves,
contracts could indeed spur trade among non-coethnics. However, the offer to sign a state-
backed contract may improve expectations of behavior through a signaling channel instead
of disciplining the incentives of the trader. Indeed, this result could be the result of pure
signaling, if access to state-backed contracts signals that the trader is a better type. Do
contracts provide incentives to deliver or do they just signal better traders? In the next
Section, I provide support to the relevance of the findings in this section, and demonstrate
that contracts provide incentives not to defect.
3.5.3 Why do contracts improve trust?
Measuring incentive effects of contracts in survey data
Section 3.5.1 showed that contracts and shared ethnic affiliation increase trade by improving
expectations that the trader (the agent) will deliver as promised. This section uses survey
data to show that contracts and coethnicity reduce incentives to cheat. In Section 3.5.4 I
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confirm this finding using real behavior in Experiment III.
To measure the sanctions that would prevail if the trader does not deliver, I exploit
survey responses. At the end of the offer, I ask the households what they think will happen
to the trader if he does not deliver as promised. I coded the answers as Informal sanctions
(Shame, Loss of friends, and Physical violence) and judicial sanctions. The question on
judicial sanctions was asked as follows: “Do you believe that this contract can lead to
judicial sanctions if needed?”. Hence, the question captures whether judicial sanctions are
a threat if the contract was signed, and is also asked to households who did not sign the
contract.
Table 3.11 reports results of a linear probability model of this measure regressed on
Coethnicity or Contract. To capture how coethnicity produces informal sanctions, Columns
(1)-(4) report the effects of coethnicity on informal sanctions. To capture if households
believe that judicial sanctions are a real threat, Column (5) regresses the measure of beliefs
about the judiciary on Contract. The coefficient on Coethnic in column (1) is .10 and
statistically significant, suggesting that households whose ethnic affiliation coincides with
the traders’ are 10% more likely to expect that informal sanctions are a real threat. Overall,
37.5% of non-coethnic households expect informal sanctions upon defection, against 47% of
coethnic households. As shown in columns (2)-(4) show, this is driven by concerns about
reputation (shame). Column (5) shows that 13% of households believe that judicial sanctions
are a real threat if the trader would sign the contract. This proportion rises by 5% if the
contract was offered.
Therefore, coethnicity produces beliefs about the threat of informal sanctions and a
significant fraction of the population believes in the judicial system. Do they change the
beliefs about the trader type? To asses whether contracts change the beliefs about the
trader’s type, I measured self-reported belief about the motive of the trader at the end of
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the offer. In particular, I asked the household who they think the trader is working for.
I regress this outcome on Coethnicity and Contract in a fully saturated linear probability
model in Table 3.12. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(3) are three institutions
that the trader could potentially work for, from the perspective of households. These are,
respectively, a University, a private company, an NGO. Accross columns, Coethnicity and
Contract do not affect the belief about who is employing the trader. Furthermore, beliefs
are widely dispersed across categories: 25% of households believe that the trader works for
an NGO, 34% of households believe that the trader works for a University, and 15% of
households believe that the trader works for a private company. This suggests that showing
a contract is unlikely to affect the beliefs about the trader’s type.
This section has shown, using self-reported survey data on expectations that a significant
portion of households believe contracts are enforceable, and that contracts do not affect
households’ beliefs about the trader’s type. Self-reported data, however, is subject to social
desirability bias. For instance, households may report what they think the trader wants to
hear.22 Furthermore, social desirability bias may correlate with the willingness to engage in
trade for other reasons. To avoid social desirability biases, the next Section, examines real
behavior to capture whether self-reported beliefs are mirrored in real behavior. In particular,
I examine whether the act of signing a state-backed contract decreases the likelihood to cheat,
in order to provide support to the interpretation that contracts solve a holdup problem
because they are a credible commitment device.
22This concern is plausible: in Humphreys, Sa´nchez de la Sierra, and Van der Windt (2013c), I demon-
strate the presence of strong social desirability bias in this population using a randomized experiment.
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3.5.4 Why do contracts improve trust?
Observing incentive effects of contracts in Experiment III
Section 3.5.1 established that state-backed contracts increase trade among non-coethnics.
Access to contracts may reveal information about the traders’ types. If beliefs about the
trader’s type correlate with the belief that the trader will deliver the good, signaling alone
can lead contracts to increase trade. To disentangle signaling from the incentives effect
of contracts, I analyzed survey-based evidence in Section 3.5.3. The results suggest that
contracts are enforceable and that beliefs about the trader’s type do not change when traders
show a contract. In this section, I present the results of Experiment III, which confirm the
survey-based results. I find that signing a state-backed contract reduces incentives to cheat
on claimants that are part of the dominant social group. However, I also find that contracts
are ineffective for claimants that have low representation in the state administration.
Incentive effects of contracts
Table 3.13 presents the main result of Experiment III. To capture whether contracts decrease
incentives to cheat, I consider the pool of households who accepted the sale on debt. That is, I
consider households who accepted to receive the good immediately and promised to pay in the
future, under the condition to sign a state-backed contract in which they commit to pay. In
a random sample of these households, traders withdrew the requirement to sign a contract.
Since households selected into the accepting the trade prior to this randomization (other
households rejected the deal), I can obtain the incentive effects of contracts by comparing
payments among households who ultimately signed the contract to payments of households in
which traders withdrew the requirement to sign a contract. This contrasts to the analysis of
the screening effects of contracts in Section 3.5.4, where I focus on households who ultimately
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accept the trade (after the trader announced that the requirement to sign the contract was
withdrawn).
Among the households who accepted the offer, I regress a dummy indicating whether the
payment was actually executed on the contract dummy. To identify the effect of contracts,
I implement a fully saturated linear probability model on the dummies Rwandophone and
Contracts, including team and avenue fixed effects.23 Column (1) reports the regression
on Contract, column (2) reports the regression on Rwandophone trader, and column (3)
reports the fully saturated model. Column (1) shows that the average effect of Contract
is insignificant, and column (2) shows that the average effect of a Rwandophone trader is
negative but is marginally significant. Turning to column (3) Contract has a strong effect for
all sales when the trader is not Rwandophone. Indeed, the coefficient on contract is .9 and
significant, suggesting that contracts increase payment by almost 10% when the trader is
not Rwandophone. Furthermore, the coefficient on Rwandophone is insignificant and small,
suggesting that the average effect of Rwandophone traders identified in column (2) does not
arise from sales where the traders withdrew to the requirement to sign the contract. As
confirmed by the coefficient on Contract X Rwandophone, contracts do not have a positive
effect on payment when the trader is Rwandophone. Scrutiny of the coefficients suggests
that the average effect of contracts is negative when the trader is Rwandophone, but not
significant.
This result supports that contracts provide incentives to respect the promise (L > 0).
However, this is only true if traders (the claimants) belong to the dominant groups. The
marginal effect of contracts is identified for each subgroup of traders, since I randomized
23Avenues were randomly assigned to trader teams. Teams were composed of two traders, one Rwando-
phone, one not. Within each avenue, households were randomly assigned to traders, and treatments were
randomly assigned within trader. I therefore use avenue and team fixed effects in all specifications. Since
trader ethnicity is fixed within trader, I cannot use trader fixed effects.
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the requirement to sign the contract within trader. But is this evidence that Rwandophones
have less leverage to enforce contracts (L(E = 1) > L(E = 0), where E = 0 if and only if the
trader is Rwandophone)? Since the pool of households considered in Table 3.13 is restricted
to households who have accepted the sale, I am potentially conditioning to different pools
of households when the trader is Rwandophone than when the trader is not Rwandophone.
Differential selection into trade by trader ethnicity could be due to preferences ( ∂v
∂E
6= 0
households may value differently Rwandophone payoffs), social sanctions ( ∂v
∂E
6= 0, households
may believe that social sanctions upon defecting a Rwandophone are different), or beliefs
about the relative ability of Rwandophones to enforce contracts ( ∂L
∂E
6= 0). In what follows,
I show that there is no evidence for ∂v
∂E
6= 0 or ∂v
∂E
6= 0.
Heterogeneous incentive effects of contracts by ethnic group: mechanisms
In this section, I identify why contracts fail to work if the claimant is a member of the
Rwandophone community. Rwandophones may have be less able to activate legal sanctions
( ∂L
∂E
< 0), or the screening effects of contracts may be different for Rwandophones, generating
a different pool of households under the contract condition. This will be the case if ∂θ
∂E
< 0
(social sanctions/internalized sanctions are endogenous to the identity of the trader) or if
∂θ
∂E
< 0 (private valuation of the good is endogenous to the identity of the trader). I start
with a measure of the preference against Rwandophones.
Preferences
To capture preferences against trading with Rwandophones, I use the subset of sales that
were implemented on the spot. If there is a preference-based bias against Rwandophones,
sales on the spot should be less likely if the trader is Rwandophone. I implement a linear
probability model of whether trade occurs Tradei,j on whether the trader was Rwandophone
(Rwandophonej). I also include the variable contract as a balance test. Since contract was
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randomized at the household level, each household that participated to a sale on the spot
later participated to a sale on debt, where the contract randomization was implemented.
Thus, contract should not be related to whether the trade on the spot occurs. I include
team and avenue fixed effects in all specifications.
Table 3.14 presents the results. Columns (1)-(3) show the results respectively on: Con-
tract, Rwandophone, and the fully saturated model. As expected, the coefficient on contract
in column (1) is negligible. As seen in column (2), households who receive the offer from a
Rwandophone trader are 4% less likely to accept the deal, but this difference is not statisti-
cally significant. This suggests that preference-based discrimination against Rwandophone
traders is absent in this population. I then turn to the analysis of screening in the sale on
debit sample.
Screening: pool size
I now analyze the screening effects defined in Table 3.6. To capture screening, I focus on
the sample of households who ultimately accepted the trade. This contrasts to the analysis
of the incentive effects of contracts in Section 3.5.4, where I focused on households who ini-
tially accepted the trade. Focusing on households who initially accepted the trade allowed
me to exclude selection effects, by comparing payment behavior among households who ul-
timately had to sign a contract and those in which the traders withdrew the requirement to
sign a contract. Here, I focus on households who accepted the deal ultimately, B(t = 2),
and are subject to a common incentive schemes (those households in which the contract was
ultimately not required). After implementing the contract randomization, traders allowed
households who rejected the initial offer (with the requirement to sign a contract) to change
their decision. This is especially important for the households in which traders ultimately
withdrew the requirement to sign the contract: some households may now find it profitable
to accept. I first provide evidence of screening, by showing that the decision to ultimately
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accept the trade, B(t = 2), depends on whether the contract has to be signed or not.
To show that the requirement to sign a contract affects the household decision to accept
the offer, I regress acceptance of the trade post-randomization on the treatment, contract.
I use a linear probability model to regress a dummy indicating whether the household ulti-
mately accepts the deal (B(t = 2)) on the following dummy variables: Contract ultimately
requested (Contract), whether the trader is Rwandophone (Rwandophone), and their inter-
action (Contract X Rwandophone). Table 3.15 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2)
report the average effects of Contract and Rwandophone respectively and column (3) reports
the full specification. As expected, column (1) households are 6% more likely to accept to
trade at this second step if the contract requirement is withdrawn. This difference is statisti-
cally significant. Furthermore, column (2) shows that households visited by a Rwandophone
trader are 5% less likely to accept the deal, but this difference is marginally significant. I
then turn to the fully saturated model in column (3). The coefficient on Contract reveals
that contracts have a strong screening effect for traders who are not Rwandophones: house-
holds are 9% more likely to accept the purchase if the contract requirement is withdrawn.
However, contracts have no effect on acceptance when the trader is Rwandophone. Indeed,
the linear combination Contract + Contract X Rwandophone, which captures the effect of
contracts among the Rwandophone traders, is not significant (and negative).
Screening: pool quality
I have now established that contracts affect the decision to purchase goods from non-
Rwandophone traders, and they do not affect this decision when the sale is offered by a
Rwandophone trader. I now establish that the screening effect of contracts I identified for
non-Rwandophone traders is positive. Namely, the households who were screened by ini-
tially requiring a contract are a pool of higher quality. To do this, I now focus on households
who accepted the offer ultimately, and in which the contract requirement was withdrawn.
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Among these households, I compare the payment rates of households who initially accepted
to households who initially rejected the offer: this obtains the screening effect. Table 3.16
presents the results of this comparison, estimated in a linear probability model. I include
avenue and team fixed effects in all columns. Column (1) focuses on the entire sample, col-
umn (2) restricts the sample to sales by non-Rwandophone traders, and column (3) restricts
the sample to sales by Rwandophone traders. The variable Screened indicates whether the
household accepted the initial offer, in which signing the contract was a requirement. Since
in this sample, the requirement to sign a contract was withdrawn, the coefficient on Screened
indicates how much more likely to pay are households who were initially screened, holding
constant their current contractual conditions. The coefficient in column (1) is positive and
significant. Its magnitude, .35 suggests very strong screening effects: households who ac-
cepted the offer initially are 35% more likely to pay. Columns (2) and (3) reveal that this
effect is entirely driven by sales by non Rwandophones: the coefficient in the non Rwando-
phone sample is almost identical, while the coefficient on the Rwandopnone sample is zero.
Heterogeneous ability to enforce contracts
This result suggests contracts have a screening effect, only for the group of traders who
has access to the judiciary. In Section 3.5.4, I showed that contracts have incentive effects,
only if used by the group of traders who has access to the judiciary. Furthermore, in Sec-
tion 3.5.4, I showed that Rwandophone traders are no less associated with trades on the spot,
suggesting there is no preference-based discrimination against Rwandophone traders. Absent
preference-based ethnic bias, ∂v
∂E
= 0. If contracts are less effective for Rwandophone traders
and they have a lower screening effect, it must be that θ, social sanctions, is higher when
cheating on a Rwandophone trader, or that L, the judiciary sanctions, is lower for Rwando-
phones. But if θ was higher for Rwandophones, payment rates in sales on debt would likely
be higher for Rwandophone traders in the absence of contracts. Furthermore, as shown in
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Table 3.15, purchase is no less likely for Rwandophone traders. It is therefore unlikely that
θ is higher among Rwandophones. As shown in Section 3.4.2, for constant θ and v, lower
L decreases the screening effects of contracts (consistent with the results in Tables 3.15 and
3.16) and reduces the incentive effects of contracts (consistent with Table 3.13). Therefore,
the evidence presented in this section is strongly supportive that contracts are enforceable,
but only when the claimant is member of a group that has access to the state administration,
which is not the case of Rwandophones.
I go a step further to validate this result. I asked at the end of the trade in each household
whether they believed the contract would have real consequences. Table 3.17 presents these
results using a linear probability model. This time, 70% of households who signed a contract
believed that the contract was enforceable. This proportion is 11% smaller if the contract is
claimed by a Rwandophone.
Figure 3.8 replicates the results using the answer to the question “If you do not pay, what
consequences do you think are likely?”.24 In this figure, I present the proportion of house-
holds who believe that there will be legal sanctions if they do not pay. I separate matches by
whether the household is of the majority ethnic groups (above, labelled NR) and whether the
household is of the Rwandophone minority (below, labelled R). For each type of household,
I include the proportion who believe that there will be legal consequences when the trader
that visited the household is not Rwandophone (NR), and when the trader that visited the
household is Rwandophone (R). Clearly, non-Rwandophone traders are consistently better
able to activate legal threats. Furthermore, non-Rwandophone traders are better able to
activate legal threats on Rwandophone households than vice-versa. Both these differences
24Results using both questions are qualitatively identical. However, the wording of the question used in
Table 3.17 is ambiguous. It asks the household to identify if there were legal consequences if he would sign
a contract. In order to better capture the impact of the dyadic relationship between trader and household
on the legal threat, I focus on the second question.The analysis pools all households, including those that
did not sign a contract.
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are statistically signifcant. This is consistent with the interpretation that it is the ability to
enforce contracts that explains why Rwandophones are not better able to increase payment
rates when they use a contract to protect themselves. Results in Table 3.17 and Figure 3.8
confirm that contracts are enforceable, but only if they are drafted to protect the claims of
certain groups: those which have captured the state.
3.6 Discussion
The previous sections have shown that contracts and coethnicity are substitutes that can
solve the holdup problem in Eastern Congo. This section discusses external validity.
One may worry that the household delivery sector considered in this paper is artificial,
and created by the researcher.
First, the findings of this paper improve upon a laboratory setting. Haley K. J. (2005)
show that cooperation levels in a public goods game increase in a laboratory setting when the
experimenter displays an eye on the screen, and decrease when subjects are asked to wear
earplugs. This finding revealed controlled environments can generate biases in unknown
ways. In this experiment observe behavior in a natural context. To do so, I created a real
economic activity of household delivery.
Second, the sales I implement are plausible. The design reflects months of field exper-
imentation. These preparatory activities showed that there was a large demand for soaps
in rural households, and for cellphone credit in semi-rural households. Following these ob-
servations, I designed a sector of home delivery that provided households with goods that
ambulant traders would plausibly deliver.
Third, one may worry that sales on credit (or on debt) are unusual. Households reacted
to the trade on credit (or on debt) without suspicion. To assess perceptions, I included a
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question at the end of the survey that asked respondents to describe what they thought was
the purpose of the traders. Figure 3.9 provides a graphical representation of the language
used in this answer. Most households describe economic and research related goals and there
is no evidence that households knew what the purpose of the experiment was.
Finally, I included a closed form question at the end of the survey in order to capture
whether the respondent finds the activity unusual. Less than 10% did.
3.7 Conclusion
While the impact of the state on economic development has attracted scholars of all social
sciences (Bates, 2011), there is little statistical evidence of economic activity in the absence
of the state. As a result, the empirical bases of existing scholarship are weak. To improve
upon this, I implemented a field experiment in East Congo, where the state is relatively
absent, and I am able to estimate the impact of expanding the state, by providing access to
its formal system of contract enforcement.
I provide econometric evidence on the economic consequences of extending access to the
state judiciary. To observe expansion of the judiciary to areas where there penetration is
limited or absent, I managed a team of twenty traders in Eastern Congo. I developed an
economic activity of household delivery, based on prior qualitative fieldwork. I allocated the
traders to more than 4,000 households, in which they offered to sell a domestic good in high
demand at a discount. In randomly selected households, they offered a state-backed contract
to guarantee delivery. This contract was drafted by a lawyer and validated by the Provin-
cial administration. Exploiting the mixed ethnicities of this population, I examine whether
expanding access to state-backed contracts can lead to gains in trade in where the holdup
problem prevails. Furthermore, I can compare it to the mechanisms that groups already
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have established in the absence of the state, such as coethnicity. I am able to ask whether
access to state-backed contracts increases trade, crowds-out the prevailing social norms, and
why.
In Experiment I, I provided the main result. I exploit a feature of the design of the
household delivery activity: traders requested immediate payment and promised future de-
livery. I randomly assigned whether the trader was required to back this promise with a
state-backed contract. I find evidence that contracts and coethnicity are equally effective at
increasing trade. Furthermore, I find that contracts are ineffective among coethnics. Finally,
using self-reported survey data, I find no evidence that contracts crowd-out social norms.
In Experiment II, I extended the main result. Contracts and coethnicity may improve
trade because of other channels than households’ expectations of the traders’ behavior. In
particular, coethnics may be more willing to trade because they attach a higher value to
the payoff of their in-groups than to the payoff of out-groups (preference-based discrimi-
nation/social preferences). To disentangle preference-based families of explanations from
expectations of trader’s behavior, I randomly assigned whether the sale was offered on the
spot or on credit. This allows me to separate the effects of contracts and of coethnicity on
expectations of trader behavior from other effects such as preferences. I can identify the trust
effect of contracts and coethnicity by comparing their effects in sales are made on credit to
their effects in sales that are made on the spot. I demonstrated that both coethnicity and
contracts affect trade exclusively through expectations of future behavior.
Finally, using survey data as well as a third Experiment, I showed that contracts have
have strong incentive effects. This finding provides confidence in the main result. However, I
find that contracts are only enforceable when the potential claimant is member of an ethnic
group that has captured the state. This suggests that groups unconnected to the state will
struggle to extract the rents that the legal system provides.
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This paper has implications for policy. First, my results suggest that expanding access to
the state judicial system by providing contracts has potentially large welfare gains, especially
in populations where social groups are fragmented. Second, my findings suggest that the
design of interventions that ignore the allocation of material power and the political equilib-
rium may be misguided, as suggested in Acemoglu and Robinson (2013). In Experiment III,
state-backed contracts activate threats of judiciary sanctions enforced by the state. However,
the state is embedded in a network of social relations and some groups have captured the
state. Ignoring the political equilibrium underlying the state can lead to misled policies. In
particular, expanding access to state backed contracts where one group has limited access
to the state can increase the gap in bargaining power by providing more leverage to those
with pre-existing access to the state.
The sales I am able to observe in this field experiment are only a small fraction of the
potentially larger number of foregone trade opportunities stemming from poor access to the
state-endorsed, formal system of contract enforcement. Future research and policy interven-
tions should consider solutions to the holdup problem that take into account the social and
political equilibrium in place.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Design of Experiment I
Coethnic trader non-Coethnic trader
Contract I II
No contract III IV
Notes: This table presents the factorial design of Experiment I. There are four treatment cells, according to
whether the trader was coethnic, and whether the trader was instructed to offer a state-backed contract to
guarantee the sale. In Cell I, the trader is coethnic and offers a contract. In cell II, the trader is non-coethnic
and offers a contract. In cell III, the trader is coethnic and does not offer a contract. In cell IV, the trader is
non-coethnic and does not offer a contract. In Experiment I, all sales are made on credit. In sale on credit,
the trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange of immediate payment by the household.
Table 3.2: Design of Experiment II
Coethnic trader non-Coethnic trader
Contract I II
No contract III IV
Sales on the Spot
Coethnic trader non-Coethnic trader
Contract V VI
No contract VII VIII
Sales on Credit
Notes: This table presents the factorial design of Experiment II. There are eight treatment cells, according
to whether the trader was coethnic, whether the trader was instructed to offer a state-backed contract to
guarantee the sale, and also whether the trade was implemented on the spot or on credit. In sales on the
spot, the trader provides the good on the spot immediately upon receiving payment. In sales on credit, the
trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange of immediate payment by the household. In
cells I to IV are the households in which trade is implemented on the spot. In Cell I, the trader is coethnic
and offers a contract. In cell II, the trader is non-coethnic and offers a contract. In cell III, the trader is
coethnic and does not offer a contract. In cell IV, the trader is non-coethnic and does not offer a contract. In
cells V to VIII are the households in which trade is implemented on credit. In Cell V, the trader is coethnic
and offers a contract. In cell VI, the trader is non-coethnic and offers a contract. In cell VII, the trader is
coethnic and does not offer a contract. In cell VIII, the trader is non-coethnic and does not offer a contract.
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Ethnic preferences: Households prefer to trade with traders of their ethnic
group
a1 > 0
Contract preferences: Households prefer to trade with traders that have re-
vealed to have access to state-backed contracts (when there is no risk involved)
a2 < 0
Contracts preferences/ethnic preferences substitutes: Contract dis-
taste is larger among coethnics
a4 < 0
Trust/Discount: Households value more immediate delivery than future de-
livery
a3 < 0
Ethnic trust: Households trust more traders of their ethnic group a5 < 0
Contract trust: Households trust more traders who use contracts to back
their delivery promise
a6 < 0
Contracts trust/ethnic trust substitutes: Contracts improve trust less
among coethnics
a7 < 0
Contracts crowding out/in of ethnic trust: Contracts reduce/increase
trust among coethnics
a6 + a7 < 0
Notes: This table presents the testable implications from Experiments I and II. The left column describes
the hypothesis. The right column describes the testable implication in the framework of the econometric
specification. It indicates the implied sign of the parameter in the corresponding specification. Let Ei,j ∈
{0; 1} denote whether the interaction is coethnic, Fi,j ∈ {0; 1} whether formal contracts are used, and
Ci,j ∈ {0; 1} whether the sale is made on credit. In addition, let Tv be village fixed effects. The regression
specification is: Tradei,j = a0+a1Ei,j+a2Fi,j+a3Ci,j+a4Ei,jFi,j+a5Ei,jCi,j+a6Fi,jCi,j+a7Ei,jFi,jCi,j+
Tv + ei,j . In Experiments I and II, sales are either on credit (both experiments I and II) or on the spot
(experiment II only). In sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange
of immediate payment by the household. In sales on the spot, the trader provides the good on the spot
immediately upon receiving payment.
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Table 3.4: Characterization of the four types of buyers
Strategies B = 1, P = 1 B = 0, P = . B = 1, P = 0
Preference ordering u11 > . u00 > . u10 > u11 > u00 u10 > u00 > u11
conditions θ > ℘ v < θ θ < ℘ v > θ
v > ℘ v < ℘ v > ℘ v < ℘
Share α1 α2 α3 α4
Label Honest peach Honest lemon Moral Hazards Dishonest lemon
Notes: This table characterizes the strategies in the parameter space. The first line maps the strategy set.
The second line presents the conditions associated to the corresponding observable behavior. I present the
implied parameter relationships in line three. The terms in line four, αi ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4 are the mass of agents
in each of the relevant cells. Cell relevance is defined by observable behavior: I consider the cells in which
buyers make identical choices with and without contracts. For instance, while α3 and α4 display the same
behavior in the absence of contracts, α3 values the good enough that he would be willing to accept a purchase
requiring enforceable contract while α4 not. Finally, I label each mass according to two dimensions. First,
if the cost of not paying, θ, is sufficiently high (this depends on the individual v) I label them honest. This
reflects that they have a relatively high θ given v so that they would never defect (forego payment). Second,
if the valuation of the good purchased is higher than the monetary cost, I label them peach. If the valuation
of the good purchased is lower than the monetary cost, I label them lemon. The peach/lemon terminology
captures that trade is only socially optimal when the customer has a sufficiently high private valuation,
which is unobserved.
Table 3.5: Screening and Incentives in Experiment III
Step1 selection C=1
B = 0 B = 1
Who buys? α2 + α4 α1 + α3
Step2 incentives C=0 C=1
Who pays? α1 α1 + α
P
3
Notes: This table presents the predicted selection and incentives effects in Experiment III. To disentangle
both effects, all households are offered to purchase the good (with immediate delivery) with the condition
to sign a contract guaranteeing that they will pay for that good within 2 days by cellphone. If L > ℘, the
contract is sufficient to motivate payment upon purchase, where L ∈ R is the cost associated with breaking
the contract. In that case, αP3 = α3. Individuals in the groups α2 and α4 reject the offer, since they don’t
value the good enough to pay for it. Once customers have self-selected, at the time of the transaction, the
trader announces in a randomly selected subset of households that he cannot offer a contract because he
does not have enough contracts (C = 0) while the remaining are still required to sign the contrct. The last
column reports who pays: among the households in which the contract requirement was withdrawn, α3 will
now prefer to avoid payment.
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Ethnic preferences: There is a preferences-based ethnic bias b1 < 0
Contract enforceable, non-Rwandophones: Contracts have positive in-
centive effects when they are used to protect a non-Rwandophone trader
c1 > 0
Contract enforceable, Rwandophones: Contracts have positive incentive
effects when they are used to protect a Rwandophone trader
c1 + c3 > 0
Contract screening, non-Rwandophones: Contracts have positive screen-
ing effects when they are used to protect a non-Rwandophone trader
d1 > 0
Contract screening, Rwandophones: Contracts have positive screening
effects when they are used to protect a Rwandophone trader
d1 + d3 > 0
Contract heterogeneous incentive effects: Contracts used to protect the
trade are more effective for non-Rwandophone traders. This does not identify
the difference in access to the judiciary because θ and v are functions of E and
hence affect the pool of customers
d1 + d3 > 0
Contract screening vs. access to the state: If the screening effect is
smaller for Rwandophone traders, it must be that Rwandophones have weaker
access to justice
d3 < 0
Notes: This table presents the testable implications from Experiment III. In experiment III, sales are either
on debt or on the spot. In sales on debt, the trader first provides the good, and asks the household to
pay in the future by cellphone. In sales on the spot, the trader provides the good on the spot immediately
upon receiving payment. The left column describes the hypothesis. The right column describes the testable
implication in the framework of the econometric specification. In particular, it indicates the implied sign of
the parameter in the corresponding specification. Let Bi,j ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the customer accepts to
buy. For sales on debt, B(t = 1)i,j indicates whether the customer accepted the sale initially (when signing
the contract was requested) and B(t = 2)i,j indicates whether the customer accepted the sale after the
randomization was implemented and they were asked to reconsider their choice. Let Pi,j ∈ {0, 1} indicate
whether the customer pays for the transaction. This is only observed if the customer accepted the purchase.
Let Rj ∈ {0, 1} denote whether the trader is Rwandophone, Fi,j ∈ {0, 1} whether formal contracts are used,
and Di,j ∈ {0, 1} whether the sale is made on debt. In addition, let Ta ∈ {0, 1} be avenue fixed effects and
Te ∈ {0, 1} denote team fixed effects. Trader teams of two are randomly assigned to avenues. Within each
avenue, traders are randomly assigned to households. Finally the contract treatment is randomly assigned
within avenue for each trader. The linear probability model specifications are as follows. To capture the
incentive effects: Pi,j = c0 + c1Fi,j + c2Ri,j + c3Fi,jRi,j + Aa + Te + ei,j where I condition the sample
on Di,j = 1 and B(t = 1)i,j = 1. To capture ethnic preferences: Bi,j = b0 + b1Ri,j + Aa + Te + ei,j
where I condition the sample on Di,j = 0. Let Si,j ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the customer was initially
screened by the request to sign a contract (Si,j = B(t = 1)i,j). To capture the screening effects of contracts:
Pi,j = d0+d1Si,j +d2Ri,j +d3Ri,jSi,j +Aa+Te+ei,j where I condition the sample on Di,j = 1 and Fi,j = 0.
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Table 3.7: Effect of contracts and coethnicity on trade (Experiment I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
Contract 0.191*** 0.182*** 0.194*** 0.185*** 0.184**
(0.0594) (0.0593) (0.0596) (0.0617) (0.0809)
Coethnic 0.190*** 0.171*** 0.203*** 0.170*** 0.209***
(0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0523) (0.0540) (0.0755)
Contract X Coethnic -0.168*** -0.158** -0.172*** -0.148** -0.190**





Wealth Index (Family Size) 0.0102**
(0.00424)
Wealth Index (Assets) 0.152***
(0.0413)
Constant 0.448*** 0.351** 0.116 0.427*** 0.473***
(0.0471) (0.153) (0.127) (0.0532) (0.0675)
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,650 1,563 870
R-squared 0.113 0.126 0.125 0.123 0.213
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES
Household controls NO NO YES YES YES
Sample CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents the results of the main effect. Within villages, traders are randomly assigned
to households. In Experiments I and II, sales are either on credit (both experiments I and II) or on the
spot (experiment II only). In sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in
exchange of immediate payment by the household. In sales on the spot, the trader provides the good on
the spot immediately upon receiving payment. In a random subset of households for each trader, traders
were instructed to sign a contract in which the trader commits to deliver the good within two days. The
contract was drafted by a local lawyer and stamped by the Provincial authorities (Ministry of the Interior
of Sud Kivu). I regress a dummy (Trade) indicating whether the trade took place on a dummy indicating
whether the trader used a contract (Contract), a dummy indicating whether the trader and the household
were coethnics (Coethnic) and their interaction. Each column presents the results of a linear probability
model with village fixed effect. All regressions include only sales made on credit. Column (1) presents the
baseline specification, and Column (2) adds trader fixed effects. Columns (3)-(5) include household level
controls.
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Table 3.8: Effect of contracts on beliefs about social norms (Experiment I)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Informal sanctions Shame Loss of friends Physical violence
Contract -0.0156 0.00583 -0.0281** 0.00660
(0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0130) (0.00747)
Constant 0.492*** 0.381*** 0.0899*** 0.0208***
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.00923) (0.00531)
Observations 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654
R-squared 0.204 0.154 0.073 0.090
Village FE YES YES YES YES
Sample CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents the analysis of the impact of contracts on informal social sanctions. All columns
present the results of a linear probability model of the dependent variable on a dummy (Contract) indicating
whether a contract was shown by the trader. The dependent variable is the response to the following survey
question, asked after the transaction was made “If I did not deliver the good as promised, what do you think
will happen to me?”. Answers were open, but the traders coded answers into the three most frequent ansers:
Shame, Loss of friends, Physical violence. Shame captures reputational losses. Each of these dependent
variables is a dummy taking value 1 if it was part of the answer. The dependent variable in column (1) is
a dummy variable taking value 1 if any of the three informal sanctions above was part of the answer. All
regressions include village fixed effects, since randomization is within village. In Experiments I and II, sales
are either on credit (both experiments I and II) or on the spot (experiment II only). In sales on credit, the
trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange of immediate payment by the household. In
sales on the spot, the trader provides the good on the spot immediately upon receiving payment.
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Table 3.9: Effect of contracts on willingness to sanction defectors (Experiment I)
(1) (2) (3)
Willing to pay Willing to pay Willing to pay
VARIABLES to sanction to sanction to sanction
Contract 0.0252** 0.0250** 0.0301**
(0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0131)
Coethnic 0.00241 -0.0158 0.00102
(0.0246) (0.0237) (0.0258)
Constant 0.125*** -0.00678 0.0285
(0.0237) (0.110) (0.0717)
Observations 3,012 3,012 2,768
R-squared 0.076 0.153 0.081
Village FE YES YES YES
Sample CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT
Trader FE NO YES NO
Household controls NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents the effect of contracts on the answer to the following survey question: “If I did
not deliver the good as promised, would you be willing to pay so that I receive a sanction?”. The regression
model is a linear probability model with village fixed effects in all Columns. All regressions include village
fixed effects, since randomization is within village. In Column (1) I report the baseline specification, in
Column (2) I include trader fixed effects. In Column (3) I include household controls instead (age, age
squared, number of children as a proxy of wealth). In Experiments I and II, sales are either on credit (both
experiments I and II) or on the spot (experiment II only). In sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver
the good in two days, in exchange of immediate payment by the household. In sales on the spot, the trader
provides the good on the spot immediately upon receiving payment. The sample is restricted to sales on
credit.
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Table 3.10: Effect of contracts and coethnicity. Preferences or trust? (Experiment II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
Credit sale -0.161*** -0.443*** -0.442*** -0.441***
(0.0313) (0.131) (0.135) (0.130)
Contract 0.0591 0.0953*** -0.00975 -0.0283 -0.0229
(0.0430) (0.0320) (0.146) (0.151) (0.145)
Coethnic -0.0897 0.106** -0.0913 -0.0840 -0.119
(0.0879) (0.0536) (0.118) (0.120) (0.117)
Contract X Coethnic 0.0775 0.0891 0.0937
(0.154) (0.158) (0.153)
Credit sale X Contract 0.284* 0.301* 0.283*
(0.172) (0.178) (0.171)
Credit sale X Coethnic 0.293** 0.283** 0.293**
(0.136) (0.140) (0.136)
Credit sale X Contract X Coethnic -0.281 -0.263 -0.281
(0.182) (0.188) (0.181)
Constant 0.752*** 0.675*** 0.569*** 0.786*** 0.524*** 0.808*** 0.518** 0.971***
(0.0243) (0.0304) (0.0226) (0.0826) (0.0495) (0.113) (0.214) (0.218)
Observations 1,308 450 858 450 858 1,308 1,179 1,308
R-squared 0.069 0.084 0.131 0.082 0.126 0.083 0.095 0.098
Trader FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Household controls NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Sample ALL SPOT CREDIT SPOT CREDIT ALL ALL ALL
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents the results from a linear probability model of the dummy Trade (indicating whether the trade was successful)
on the following dummies: Sale on Credit, Contract, Coethnic. In Experiments I and II, sales are either on credit or on the spot. In
sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange of immediate payment by the household. In sales on the
spot, the trader provides the good on the spot immediately upon receiving payment. Sale on Credit is a dummy takes value 1 if the sale
was on credit and 0 if the delivery was implemented on the spot.Column (1) presents the average effect of Sale on Credit in the whole
sample. Columns (2) and (3) present respectively the average effect of Contract, in the sample of sales on the spot and the sample of
sale on credit. Columns (4) and (5) present respectively the average effect of Coethnic, in the sample of sales on the spot and the sample
of sale on credit. Column (6) presents the fully saturated model. Column (7) includes household level controls (age, age squared, and
number of children) and Column (8) includes trader fixed effects. All regressions include village fixed effects.
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Table 3.11: Self-reported expectations about sanctions on the trader (Experiment II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Informal Loss of Physical Legal
VARIABLES sanctions Shame Friends violence sanctions
Coethnic 0.0981* 0.0880* 0.0256 -0.0156 0.0231
(0.0509) (0.0503) (0.0271) (0.0176) (0.0376)
Contract -0.0211 -0.00450 -0.0235 0.00688 0.0499**
(0.0275) (0.0272) (0.0146) (0.00953) (0.0203)
Constant 0.386*** 0.286*** 0.0611** 0.0392** 0.112***
(0.0500) (0.0494) (0.0266) (0.0173) (0.0370)
Observations 1,219 1,219 1,219 1,219 1,219
R-squared 0.156 0.115 0.113 0.097 0.139
Village FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sample CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents the results of regressing survey measures of expectations about sanction upon
defection of the trader on a dummy indicating whether the household and trader are coethnics (Coethnic)
and a dummy indicating whether the trader was instructed to show a contract (Contract). The survey
measures of expectations in columns (1)-(4) are the answer to the following question, asked at the end of the
sale: “If I did not deliver the good as promised, what do you think will happen to me?”. Answers were left
open, but the traders coded answers into the three most frequent ansers: Shame, Loss of friends, Physical
violence. Shame captures reputational losses. Each of these dependent variables is a dummy taking value 1
if it was part of the answer. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy variable taking value 1 if any
of the three informal sanctions above was part of the answer. The survey measures of expectations in column
(5) is the answer to the following question: “If I signed this contract to guarantee delivery and I did not
comply, would there be judiciary consquences for me?”. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy
variable taking value 1 if any of the sanctions in columns (2)-(4) was part of the answer (Shame, Loss of
friends, Physical violence). All regressions include village fixed effects, since randomization is within village.
In Experiments I and II, sales are either on credit (both experiments I and II) or on the spot (experiment
II only). In sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange of immediate
payment by the household. In sales on the spot, the trader provides the good on the spot immediately upon
receiving payment.
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Table 3.12: Self-reported beliefs about traders’ types (Experiment II)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES University Soap company NGO
Coethnic 0.00771 0.00319 -0.0328
(0.0485) (0.0367) (0.0451)
Contract -0.0340 0.0131 0.0209
(0.0609) (0.0460) (0.0566)
Contract X Coethnic 0.0382 -0.00816 -0.0127
(0.0636) (0.0480) (0.0591)
Constant 0.337*** 0.151*** 0.254***
(0.0463) (0.0350) (0.0431)
Observations 2,591 2,591 2,591
R-squared 0.173 0.194 0.085
Village FE YES YES YES
Sample ALL ALL ALL
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents the results of the fully saturated regression model of a dummy variable indicating,
respectively, whether the household believes that the trader works for a University, for a Soap company, or
an NGO. This variable is the answer to the following survey question, implemented after the sale: “Who do
you think I work for?”. All regressions include village fixed effects, since randomization is within village.
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Table 3.13: Incentive effects of contracts, by ethnic group (Experiment III)
(1) (2) (3)





Contract X Rwandophone -0.158**
(0.0636)
Constant 0.460** 0.477** 0.439*
(0.226) (0.225) (0.225)
Observations 668 668 668
R-squared 0.204 0.208 0.216
Team FE YES YES YES
Avenue FE YES YES YES
Sample ALL TRADERS ALL TRADERS ALL TRADERS
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents Experiment III results on incentives. All regressions consider only sales on debt,
in which the trader provided the good first, and asked the household to pay by cell phone. I regress a dummy
variable indicating whether the household paid by cell phone (Pay) on the dummy Contract, Rwandophone,
and their interaction. Contract indicates whether the household ultimately was requested to sign the contract
in which he commits to pay by cell phone. Randomization was implemented by randomly withdrawing the
requirement to sign the contract in some households after they had accepted the deal (the script specifies that
the trader does not have enough contracts to allow him to request a contract here). Rwandophone indicates
whether the trader is Rwandophone, and Contract X Rwandophone is their interaction. In column (1) I
regress Pay on Contract only. Column (2) I regress Pay on Rwandophone only. Incolumn (3) I report the fully
saturated regression model. All regressions are a linear probability model with avenue and team fixed effects.
Mixed ethnic two-person trader teams were randomly allocated to avenues and households within avenues
were randomly allocated to each trader. The contract randomization was implemented within trader. Since
traders’ ethnicity is fixed within trader, I do not include traders’ fixed effects. An F test of H0: Contract +
Rwanda X Contract =0 cannot reject the null hypothesis, suggesting contracts have no effect on payment
incentives when the trader is Rwandophone.
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Table 3.14: Preference against Rwandophones, sales on the spot (Experiment III)
(1) (2) (3)





Contract X Rwandophone 0.0391
(0.0541)
Constant 0.0962 0.101 0.127
(0.152) (0.152) (0.153)
Observations 1,009 1,009 1,009
R-squared 0.201 0.202 0.203
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents Experiment III preferences results. All regressions consider only sales on the spot,
in which the trader provided the good on the spot in exchange of immediate payment. I regress a dummy
variable indicating whether the trade occurred (Trade) on the dummy Contract, Rwandophone, and their
interaction. Contract indicates whether the household ultimately was requested to sign the contract in which
he commits to pay by cell phone. Randomization was implemented as randomly withdrawing the requirement
to sign the contract in some households after they had accepted the deal (the script specifies that the trader
does not have enough contracts to allow him to request a contract here). Rwandophone indicates whether
the trader is Rwandophone, and Contract X Rwandophone is their interaction. In column (1) I regress
Trade on Contract only. Column (2) I regress Trade on Rwandophone only. Incolumn (3) I report the fully
saturated regression model. All regressions are a linear probability model with avenue and team fixed effects.
Mixed ethnic two-person trader teams were randomly allocated to avenues and households within avenues
were randomly allocated to each trader. The contract randomization was implemented within trader. Since
traders’ ethnicity is fixed within trader, I do not include traders’ fixed effects. The variable Rwandophone
does not decrease Trade when sales are on the spot, at conventional levels of statistical significance. This
suggests absence of preference-based ethnic bias against Rwandophones.
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Table 3.15: Screening. Effect of contract on trade, in sales on debt (Experiment III)
(1) (2) (3)





Contract X Rwandophone 0.0622
(0.0543)
Constant 1.185*** 1.181*** 1.224***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.157)
Observations 960 960 960
R-squared 0.192 0.191 0.196
Team FE YES YES YES
Avenue FE YES YES YES
Sample ALL TRADERS ALL TRADERS ALL TRADERS
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents Experiment III screening results. All regressions consider only sales on debt, in
which the trader delivered the good first, and asked the household to pay by cell phone. I regress a dummy
variable indicating whether the household accepted the sale (Trade) after being asked again once the contract
randomization took place. Traders offered the sale with the request to sign a contract to all households.
Once they have accepted or rejected, the contract requirement was randomly withdrawn in a subset of
households. At this point, households were asked to reconsider their choice. Trade indicates whether at this
second step, the household accepted the trade. I regress Trade on the dummy Contract, Rwandophone, and
their interaction. Contract indicates whether the household ultimately was requested to sign the contract
in which he commits to pay by cell phone. Randomization was implemented as randomly withdrawing the
requirement to sign a contract in a random sample of households, after the household has accepted the
offer. Rwandophone indicates whether the trader is Rwandophone, and Contract X Rwandophone is their
interaction. In column (1) I regress Pay on Contract only. Column (2) I regress Pay on Rwandophone only.
Incolumn (3) I report the fully saturated regression model. All regressions are a linear probability model with
avenue and team fixed effects. Mixed ethnic two-person trader teams were randomly allocated to avenues
and households within avenues were randomly allocated to each trader. The contract randomization was
implemented within trader. Since traders’ ethnicity is fixed within trader, I do not include traders’ fixed
effects.
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Table 3.16: Screening. Effect of contract on customers’ pool quality, in sales on debt (Experiment III)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pay Pay Pay
Screened 0.346* 0.386* 0
(0.181) (0.213) (0.409)
Constant -0.0621 -0.0353 0.429
(0.207) (0.219) (0.419)
Observations 355 201 154
R-squared 0.268 0.377 0.375
Team FE YES YES YES
Avenue FE YES YES YES
Sample ALL TRADERS NON RWANDOPHONES RWANDOPHONES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents Experiment III screening results. All regressions consider only sales on debt,
in which the trader delivered the good first, and asked the household to pay by cell phone. I regress a
dummy variable indicating whether the household implemented the payment by cell phone (Pay). Traders
offered the sale with the request to sign a contract to all households. Once households have accepted or
rejected the offer, traders withdraw the requirement to sign a contract in a random sample of households.
At this point, households were asked to reconsider their choice. In this table, I consider only households in
which the contract requirement was withdrawn. I compare those that accepted in the first step (when they
were required to sign a contract) to those that accepted only in the second step (when the requirement was
withdrawn). Pay indicates whether at this second step, the household implemented the payment. I regress
Pay on the dummy Screened. Screened takes value 1 if the household had initially accepted the offer, with
the contract requirement, and 0 if it had not (but accepts once the requirement is withdrawn). Rwandophone
indicates whether the trader is Rwandophone, and Contract X Rwandophone is their interaction. In column
(1) I regress Pay on Contract only. Column (2) I regress Pay on Rwandophone only. Incolumn (3) I report the
fully saturated regression model. All regressions are a linear probability model with avenue and team fixed
effects. Mixed ethnic two-person trader teams were randomly allocated to avenues and households within
avenues were randomly allocated to each trader. The contract randomization was implemented within trader.
Since traders’ ethnicity is fixed within trader, I do not include traders’ fixed effects.
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table presents Experiment III main results using survey based data. I regress a dummy variable
indicating whether the household believes that the contract is enforceable (Legal sanctions) on the dummy
Rwandophone. Rwandophone indicates whether the trader is Rwandophone. Legal sanction takes value 1
if the household answered yes to the following questio: “Do you think that the contract you just signed
can have judicial consequences if you don’t pay?”. The econometric model is a linear probability model
with avenue and team fixed effects. Mixed ethnic two-person trader teams were randomly allocated to
avenues and households within avenues were randomly allocated to each trader. The contract randomization
was implemented within trader. Since traders’ ethnicity is fixed within trader, I do not include traders’
fixed effects. 62% of households believe that contracts are enforceable, when they are used to protect a non-
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Notes: This graph illustrates the structure of experiments I and II. Once households have been sampled,
I randomly allocate households to either Sale on Credit or Sale on the Spot. In sale on credit, the trader
makes the offer and requests payment immediately, in exchange for the promise of delivering the good to the
household in the near future (in a few days). In sale on the spot, the trader makes the offer and requests
payment immediately, but makes the good available to the household immediately upon payment. Once the
offer has been made, the household can choose to accept it, in which case trade occurs, or reject it. In sales
on credit, if the household rejects, the sale ends, and if the household accepts, then the household makes the
payment to the trader. Later, the trader may deliver the good, or may defect. In sales on the spot, if the
household rejects, the sale ends, and if the household accepts, then the household makes the payment to the
trader and the trader immediately provides the good. I have included the payoffs that the trader and the
household would obtain, assuming that the utility function is linear and separable.
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Notes: This graph illustrates the structure of experiment III. Once households have been sampled, the
traders implement the visits to the households. In each household, they present the offer to the household.
The trader informs the household that he will make the good immediately available to the household, if
the household promises to pays by cell phone in the near future (two days). However, all households are
informed that in order for the sale to be possible, the household needs to sign a state-backed contract in
which he commits to pays within two days. This is the sale debt. The household then accepts or rejects.
Once the decision has been recorded, a random sample of households is selected in which the requirement to
sign the contract is withdrawn. In these households, the trader announces “I do not have a sufficient number
of contracts today that would allow me to have you sign a contract. Since we have decided to make the deal,
I must go ahead without having you sign a contract”. In the remaining households, the requirement to sign
the contract is maintained. The trader then leaves the household and the household can pays or defects. I
included the payoffs that the trader and the household would obtain, with linear and separable utility.
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Figure 3.3: Instructions for payment by cellphone (Experiment III)
Notes: This figure shows the payment instructions given to the household in Experiment III.
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Figure 3.4: State-backed contract used in Experiments I and II
Notes: This figure shows the contract used in Experiments I and II.
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B = 1;P = 0
B = 1;P = 0
B = 1;P = 1







Notes: This figure maps the the parameters to the best responses of the household. Thick lines delinate
areas where the observed strategies are different. Dotted lines delineate areas where the prefrence ordering
changes, but leads to no change in observed behavior whether contracts are required or not. αi ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4
are the mass of agents in each of the cells. For instance, while α3 and α4 display the same behavior in the
absence of contracts, α3 values the good enough that he would be willing to accept a purchase requiring
enforceable contract while α4 not.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of contracts and coethnicity on trade (Experiment I)
Notes: This figure presents the main result in Experiment I. In Experiment I, sales are implemented on
credit. In sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver the good in two days, in exchange of immediate
payment by the household. The vertical axis indicates the share of attempted sales that were successful.
There are four columns. The first two columns from the left indicate the share of successful sales among
households that are non-coethnics of the traders. Among these households, the first column reports the
share for households in which traders did not show a contract, and the secnd, the share for households in
which the traders showed a contract. Columns 3 and 4 have the same interpretation, albeit for sales in which
traders and households are coethnics. Red intervals indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.7: Disaggregation of the main effect by ethnic sub-group (Experiment I)
Notes: This figure presents the main result in Experiment I, disaggregated by households’ and traders’
ethnicity. In Experiment I, sales are implemented on credit. In sales on credit, the trader promises to deliver
the good in two days, in exchange of immediate payment by the household. The vertical axis indicates the
share of attempted sales that were successful. There are two groups of columns. The first group columns
on the left (dark columns) indicate the share of successful sales among households visited by a Shi trader.
Columns are grouped in two for each ethnic group of the household: the first column reports the share
for households in which traders did not show a contract, and the secnd, the share for households in which
the traders showed a contract. The second group columns on the left (light columns) indicate the share of
successful sales among households visited by a Havu trader and its interpretation is identical. Red intervals
indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.8: Belief about contract enforceability (Experiment III)
Notes: This figure presents the beliefs result in Experiment III, disaggregated by households’ and traders’
ethnicity. In Experiment III, traders are implemented on debit. In sales on debit, traders provide the good,
and ask the household to pay within two days by cellphone. At the end of the transaction, the trader asks
the household what sanctions he thinks he incurrs if he does not pay as promised. In this figure, I present
the proportion of households who believe that there will be legal sanctions if they do not pay. I separate
matches by whether the household is of the majority ethnic groups (above, labelled NR) and whether the
household is of the Rwandophone minority (below, labelled R). For each type of household, I include the
proportion who believe that there will be legal consequences when the trader that visited the household is
not Rwandophone (NR), and when the trader that visited the household is Rwandophone (R). I label each
of the four interactions according to the ethnicity of the trader, followed the ethnicity of the household.
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Figure 3.9: Language used to describe the intention of the traders (Experiments I and II)
Notes: This figure presents the language used by respondents as answer to the following question: “Ac-
cording to you, what am I trying to find out with the reseach component?” As can be seen, households
overwhelmingly thought that the traders, through their survey, want to know about their life and economic
conditions.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Mathematical Appendix
A.1.1 Households first order conditions
There are N First order conditions for ei, N First order conditions for e
H
i , N first order
conditions forHi conditioned on α˜iei plus theN+1 first order conditions from the constraints.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to Hi, i = 1, . . . , N give:
∀ α˜i, u′[τipi −G′(Hi, pi)]µi = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
and
τipi −G1(Hi, pi) ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , N
An interior solution is therefore given by Hi < α˜iei and Hi > 0, hence µi = 0 and:
τipi = G1(Hi, pi)
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Similarly, an interior solution for eHi is given by e
H





The FOC with respect to ei, i = 1, . . . , N give:
∫
(u′[(1− τi)piα˜i − ti] + µi)dF (α)− λ− c′(ei) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
for sectors where the hiding constraint is binding, and:
∫
(u′[(1− τi)piα˜i − ti])dF (α)− λ− c′(ei) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
for sectors where it is not.
A.1.2 Proof of proposition 1




parameter k captures the cost of hiding output. Let c(e) = e
2
2 and the utility function be







The optimal tax is larger the higher is the cost to conceal an additional unit of output.
At the limit, if output cannot be concealed, and k = +∞, τ ∗ = 1
2
. This is because labor
supply is isoelastic and always equal to 1, which can be seen from the inverse elasticities
rule. If k ∈ R+, 0 < τ ∗ < 1
2
. When α is large τ ∗ approaches its upper bound, and when α
is small, τ ∗ tends to 0. Since αg ≈ 0, the optimal tax in a village where the only sector is
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gold will be low. Furthermore, if αg is sufficiently low so that αgL < H (assumption G1),
the choice of tax is irrelevant and always raises no revenues, since output is always hidden.

















which is strictly increasing in α. Therefore, ∃α s.t. ∀α < α,
R(α) ≤ Fg, τ ∗ = 0
and ∀α > α,
R(α) > Fg, τ
∗ > 0
where Fg was defined as the fixed cost of levying an output tax in the gold sector.
A.1.3 Proof of proposition 2
The household’s and the bandit’s programs are now, respectively:
max
e,eH ,H
(1− τ) pαe+ τpH − t (e− eH)− 12e2 − c2e2H − ph2 H2
max
t,τ
τp (αe−H) + t (e− eH)










, where s = 1+c
α2h
. Applying the









































































A.2.1 Validation of the coltan shock




Notes: This figure shows two images of the survey area from satellite at night. The left figure shows the average cloud free lights captured
by NASA-NOAA satellites from the survey area in 1999. The right figure is the equivalent figure for 2000. The orange lines indicate
international borders. On the left is the Democratic Republic of Congo. On the right, and from North to South: Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, Tanzania. The endowments of the villages are as indicated in the figure legend. In the year 2000, a very large town emerges
in the northern part of the picture. This town is close to Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, which is the richest region in
coltan. As the price of coltan skyrocketed, miners, traders and individuals whose activities related to mining had an income shock, and
consumption increased in the main towns in the proximity of the provincial capitals.
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Figure A.2: The coltan shock, number of marriages and occupational choice
Notes: This figure plots the number of recorder marriages on years. The left vertical axis indicates the
average number of marriages and the horizontal axis indicates the year. The solid line indicates the average
number of marriages in coltan villages, by year. The dashed line indicates the average number of marriages
in villages not endowed with coltan, by year.
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A.2.2 Validation of the data
Table A.1: Survey and ACLED battles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES 1 km 2 km 5 km 10 km 15 km 20 km 25 km 50 km
Conquest attempts, survey 0.0138*** 0.0298*** 0.0565*** 0.0679*** 0.100*** 0.0872*** 0.122*** 0.102***
(0.00396) (0.00674) (0.0107) (0.0167) (0.0233) (0.0268) (0.0291) (0.0359)
Constant 0.00718* 0.0295*** 0.0515*** 0.0817*** 0.126*** 0.203*** 0.248*** 0.614***
(0.00373) (0.00636) (0.0101) (0.0158) (0.0220) (0.0253) (0.0274) (0.0339)
Observations 2,102 2,102 2,102 2,102 2,102 2,102 2,102 2,102
R-squared 0.107 0.133 0.146 0.172 0.232 0.271 0.281 0.396
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results on the OLS regression of battles recored by ACLED on battles
recorded by my survey. To assign battles recorded by ACLED to the survey villages, I derived circles of varying circumferences to each
of my survey villages. For each circle, I computed the number of geo-located ACLED battles that fall inside the circle. Thus, for each
village, the assigned number of ACLED battles is the number that is closer than the radius of the selected circle. Across columns, I
present the results for circles of the following radius: 1km (column 1), 2km (column 2), 5km (column 3), 10km (column 4), 15km (column
5), 20km (column 6), 25km (column 7), 50km (column 8). Standard errors are clustered at the village*year level.
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Figure A.3: Recorded violent Events and known historical rebellions
Notes: This figure plots the number of attacks on the sample villages by different armed groups recorded
in my survey, by year and compares them to well known dates for known historical rebellions. The left axis
indicates the number of attacks recorded in the sample, and the horizontal axis indicates the year. The blue
line indicates attacks by the AFDL as recorded in the survey. The black line indicates attacks by the RCD as
recorded in the survey. The red, dashed line indicates the number of attacks by the CNDP group as recorded
in the survey. Correspondingly, the vertical blue lines at 1996 and 1997 mark the well known dates for the
launch and end of the AFDL rebellion as known from historical accounts; the vertical dotted lines at 1998
and 2003 mark the well known dates for the launch and end of the RCD rebellion as known from historical
accounts; the vertical dashed line at 2004 mark the well known date for the launch the CNDP rebellion as
known from historical accounts. The dates of the attacks recorded from the survey coincide exactly with
well known historical rebellions. The source for this graph is the attacks dataset, which contains less, more
detailed information on attacks.
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Figure A.4: Recorded violent Events and ACLED violent events
Notes: This figure plots the total number of attacks on the sample villages recorded in my survey and
recorded by ACLED in the neighborhood of my survey villages, by year. The solid line represents the total
number of attacks recorded in my survey, and the dotted and dashed lines represent the number of attacks
recorded from ACLED, in the neighborhood of my survey villages. To assign attacks recorded by ACLED to
the survey villages, I derived circles of varying circumferences to each of my survey villages. For each circle, I
computed the number of geo-located ACLED violent events that fall inside the circle. Thus, for each village,
the assigned number of ACLED battles is the number that is closer than the radius of the selected circle.
The dotted line indicates the resulting number of violent events in a circle of 10km radius. The dashed and
dotted line, 5 km radius. The dashed line, 2 km radius. The solid line captures the well-known phases of the
Congo Conflict. The number of attacks rises in 1998 drastically, with the Second Congo War, an in 2000,
with the coltan shock. It then decreases with the post-conflict period, and rises again in 2009, 2010. This
last rise is the rise in attacks by the FDLR as a result of the Kimia II operation that led them to pillage. The
ACLED dataset does not capture these trends. This provides additional confidence in my survey attacks
data. The source I used for villages in my survey for this graph is the village dataset, which contains more,
less detailed information on attacks.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Mathematical Appendix
B.1.1 Households first order conditions
There are N First order conditions for ei, N First order conditions for e
H
i , N first order
conditions forHi conditioned on α˜iei plus theN+1 first order conditions from the constraints.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to Hi, i = 1, . . . , N give:
∀ α˜i, u′[τipi −G′(Hi, pi)]µi = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
and
τipi −G1(Hi, pi) ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , N
An interior solution is therefore given by Hi < α˜iei and Hi > 0, hence µi = 0 and:
τipi = G1(Hi, pi)
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Similarly, an interior solution for eHi is given by e
H





The FOC with respect to ei, i = 1, . . . , N give:
∫
(u′[(1− τi)piα˜i − ti] + µi)dF (α)− λ− c′(ei) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
for sectors where the hiding constraint is binding, and:
∫
(u′[(1− τi)piα˜i − ti])dF (α)− λ− c′(ei) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
for sectors where it is not.
B.1.2 Optimal tax properties
This section derives some of the results introduced in Section 2.3.3.
Price shocks and the optimal tax
If labor supply is isoelastic, a price shock has no effect on the optimal tax. To see when
price changes increase the optimal tax, suppose there is only one sector, that there are no
labor hiding or output concealing activities (for instance, when the cost of both activities is
infinite), that the utility function is separable in consumption, (1−τ)pαe, and labor disutility,
c(e). From the household’s problem, the optimal labor supply is given by c′(e∗) = (1− τ)pα.
Let g(e) = c′(e), the optimal tax formula can be rewritten as:
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τ ∗ =
g−1 ((1− τ) pα)
g−1′ ((1− τ) pα) pα








Hence a price increases the optimal tax when g−1
′
is sufficiently large relative to g−1.
This will be the case when c′′(e) is sufficiently small. In this case, the elasticity of labor
supply decreases with the level of the price and the optimal tax increases.
Poll tax
The poll tax is a tax on households, where the activity being taxed is living permanently
in the village. Since migration is costly, the elasticity of living permanently in the village is
low, and the optimal tax on living in the village may be positive. This can be seen directly
from the optimal tax formula.
Incentives to increase the cost of concealing output
















The optimal tax increases in k. Hence the costlier it is to conceal output, the higher the


















Hence, R is increasing in k. If the bandit can manipulate k by using power to increase
the cost of concealing output, he will do so since this raises his tax revenue.
Mix of input and output taxes
Proposition: If either both the bandit and households are risk averse, or if both output and
input can be hidden, the optimal contract at extraction sites will be characterized by a mix
of input and output taxes. Furthermore, in the absence of risk aversion, but with imperfect
monitoring of inputs and outputs, the ratio of output to input taxes will be characterized
by the following relationship:





Under either risk aversion or imperfect observability (or both), if stationary bandits are
offering optimal contracts, they should provide a mix of input and output taxes. First, be-
cause the optimal contract is an insurance contract. Indeed, by levying a tax on output, the
bandit is absorbing the risk stemming from output realizations. On the contrary, there is no
risk transfer associated with a task on labor inputs, since labor supply is certain. The optimal
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contract will thus be characterized by a contract in which risk is bared disproportionately by
the actor with lower risk aversion. Second, even in the absence of risk aversion, when either
outputs or inputs are imperfectly monitored, the optimal contract will be characterized by
a mix of input and output taxes. Sheltering activities generate losses through two channels:
since they consist of hiding, they decrease the surplus available to tax; in addition, since
they are costly, they decrease the overall surplus.
Proof that the optimal tax on output is positive when households are risk averse. Con-
sider the one sector problem without sheltering activities:
max
t,τ
(t+ pατ) e = R
s.t. e = argmax{Eu ((1− τ) pα˜e− te)− c(e)}
where α is the mean of the volume productivity distribution. I use the fact that the con-
straint is a first order condition on the producer’s objective function. From the Lagrangian
first order conditions:
α =
E [u′′ ((1− τ) pα˜e− te) ((1− τ) pα˜− t) α˜e+ α˜u′ ((1− τ) pα˜e− te)]
E [u′′ ((1− τ) pα˜e− te) ((1− τ) pα˜− t) e+ u′ ((1− τ) pα˜e− te)]
Exploiting the definition of the Coefficient of relative risk aversion, this expression is equiv-
alent to:
E [u′ ((1− τ) pα˜e− t) (α˜− α)] = 0
Which implies:
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cov (u′ ((1− τ) pα˜e− t) (α˜)) = 0
This obtains only for τ = 1. Obviously, the optimal contract is characterized by the bandit
(principal) absorbing all the risk from production. Inserting τ = 1 on the program leads to
u′′ (−te) = −1
λ
where λ is the lagrange multiplier on the producer maximization incentive compatibility
constraint. This implies t < 0. The optimal contract if the bandit was risk neutral is one
in which the bandit provides payment to producers in order to work that does not depend
on output (a wage), and keeps all output. This assumes that the bandit is risk neutral. It
is straightforward to show in the same framework that when the bandit is risk averse, the
optimal contract will be a mix of input and ouptut taxes/payments.
I now consider sheltering activities exclusively and ignore risk. Consider the dual prob-
lem. To avoid dealing with interactions between sheltering and labor supply, I focus on a
problem with infinitely elastic labor supply. This allows me to extract the role of sheltering
activities, while leaving the qualitative conclusions unchanged. The proof exploits the sta-
tionary bandit’s revenue neutral change in τi and ti around the optimal choice of ei and Hi
for the household. The stationary bandit’s revenue neutral infinitesimal change in taxes in
sector i for a given ei is characterized by:
dR = 0 = dτi
[












= eipidτiE [−u(α˜i − αi)]− eidtiEu′
subsituting for dti from the last equation:
= eipidτiE [−u(α˜i − αi)]− piτi ∂Hi∂τi Eu′dτi
= pidτi
[
−τi ∂Hi∂τi Eu′ − cov(u′, α˜iei)
]
It is immediate to see that dEU > 0 if τi = 0 which implies that conditional on a tax
on inputs being optimal, it must be that there are also taxes on outputs in the case of
uncertainty.
I have already shown that dEU > 0 if τi. Let’s now show that dEU < 0 at τi = 1.
dEU = pidτi
[
−cov(u′, α˜iei)− ∂Hi∂τi Eu′
]
= −pidτi ∂Hi∂τi Eu′
= −piEu′ ∂Hi∂τi < 0
The first equality follows from the fact that in an interior solution, when τi = 1,
cov(u′, α˜i) = 0 (since at interior solutions for the hiding choice, α˜i where Hi = α˜iei are
of measure zero.)
The maximum τi therefore must be interior. A necessary condition for the maximum is






Derivation of the closed form formula for input and input taxes when both can be hid-
den. The proof of the optimal tax with imperfectly observable inputs and outputs exploits
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a revenue neutral change in ti and τi and selects amount the sect of revenue constant com-
binations the one that maximizes household welfare. As explained above, I focus on the
problem, given ei. The bandit’s revenue in sector i can be written as:




Total differentiation of the bandit’s revenue in sector i gives:
dR = dτi
[









The infinitesimal change in ti and τi is revenue neutral, given ei, by setting dRi = 0. Total
differentiation of the household’s utility given ei gives:
dU = pi (−αiei +Hi) dτi − eidti
Expressing dti by the equivalent revenue neutral dτi from the previous equation gives:
dU =
pidτi












Setting dU = 0 gives the revenue neutral combination that minimizes distortions:







= t∗i (αiei −Hi) G11piE11
Proceeding similarly, it is straightforward to derive the set of contracts as a function of the
distribution of risk aversion in this population and the observability of inputs and outputs.
Table B.1 characterizes the optimal contracts.
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Table B.1: Optimal contracts
Sheltering activities:
None τ = 1
t < 0
0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
0 ≤ τ ≤ 1
0 ≤ t ≤ 1
τ = 0
0 < t < 1
Outputs 0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
τ = 0
0 < t < 1
τ = 0
0 < t < 1
Inputs τ = 1
t < 0
0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
0 < τ < 1
t = 0
0 < τ < 1
t = 0
Inputs and outputs 0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
0 < τ < 1
0 < t < 1
Bandits Risk neu-
tral
Risk averse Risk neu-
tral
Risk averse
Households Risk averse Risk neutral
